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Abstract 
This dissertation defends the so-called 'agency-approach' to causation, which attempts to ground 
the causal relation in the cause's role of being a means to bring about its effect. The defence is 
confined to a conceptual interpretation of this theory, pertaining to the concept of causation as it 
appears in a causal judgement. However, causal judgements are not seen as limited to specific 
domains, and they are not exclusively attributed to human agents alone. As a methodological 
framework to describe the different perspectives of causal judgments, a method taken from the 
philosophy of information is made use of – the so-called 'method of abstraction'.  According to this 
method, levels of abstraction are devised for the subjective perspective of the acting agent, for the 
agent as observer during the observation of other agents’ actions, and for the agent that judges 
efficient causation. As a further piece of propaedeutic work, a class of similar (yet not agency-
centred) approaches to causation is considered, and their modelling paradigms – Bayesian networks 
and interventions objectively construed – will be criticised. The dissertation then proceeds to the 
defence of the agency-approach, the first part of which is a defence against the objection of 
conceptual circularity, which holds that agency analyses causation in causal terms. While the 
circularity-objection is rebutted, I rely at that stage on a set of subjective concepts, i.e. concepts that 
are eligible to the description of the agent’s own experience while performing actions. In order to 
give a further, positive corroboration of the agency-approach, an investigation into the natural 
origins and constraints of the concept of agency is made in the central chapter six of the 
dissertation. The thermodynamic account developed in that part affords a third-person perspective 
on actions, which has as its core element a cybernetic feedback cycle. At that point, the stage is set 
to analyse the relation between the first- and the third-person perspectives on actions previously 
assumed. A dual-aspect interpretation of the cybernetic-thermodynamic picture developed in 
chapter six will be directly applied to the levels of abstraction proposed earlier. The level of 
abstraction that underpins judgments of efficient causation, the kind of causation seemingly devoid 
of agency, will appear as a derived scheme produced by and dependent on the concept of agency. 
This account of efficient causation, the ‘objectification of agency’, affords the rebuttal of a second 
objection against the agency-approach, which claims that the approach is inappropriately 
anthropomorphic. The dissertation concludes with an account of single-case, or token level, 
causation, and with an examination of the impact of the causal concept on the validity of causal 
models.  
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1 Introduction 
This dissertation is the product of a research project whose goal was to deliver an examination of 
the concept of causation. I have understood that examination explicitly as conceptual, in contrast to 
providing an ontological account of causation, or searching for solutions concerning more specific 
problems of the epistemology of causation, which take the content of causation for granted to some 
extent. I had started the project in the way a classical project of conceptual analysis would have 
been conducted, by providing continuous refinements of an initial analysis that belongs to a certain 
class of approaches to causation, and to which one would have to commit at the outset. The 
continuous refinements would be due to the pressure put on an initial attempt of analysis by 
conceived counterexamples, which takes it for granted that there is a univocal intuition that 
provides the verdict in those cases, and whose results the theory is supposed to capture. Some 
philosophical literature on causation still proceeds like that, although it rarely refers to itself as 
’conceptual analysis‘. My method does not consist in a continuous refinement of some stage of the 
account in the light of examples that more and more inform the account. Instead, the initial attempt 
captures the idea very generally: when we apply the concept of causation we actually apply the 
concept of agency. As a further constraint of that identity, I add that applying the concept refers to 
its use in a judgment that can be made explicit. After this identity will have been defended against 
some typical objections, whereby it will be demonstrated that such an account is possible, a 
naturalistic turn is then taken in order to search for the most likely origins of the concept of agency, 
in order to show that the account is also plausible. But why turn to an explicitly conceptual 
understanding of an analysis of causation? The downsides are clearly that   
a) it looks like conceptual analysis as commonly understood, and therefore will most likely 
ultimately result in a failure (even more likely because causation is such a basic idea that 
seems to resist further analysis); 
b) the analysis, if explicitly understood in contrast to how its object is ontologically realised, 
might produce an unconstrained concept;  
c) the result might be subjective, which is again especially worrying for something supposedly 
’objective‘ like causation. 
But also the advantages are very obvious:  
1) The ontology and the epistemology of causation are hard problems. Humanity has been thinking 
about them for two and a half millennia now. By means of a distinct conceptual understanding 
of the question we might be able to break down the difficulty a little bit, by distinguishing certain 
aspects of causation from cognate concepts like regularities, laws of nature, determination, 
dependence, etc. Such an analysis is not unconstrained at all. If some specific and practical 
problems can be solved without addressing the ontological aspects, then these aspects maybe 
do not play such a crucial role for all of the aspects of causation, or maybe it does play a role 
only for one of the other concepts from the above family of concepts germane to causation.  
2) In the debate on causation, sometimes one has the impression of what Dennett (1991), in the 
context of phenomenology, refers to as a situation where ’controversies degenerate into desk-
thumping cacophony, with everybody talking past everybody else.’ Although it might sometimes 
be wrong-headed to proceed according to a clear-cut sequence of conceptualising the object of 
study in order to then go into the field and see whether the concept is vacuous or not, I think the 
least one could say about causation is that it would be worth mapping the conceptual territory 
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and taking serious at least the not obviously inconsistent interpretations of causation. Then one 
can properly address elements of this map and make a point more precisely, such as expounding 
a concern of internal coherence, or worries that the term is sound but has no corresponding 
object in nature. Also, the structure of such a map might tell a story of how the different ways of 
understanding causation are related to each other. Is it really the case that they are mutually 
incoherent? Are capacity-based approaches in conflict with manipulation theories, and do 
counterfactual approaches rule out nomological accounts? 
As it will be clear in the course of the chapters, I think of my account rather as reconstruction than 
analysis (although I see no substantial problem in referring to it by the term ‘analysis’). I would also 
feel comfortable with saying that analysis – analysing how the concept of causation is used – guides 
the conceptual reconstruction. As far as the ontological questions are concerned, the kind of 
examination that I am offering will have little to do with them. As an example, there is the question 
whether there are real causal capacities of objects, which give rise to observable regularities by 
virtue of the objects’ arrangements, or, reversing the explanatory direction, whether there are real 
causal laws of nature that merely make us ascribe certain dispositions to objects. My analysis will 
not cut that deep into such metaphysical issues.  
The account, although I spend a large section on non-circularity, also presupposes some 
realities that are sometimes discussed in the causal context. I will not analyse where the asymmetry 
of time stems from. Hence I will not expound the problem of whether the direction of time is 
independent of the direction of thermodynamic entropy and of causation or is just given by the way 
causal agents usually happen to reason. Besides that, I rely on the notion of ’dependence’ in the 
logical sense, and thus take it as a non-causal term that can be used to explain causal matters 
without danger of circularity. And I take the reality of thermodynamics for granted, according to 
which we are able to tell apart the unfolding of events in forward and in reversed playback while 
watching video footage. My analysis of causation will build on this unexplained phenomenon. All 
these assumptions can be attacked, however, and one could claim that causation plays a role in their 
grounding. But the role causation plays in my theory does not have this wide a range. It rather 
resembles a more ’light-weight’ concept like those expounded in Russell (1913), or more recently in 
Norton (2003) and also in Maudlin (2007). I treat it as an epiphenomenal concept that can be 
explained in terms of agency, and agency in turn can be embedded into a thermodynamic 
framework.  
Thus, while abstracting from some classically ontological questions, there is still a 
metaphysical backdrop that the account – my specific interpretation of the agency-approach to 
causation – fits in.  This metaphysical backdrop is a cybernetic view of the world, interpreted 
according to the dual-aspect theory, which refrains from giving precedence to either the subjective 
or the objective view of the world. According to this backdrop, I consider the world as a system 
whose entropy rises in time, and which comprises smaller systems, some of which are agents. The 
reality of these sub-systems as agents in this world is made possible by a loophole in physics that 
allows the unlikely phenomenon of acting by living organisms. Acting is part of a cybernetic feedback 
cycle (or control-circuit) that defines the identity of an agent, and the locality that the second law of 
thermodynamics imposes on that structure defines the boundaries of the agent. The material input 
into the cybernetic structure is free energy, and it is the asset that allows the agent to maintain its 
unlikely structure. But the input can also be informational feedback, in which case the agent learns 
something, which is tantamount to updating its model of its environment. The model, and the 
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contingent information that informs a particular output of the model, are necessary for acting 
sensibly and for exerting control. In an entropic world there is nothing like uninformed acting if the 
actions are supposed to yield a result. Since a single agent is not the only player operating in that 
entropic environment, other agents seeking their advantage also have to be taken into account in 
the agent’s model. When we see causes at work, we apply our conceptual scheme of acting, and 
causing becomes a derived concept that depends on acting; this is the central claim of the agency-
theory. I interpret the imposition of such a scheme as a partial imposition of the scheme of a 
complete cybernetic feedback cycle, whenever we apply it to objects in order to turn them into 
‘causes’ even when the objects are bereft of the capacity to process the feedback stemming from 
their imputed ‘actions’. 
When one analyses what an action is, one has to deal with the question of teleology. A 
natural teleology is provided by cybernetics by the idea of the purpose of self-preservation: the 
unlikely structure exists for maintaining the unlikely structure. This can be rephrased directly into a 
thermodynamic language. In fact, cybernetics and thermodynamics are really two sides of the same 
coin. I will show how this account of teleology, grounded in entropy reduction, can be used to 
ground a naturalised account of the concept of action, illustrated by the thought-experiment of 
Maxwell’s demon, which I will adapt in such a way that its agent completes a thermodynamic cycle.  
That cybernetic feedback is sometimes informational perfectly fits the purpose of taking into 
account the reality of higher-order utility: not everything we seek is physical entropy reduction. For 
example, if a chemist has discovered a substance of which she thinks it might be toxic, and she does 
not want to test it on other human beings or animals, then she might decide to consume a diluted 
quantity of that substance herself. It is not the well-being of her body that she seeks by doing so, but 
general knowledge, and the implications for possible, more serious future situations that involve 
that substance. This is the path to explain higher-order utility, while ultimately staying grounded in 
entropy reduction. Of course, it is not easy to prove the overall consistency of such an account of 
teleology, but it shows that it would be too easy to rebut this account on the basis of seeing no 
obvious connection to physical entropy. The issue is similar to money and real values: whereas 
money promises the prospect of being convertible into consumable goods, information promises to 
be convertible into adequate behaviour at some later time. (But our existential position makes it 
sometimes hard to say when and if this is going to happen.) Although information plays a central 
role in this thesis, the account is thus not a pan-informational one.  
 Next to these remarks concerning ontological aspects, there need to be some clarifications 
concerning the scope of the epistemology of causation considered in this thesis. Although the 
account is informed to a large extend by thermodynamic considerations, the account is not 
considered to be a contribution to the philosophy of science, or to the epistemology of causation. 
The scope of the thermodynamic chapter is limited to the second law of thermodynamics, which has 
a direct impact on the crucial question of whether a process is spontaneous or non-spontaneous. 
Since acting will be interpreted as bringing about proximal non-spontaneous processes, there is an 
immediate impact on action and its concept, too. But the particular causal knowledge that regiments 
appropriate interventions in specific physical domains or higher-order domains supervening on 
physics is not analysed. Again, doing so by-passes many epistemological questions which would have 
to be considered indispensable were the scope not limited to the conceptual question as I construe 
it in chapter 3.  
The thesis can be broadly distinguished into three parts. I will first select the agency-theory 
of causation as the one best fitting my purposes of conceptual reconstruction, and I will defend it 
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against the objection of circularity, postponing the objection of anthropomorphism. At that stage, I 
embrace subjectivity (and with that, to some extent, anthropomorphism). The level of abstraction 
correspondingly employs subjective variables. I will subsequently make a detour into the 
thermodynamics of actions and information processing, in order to find an explanation of where the 
concept of action plausibly comes from. After that excursion, I will have at my disposal further 
information governing the two other levels of abstraction, i.e. the one for judging other agents’ 
actions, and the derived level of abstraction to deal with efficient causation. These three levels of 
abstraction and their mutual relations are the basis for solving the conceptual problem of causation 
and action, and each of the three will be shown to be appropriate to answering specific problems 
connected to causal judgements. In the third part, I will apply the levels of abstraction to concrete 
examples of causal judgments, and subsequently, questions of causal structure. 
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2 Outline of the thesis 
In this chapter I provide a comprehensive outline of the argument of my thesis. There is also a 
concise summary in the last chapter that might help the reader further with grasping the overall 
structure of the argument. 
The conceptual problem of causation 
The thesis seeks to deliver an answer to the question of whether the notion of causation has an 
internal structure that can be disclosed. This question shall be understood explicitly at the 
conceptual level. I take it that answering this kind of question amounts to making sense of how an 
agent could explain a judgment in terms that do not directly involve the term that is to be analysed. 
What this means in the context of causation will be explained in more detail in chapter 3. The 
conceptual problem is distinguished sharply from both epistemological and ontological problems of 
causation. It does not concern the former class, since the account does not ask where the agent has 
the knowledge from that might be required to form the judgment, or whether the agent is justified 
in making the judgment. Likewise, the ontological problem of causation is a different one: the agent 
does not need to have an idea of what really connects an event A and an event B. Instead, the 
approach seeks an account of a minimal semantics of the causal relation. The argument draws 
heavily on the idea of perspectives and their impact on judgments. The philosophical tool used to 
describe different perspectives, namely ‘levels of abstraction’, will also be introduced in chapter 3, 
and the three levels relevant to the thesis will be introduced there. 
Why agency-account of causation 
After providing an overview of theories of causation, I will give, in section 1 of chapter 4, my 
arguments for why I decided to treat causation as a relation of difference-making. In section 2 I will 
analyse the characteristics of Bayesian networks, an important sub-class of difference-making 
theories. I will criticise their inherent structural feature of the causal Markov condition, as well as 
their objectively understood notion of intervention. I will then turn to the agency-theory of 
causation as the most plausible candidate for a successful conceptual analysis, as this notion is 
understood here.1 At that stage, the result is merely one from elimination of alternatives. The choice 
of agency then needs to be positively defended against two major objections: anthropocentricity 
and circularity.  
Defence of agency-approach  
The objection of anthropocentricity will be addressed later on, by the account of ’objectification‘ (in 
section 7.1). The objection of circularity will be dealt with in section 5.1. In that section I will provide 
an explicit account of how the agency-account is to be understood without ending up in a 
conceptual circle. According to this understanding of the agency-account, physical channels mediate 
causal influences through time and space, giving rise to physical observables, into which an agent 
can intervene. This intervention is (unlike interventions in what I call ’Objective Interventionism‘) not 
a causal relation between an agent and an observable, but is a free and direct action on its target. 
The idea behind ’free and direct action‘ on the one hand, and ’correlations between physical 
observables‘ on the other hand, is that the model the agent uses to evaluate her causal judgement 
                                                          
1 This approach looks as if we single out agency as the only viable theory of causation. But this singling out 
concerns only the eligibility of a theory for my specific approach to the conceptual analysis of causation, viz. 
the singling-out is relative to the question I ask. 
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(thereby delivering an answer to the conceptual question of causation) is the same model that 
excludes determining antecedents to the agent’s decision, which is  thus  rendered ’free‘ from the 
perspective of the agent. The model likewise excludes intermediate causal variables between the 
decision to act and the target of the intervention, therefore rendering the action ’direct‘. An 
analogous reasoning (section 5.2) is applied to the process of information transfer and an agent’s 
’becoming informed of a contingent matter of fact‘. This account has the flow of information depend 
on physical correlations, and has perception consist in a direct interaction with a physical signal 
carrying information about a prior event. At this stage, we have an account of a binary causal 
judgment that allows a certain level of analysis on the basis of agency and correlations of physical 
observables. The approach so far has been only logical; it was presupposed that the concepts of 
causation, agency, information, etc. were already given and meaningful, such that their dependence-
relations could be highlighted.  
Natural origins of the concept of agency 
An assumption made in section 5.1 implies that causal flow and informational flow are physically 
identical. Thus it seems plausible that information can cause something, and that this variant of 
causation has something to do with actions. Such a view would tie the informational perspective 
(looking at physical differences that allow inferences to what has happened at an earlier time) to the 
agency-perspective (considering differences that make some difference at a later time). Binding the 
two views together alongside their respective semantic aspects (semanticisation and direct action 
respectively), yields the composite concept of ’causation by information‘. If the agent explains her 
own action as an action, then the action is judged to be constrained by information, while the action 
turns into an event if the two processes of semanticisation of information and making a decision 
based on that information are supplanted by a physical model of efficient causation. The composite 
concept of causation by information, however, hinges on the two notions of semanticisation and 
direct action, which have, at that stage, a kind of dubious status, since they involve unobservable 
relata and depend on a first-person perspective. By looking at examples of natural action we will 
want to corroborate that actions are indeed informationally triggered, and whether this is 
necessarily so. 
There are thus several motivations to turn to an examination of the natural origins of agency 
and its concept, a lead that I will follow in section 6.2. These motivations are: 
1: We need to understand better the phenomenon of causation by information. 
2: We need a plausible account of concept acquisition, since an account of concept acquisition by 
simple ostension, as suggested by Huw Price and Peter Menzies, is wanting. One of the problems of 
ostension is to explain how an agent recognizes her behaviour as an action, rather than an event.  
3: We need a better account of how the notion of a ’free action‘, a notion that is required by the 
agency-account, could arise in the first place, and how it can be reconciled with actions that are 
constrained by information transfer – a seeming contradiction in terms. 
4: We need to get further information about agency. The previous logical analysis left us with quite a 
thin causal concept that relied on the notions of actions and observable correlations. We now need 
to gather further information about agency that could, in turn, also constrain our concept of 
causation. Also, we will want to reconcile the agency-account with accounts of causation that do not 
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incorporate a free agent’s action explicitly, and we will want to be able to cover causal judgments 
that go beyond the case of a binary causal connection between A and B. 
These four points motivate taking a closer look at biological agents and how they are constrained in 
their acting. This, in turn, leads to an excursion into the physics (thermodynamics in particular) of 
acting in sub-sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3. According to the stance of physics, all biological agents have to 
regularly bring about non-spontaneous processes to maintain their structure through time, among 
achieving other, higher-order goals. I will consider bringing about non-spontaneous processes as 
goals which acting typically seeks to achieve. After expounding the importance of that idea for the 
further course of the argument, the remainder of section 6.2 will concern the results of asking the 
questions that correspond to motivation 1 to 4, as given above. An overview over the respective 
results is given by the paragraphs below: 
Concerning 1: Causation by information is first introduced as a composite concept. If an agent 
interacts with a signal that carries some meaning for the agent, this prompts the agent to take 
action. Seen from the first-person perspective, there is nothing surprising in that concept. But to 
judge in purely observational terms whether an informationally triggered action has taken place is a 
harder question. How do we tell that it is the information carried by the physical signal and not the 
physical features of that signal that do the causing? Maxwell’s demon will serve as a paradigmatic 
model of an agent, and the corresponding scenario as a model for agency. The sorting operations, 
which the demon performs, are basic, binary decisions resulting in an observable intervention into 
the physical world. It will be shown that these actions are necessarily informationally constrained, 
and that the information constraining the action is necessarily physically embodied. There are two 
ways to interpret what we see when the demon is performing the work: either the demon abides by 
laws of efficient causation, or by a computational rule, which affords an interpretation according to 
the concept of causation by information. The explanation resulting from these considerations will 
serve as a general template to explain the phenomenon of causation by information in observational 
terms. 
Concerning 2: The thermodynamics of informationally constrained acting will show that there is a 
strong pressure for biological entities to develop the concept of agency (and then, according to the 
hypothesis, causation), in order to coordinate actions or plan future actions from an internal model. 
Whereas the necessity of informed anti-entropic acting already applies to the lowest of biological 
agents, higher-level biological agents soon have to incorporate information about other agents and 
their doings into their internal models, such that the agent’s competitiveness is not just limited to 
entropic environments, but extends to environments in which different agents compete for limited 
resources. Such more complex scenarios require acting to be informed just like entropic 
environments do.  
Concerning 3: The preceding sections will have explained how information can, at least to some 
extent, determine behaviour, while they still allow for the construal of an action as an action, rather 
than an event. As opposed to this, a ’free action‘ is a realisation of several possibilities by an agent 
not constrained by preceding conditions. In the present framework, choices will be interpreted as 
possibly constrained by determinants; however, these determinants are not represented in the 
agent’s own internal model. Therefore, the free decision has to be construed as unconstrained in the 
agent’s model.  
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Concerning 4: Considering actions in a naturalised context requires a complementary partitioning of 
a considered space into agents and their immediate environment. Entropy reduction can be brought 
about only at the cost of the environment. This constitutes the fact that causation depends on local 
rather than global factors. Next to that, the asymmetry of an agent’s action is reflected in the 
explanatory asymmetry of thermodynamic processes of different entropic order. Thirdly, it will have 
been learned that information needs to be represented physically at every stage of its processing, 
which can be proved by the counterexample of Maxwell’s demon against the second law of 
thermodynamics, which can be conceived unless the assumption of physical representation is made. 
Since an agent is physically limited, this also means that an agent can only represent a limited 
number of causal laws. In order to reuse empirical knowledge, which knowledge of specific causal 
relations usually is, the agent needs to connect past with future instances of a causal connection 
through reference classes. For the conceptual (but not the ontological) problem, ’A causes B‘ 
therefore connects types A and B, not tokens. Given the right reference classes, a causal connection 
therefore gives rise to observable regularities. A second argument for the regularity of causal 
relations, understood at the conceptual level, will be the reflective or prospective, and therefore 
abstract, context, in which we evaluate causal relations.  
Connotations of agency and other constraints on the concept 
At this stage (section 6.3), after completing the detour via thermodynamics, we will have gathered 
further evidence for how to evaluate a causal claim based on agency. The first set of constraints we 
can now assume to hold corresponds to what is sometimes called the ‘connotations’ or ‘platitudes’ 
of causation: an A in ‘A causes B’ is a local factor (locality of causation), the causal relation is 
asymmetrical, and there is regularity in causal relations (causation connects types rather than 
tokens). That the account operates at the type level, rather than the token level, is to be taken in the 
conceptual sense that pervades this framework, not in the ontological sense. That means the deeper 
metaphysical question of whether causation really connects either local tokens or universals is not 
addressed. The regularity of causation requires the agent to recognize which causally relevant 
properties are ’instantiated‘ (again not in the ontological sense, but relative to its internal model of 
evaluation). Observable properties must allow an inference to the presence of causally relevant 
properties (for example: I observe the typical form, colour, size, etc. of what I take to be a stone, in 
order to infer that I could use that object to make a glass plate shatter by throwing it against it). The 
more informed concept of acting, and, by extension, causing, can also be used to evaluate 
judgments that construe actions as information-constrained. In addition, we will be able to make 
sense of the role of ‘free action’, which appears as an auxiliary concept in the agency-formula, and 
which had previously been understood only intuitively.  
Causal transitivity, extensional identity, and objectification of agency 
Up until that stage, we have a conceptual apparatus in place that allows analysing judgments 
concerning actions and binary causal relations at the type level. We can also make sense of 
judgments that concern informationally constrained actions, reconciling the two seemingly 
contradictory aspects of an action as both determined by information and, at the same time, free. 
With this, the level of expressiveness of causal judgments covered by the account is still quite 
confined. To extend it, we must first accommodate causal transitivity.  Since causal judgments of the 
form ‘A causes B’ are, on the basis of this account, to be understood on type level and in a 
probabilistic sense, an agent can make the judgment ‘A causes C’, on the basis of his judgments ‘A 
causes B’ and ‘B causes C’, if the Bs are successfully identified. In a causal chain ‘A -> B -> C’, the B 
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has a dual role. It follows depending on A if we evaluate the ‘A -> B’-part, and it occurs 
spontaneously if we evaluate the ‘B -> C’-part. The question naturally arises how and why this 
seemingly contradictory way of evaluating B does not instil a contradiction into the real course of 
events. A similar problem can arise even with judgments concerning our own actions, previously 
considered free and now considered determined in the light of new evidence. Three different levels 
of abstraction, as introduced in chapter 3, can now replace the talk concerning different 
perspectives employed until then. It will be seen that the aforementioned, seeming contradictions 
are in fact no genuine contradictions. I will call the proposed account, a compromise between the 
objectivity and the agency-dependence of causation, the ‘objectification of agency’, which will rebut 
the anthropomorphism objection against the agency-approach (section 7.1). 
Token level causation, the structure of causation, conclusion 
With the objections of circularity and of anthropomorphism the main obstacles of a conceptual 
reconstruction are out of the way. Besides the defence against these major objections, a positive 
account has been delivered that corroborates the assumption that causal judgments might be 
agency-judgments. But some further problematic cases have to be accounted for. A problematic 
issue for an agency-account seems to be the token level case, ’a caused b’. In the general case, an 
agent’s interventions can have varying success, which is possibly due an incompletely observed 
causal background, or possibly due to genuine indeterminacy inherent in the causal scenario. In such 
cases of varying success, every intervention is merely a chance-raiser of the effect. In section 7.1.1 I 
will look at two different ways of how probabilistic causation can be interpreted. One scenario 
(genuine indeterminacy) has all causal contributors in place and then determines the factor of 
remaining indeterminacy, which will be more or less biased by the setting of all the causal 
contributors; the other scenario (epistemic indeterminacy) takes the cause in question to make a 
difference to the effect deterministically while some of the other possible causal contributors are 
left unobserved. I will then demonstrate that the conceptual problem of causation can be addressed, 
i.e. sense can be made of judgments concerning such causal claims related to particular past events, 
without having to clarify which one of the two scenarios is real. I will also show agency’s role in 
analysing causal claims that seem to preclude applicability of the conceptual apparatus of agency. 
The following sections (7.1.2 to 7.1.4) all address further specific problems of accounts that rely on 
chance-raising and difference-making, and thus challenge the agency-theory as well. Following the 
defence of the agency-theory against these problematic cases, I will look in section 7.2 at the impact 
of the concept of causation as derived from agency to questions concerning the structure of valid 
causal models. Rather than being a necessary condition, the modular models complying with the 
causal Markov condition will have to be regarded conceptually as a particular sub-class of a more 
general concept of causation. Therefore, a similar consideration like the one relating epistemic and 
metaphysical indeterminacy applies with respect to the structural question: modular, but also 
certain non-modular systems (level invariant systems) count as causal systems. I conclude with the 
assessment that the agency-account has been defended successfully against the major objections, if 
its interpretation is confined to the conceptual question of grounding causal judgments. 
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3 What is causation – the conceptual question 
There is a certain sense in which one can understand the ‘conceptual problem of X’. According to the 
concept-as-abilities-view (see Margolis (2014)), having the concept of X implies the ability to judge 
correctly that the concept of X applies in a specific situation. Accounting for why it applies, however, 
implies that the concept can be analysed in terms of other concepts.  
To give an example of my reading of this problem, I can prompt an interlocutor to account 
for why she has denoted a geometrical figure, which is visible to both of us right now, by the word 
’square’. A possible answer might be: ‘Because my concept of a square implies having a rectangle 
with equal sides, and it seems that this figure in question satisfies these conditions.’ 
A concept can apply to an object in a narrow sense, like a tangible thing, or to something 
more abstract like a relation, as it is the case with ‘causation’. On this understanding of the 
conceptual problem, there is often no direct ontological commitment involved in analysing concepts, 
since the conditions that make the application of a concept viable could be devoid of such 
commitments. For example, this is often the case with operational definitions of concepts. The 
ontological commitment might, of course, be established indirectly, by virtue of the concepts that 
analyse the analysandum. Some philosophers writing on the subject of causation, who want to 
highlight this aspect of analysing causation, denote that problem by ’semantic problem’ instead of 
‘conceptual problem’.2 
The concept-as-abilities-view, as far as the ontology of concepts is concerned, combined 
with the classical theory (again, see Margolis (2014)), as far as the structure of concepts is 
concerned, comes closest to the understanding of concepts needed to follow the argument of my 
thesis. The argument could also be thought of as consisting in the bet that the classical, or 
definitional, theory of concepts applies to the concept of causation, such that it can be analysed 
according to a set of constituents. Of course, the problems of such an approach are well known (see 
Sloman (2005)). I will address these worries later on in the thesis (e.g. in 6.3.1). 
For now, another aspect is crucial, and this concerns the interpretation of the conceptual 
problem as distinct from ontological and epistemological questions, so here is another example 
illustrating this distinction: if my interlocutor has made a judgment involving the word ’dog’, and if I 
prompt her to explain the use of that word, I can expect to learn something about my interlocutor’s 
concept of a dog, such as ‘social carnivorous animal’, ‘barks when in distress’, ’lives in a kennel in the 
backyard’, etc. Concepts of an object can vary across different agents. The concept of a dog might be 
more or less fine-grained, with more or fewer conditions conjoined by conjunctive or disjunctive 
conditions. As will be made clear when analysing the concepts of ‘causation’ and ‘becoming 
informed’ in their respective sections, the conceptual problem is to be distinguished both from the 
epistemological and the ontological problem. Sticking with the dog example, at this problem-level I 
am not concerned with whether the agent’s dog-categorisation is actually correct, or how the agent 
might have verified that the conditions of dog-ness are satisfied by a candidate animal. This would 
concern the epistemological problem. Likewise, the conceptual question does not address what 
really makes an object a dog, whether dogs are instantiations of Platonic ideas, or examples of 
idealisations of survival strategies in certain ecological niches. What the question does address is the 
                                                          
2 In the literature on causation, both expressions can be observed to be used for the same thing, e.g. James 
Woodward usually talks about the ‘semantic problem’ (e.g. on page 38 in Woodward (2003b)), whereas Dowe 
(2000) uses the term ‘conceptual’; both authors contrast this with epistemological and metaphysical problems 
of causation. 
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list of criteria that the agent thinks an object satisfies to comply with a corresponding concept. 
Making these criteria explicit can serve as an explanation of a corresponding judgment.  
 As far as causation as an object of inquiry is concerned, the answer to the question that 
prompts an epistemic agent to account for his judgment ‘A causes B’ might be: ‘I think I could 
manipulate a B via an A, but not vice versa.’ In fact, a very similar understanding of causation is 
defended by this thesis, but the analysis of causation by means of manipulation is understood at a 
conceptual level only. Again, in contrast to giving meaning, or content, to a causal judgment on the 
basis of other concepts, which is how I understand the conceptual analysis of causation, one can also 
ask how the agent has verified its judgment.3 One could ask what methodology was used to disclose 
the causal structure that the judgment refers to. I consider these problems as belonging to the 
epistemology of causation. One can also search for the truth-maker of the judgment. What 
establishes the seeming connection between A and B, and is this connection a kind of entity, an 
element of our ontology that best explains reality? These are classical, ontological questions of 
causation, which are again not addressed. 
Hence I want to provide a conceptual analysis that is ontologically non-committed, and even 
leaves room for error in a causal judgment. This approach has the obvious disadvantage of yielding 
weaker claims than those resulting from a theory that makes definite assertions concerning the 
ontology of causation, or recommends a methodology for disclosing causal structure. But the 
conservative nature of the approach also has advantages, the biggest of which would be the 
clarification of what is actually meant by ‘analysis of causation’. Defining a clear-cut conceptual level 
of the problem of analysing causation enables us first to set up a list of features and constraints that 
our concept has to satisfy in order to qualify as a possible object of inquiry. For example, this could 
be ‘causation = correlation plus X’, with X as some kind of symmetry-breaker. Then, the second step 
would be to find empirical evidence for the existence of such an object. The concept might turn out 
to be vacuous; it might also turn out to have objective counterparts in reality. The concept of 
causation can be thought of as comprising a family of related, smaller concepts, which satisfy 
different constraints but all equally qualify as subspecies of causation in general. Such a web of 
concepts would be similar to the inventory of an ontology in a Quinean sense, but allows elements 
that one might want to exclude from such an ontology, like relational objects. It also permits 
vacuous concepts that are clearly not part of a scientific ontology in a Quinean sense. 
Analysing causation in terms of manipulability yields prima facie an operational 
characterisation of causation. This circumvents certain concerns that might be raised against the 
approach of explicitly distinguishing conceptual from metaphysical analysis that is more ontologically 
committed. For example, Quine (1960) asks whether such a clear-cut approach is possible if we 
investigate questions concerning definite scientific objects like neutrinos. If we were to find out that 
processes involving neutrinos actually feature particles with a mass, does that mean we have not 
been engaged with investigations into the properties of neutrinos, given that we had defined 
neutrinos, our object of investigation, as particles without mass beforehand? Or have we found out 
that neutrinos do, or at least can, have a mass? But causation understood conceptually in 
manipulative terms seem to be immune against these concerns, since empirical findings only 
concern how the means-end-relationship is established, not the conceptual nature of that 
connection. Similarly, a worry of a conflation of primary and secondary intension (Putnam (1973), 
                                                          
3 Henceforth I will refer to the agent (in the general, including non-human case) in the grammatically neutral 
gender form unless the context suggests human agency. 
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see also Chalmers (1996)) does not apply, and therefore the worry that causation is a rigid 
designator that might undermine what we have thought of as the essence of our object of 
investigation. The corresponding problem here is that the manipulability aspect of causation relates 
to the metaphysics of causation like the dispositional features of water relates to H2O. Water’s 
dispositions enable an investigator to identify her object of investigation via its primary intension. 
But once water’s chemical structure, its secondary intension, has been determined, the meaning of 
‘water’ is fixed.  
There are two ways to respond to this worry. Either causation, if understood manipulatively, 
is seen merely as an instrumental concept that has only primary intension. Then, again, empirical 
information only adds further information without putting in doubt the starting point of the analysis. 
This is the template of the objection in Searle (1983) to the twin-earth thought experiment. But even 
if there is a secondary intension involved in that structural concept, there is reason for saying that 
whatever ontologically constrains agency, in the sense of a secondary intension, constrains 
causation, too, but via agency, causation’s primary intension. 
Two other worries that I would like to obviate right from the start concern the idea of 
‘unconstrained analysis’ (even if the analysis is confined to the primary intension) and, closely 
related, the concern of subjectivity. First, I do not see that this kind of conceptual analysis is 
unconstrained in a pathological sense. Although it is true that an ontological underpinning of a 
causal judgment is a stronger constraint, the idea of a successful manipulation is constrained to 
some extent, and grounded in experience, although judging a manipulation that takes place merely 
hypothetically satisfies a corresponding constraint only in a qualified way. Similarly, it would be 
unfair to say that causal connections, construed merely as relations of means and end, and 
established by links whose nature we completely abstract from, depend only on an agent’s belief. It 
is true that the judgment concerning a causal link depends on an agent’s belief, but implicit in that 
belief is the idea that such a connection might at some point be verified or has in fact been verified 
by the agent uttering the judgment. 
That the approach of distinguishing a conceptual and an ontological level of analysing 
causation (maybe in contrast to other objects of investigation that do not allow this clear-cut 
distinction) really is expedient can be shown by two conceptual distinctions within the family of 
causal concepts. One contrastive pair is the distinction between two types of probabilistic causation. 
On the one hand, there is in a causal connection a kind of genuine, observer-independent 
uncertainty about whether an effect will happen given that the cause, and all other factors that 
determine the causal background, have been fixed.  On the other hand, there is an alternative, 
epistemic interpretation of the uncertainty about whether the effect will be triggered. The observer 
happens to be ignorant of the determining additional factors or unable to measure them correctly 
(section 7.1.1). Another contrastive pair concerns modular causation and causation that is merely 
level invariant (section 4.2). We see an ongoing debate concerning both of these issues (Hausman 
and Woodward (1999), Cartwright (2002), Hausman and Woodward (2004); Steel (2005), Drouet 
(2008)), but it is often unclear whether a claim like ‘Causal relations satisfy the causal Markov 
condition’ is meant normatively, viz. is meant to make recommendations about what makes a causal 
model a good causal model, or whether the claim is to be understood much stronger, viz. that in 
nature there is no causation that does not comply with the causal Markov condition. As far as both 
contrastive pairs are concerned, my approach makes the recommendation to first map the 
conceptual territory and assess which concepts of causation are available. These should be checked 
for inner consistency and be assigned adequate names. Then it depends on empirical findings 
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whether these concepts are vacuous or have natural representatives. Whereas this procedure seems 
to work well for the debate on how to interpret probabilistic causation, either epistemically or 
metaphysically (after all, none of the two concepts is outrageously inconsistent), the debate on 
modularity and the causal Markov condition is for some curious reason not so clear-cut.  
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3.1 Levels of abstraction 
A useful method from the philosophy of information (Floridi (2010)) is the method of levels of 
abstraction, which posits that it is desirable to stick consistently with a conceptual scheme according 
to which a problem is addressed. In particular, the answer to a question should be given in a way 
that corresponds to the question asked. This, of course, does not preclude the approach from 
tackling a problem in an iterative way that changes the focus of an investigation, and asking new 
kinds of questions in the light of new evidence. But such a cycle of rephrasing questions should be 
made explicit. Levels of abstractions are used in this thesis to express in a semi-formal fashion what 
can more colloquially be called ‘perspectives’ or ‘contexts’. 
To first provide an example of where some debates of causation sometimes take a wrong 
direction, one can point to the fact that it is often difficult to tell confidently at which level of 
ontological commitment a theory operates. When Nancy Cartwright says that nature can assign 
probability distributions for observables of a causal model in an unconstrained fashion (in Cartwright 
(1993); see also section 4.2.4.1 for further details on this issue), she is obviously starting from a 
different set of assumptions than the defenders of the causal Markov condition. For example, she 
might be implying that, from general assumptions about causation, there is no constraint intrinsic to 
our notion of causation that necessitates the causal Markov condition to hold. In other words, 
nature might assign probabilities in a certain way, but we cannot expect that to happen a priori. 
Defenders of the causal Markov condition likewise often fail to argue in a way that makes it 
transparent whether they are assuming that all systems naturally behave in accordance with that 
condition and equate these systems with ‘causal’ systems, or whether the causal Markov condition 
is inherently given by the concept of causation.  
As a second example, a similar instance of talking past each other can be observed in 
Woodward (2003a) and Pearl (2003), which shows that the two authors seem to have a very 
different understandings of what it means to ‘define causation’, without, however, making it clear 
what a satisfying definition consists in.4 
Levels of abstraction are an attempt to circumvent these unnecessary problems, and a 
relatively convenient one. To provide an overview of the gist of the method of abstraction, I will 
briefly summarize the account given in Floridi (2008). Floridi devises ‘six key concepts necessary to 
explain the method of abstraction, namely, typed variable, observable, level of abstraction, 
behaviour, moderated level of abstraction, and gradient of abstraction.’  
 A typed variable is a conceptual entity, which can be seen as the atomic building block of 
description of some system under investigation. The property of being typed is meant to 
specify exactly which kinds of value the variable can assume. For example, this prevents 
delivering a qualitative description of some feature of an object, when a quantitative 
description is required. 
 Being an observable adds the feature of being not only a typed variable, but an interpreted 
one. This is supposed to prevent confusions like those arising from different units of 
measurement, like imperial vs. metric, which can entail that sameness in values of variables 
results in different specifications of the described system. 
 A level of abstraction is a set of observables eligible to model a system under investigation. 
                                                          
4 This impression is further corroborated by Woodward’s reference to Pearl’s online discussion with readers, 
especially with regards to the question ’Has causality been defined?’, which Pearl answers in the affirmative. 
The page can now be found at http://bayes.cs.ucla.edu/BOOK-2K/singpurwalla.html 
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The definition of observables, or setting up the level of abstraction (henceforth also abbreviated by 
‘LoA’), is only the first step in studying a system. The second step consists in deciding what 
relationships hold between the observables. 
 The behaviour of a system, at a given LoA, is defined to consist of a predicate whose free 
variables are observables at that LoA. The substitutions of values for observables that make 
the predicate true are called the system behaviours. Behaviour can also regiment relations 
between observables of a LoA. In some cases, the relations between observables can be 
functions, such that, when one observable assumes a certain value, another observable’s 
value is uniquely determined by that assumption. 
 A moderated LoA is defined to consist of a LoA together with a behaviour at that LoA. 
 Finally, a gradient of abstraction regiments relations between the observables of different 
LoAs. For example, two LoAs can share some observables between each other, while 
describing other features of a system by exclusively maintained observables. The two special 
cases are ‘disjoint’ and ‘nested’ gradients of abstraction. Disjoint gradient of abstractions 
consist of LoAs of disjoint sets of observables, while nested gradients of abstractions afford a 
hierarchy of LoAs where each value in a more abstract LoA is preserved in a more fine-
grained description at the LoA following in the hierarchy.  
A philosophical example Floridi provides as a possible application of the method of abstraction is a 
gradient of abstraction consisting of the Cartesian res extensa and res cogitans. This is an example of 
a disjoint LoA. Another example is the set of Kantian antinomies – seeming contradictory 
statements, for each of which a proof can be delivered. Again, the antinomies can be shown to arise 
from disjoint LoAs, within which the proof proceeds correctly according to the rules of logic (the 
behaviour of the LoA). The relativity of the result – relative to the choice of LoA – correctly 
represents Kant’s idea that our scheme of reason is inadequate to tackle absolute metaphysical 
questions. 
 As far as the two aforementioned examples from the philosophical debate on causation are 
concerned, it seems it would help to specify whether the causal Markov condition is supposed to 
govern models or real systems. If the first were the case, then the causal Markov condition is part of 
the behaviour of the level of abstraction chosen to model a causal system, and therefore a prior 
constraint. In the second of the above examples, one should specify what a good definition consists 
in, viz. how the variables of the conceptual explanation LoA are supposed to relate to each other. 
E.g., eliminative, contextual, indirect definitions would all allow for different relations of terms. 
What I will borrow from the method of abstraction are two ideas: first, we have to make 
clear what kind of answer we have to expect from the kind of conceptual analysis that I am 
proposing. For example, in the previous section I have made clear in which way I abstract from 
ontological assumptions, and therefore from providing truth-makers for causal claims. Secondly, it 
can be useful to choose different kinds of levels of abstraction for different purposes. When this is 
done, the relation between the different levels of abstraction should be made clear, in order to 
prevent confusion. 
I will show that the agency-theory of causation can be acquitted of the objection of 
conceptual circularity and conceptual regress, by showing that raising the objection involves what 
corresponds to an inappropriate use of the method of levels of abstraction. I’ll show a similar misuse 
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in the context of information, since the two cases, causation by action, and becoming informed via 
information transfer, are analogous (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). 
Given below is a preliminary list of problems which arise if incommensurable levels of 
abstraction are applied to the same situation and the results are compared without referring to the 
correct level of abstraction that yielded the result: 
 An action (or more generally, an event) seems to be spontaneous versus seems to be caused 
mechanistically 
 An action seems to immediately influence its target versus appears to affect its target via 
causal intermediaries 
 An event seems to be triggered by information about a past matter of fact versus seems to 
be mechanistically triggered by the physical properties of a signal, bypassing any possible 
semanticisation of the information 
 An intermediate event B in a causal chain A causes B causes C has contradictory properties 
of being dependent on a causal predecessor versus occurring spontaneously 
 There is an apparent over-determination in mental causation, when we posit both mental 
and physical causal antecedents 
3.1.1 Levels of abstraction for causal judgments 
I claim that correct application of the method of levels of abstraction can resolve the seeming 
contradictions mentioned in the previous section. To indicate the solution, I will briefly anticipate my 
results. I am going to use three different levels of abstraction, which correspond to different 
perspectives of looking at causal phenomena:  
LoA1 is defined as the level of abstraction that is used for a judgment that concerns one’s 
own action. It posits an absolutely direct and either uncaused (section 5.1), or informationally 
caused (section 6.1) action, and an indirect effect of that action. Information addressee, acting 
agent, and epistemic agent (the one forming the causal judgment) are identical. 
This first-person LoA allows for an occurrence of an action either in a completely 
unconstrained way or in such a way that the action occurs as constrained by information whose 
relevance is relative to the agent’s goal. The action cannot be regarded as coerced by an efficient 
cause, in which case the event fails to qualify as an action. Also part of this LoA, since we are 
considering causal relations, is a variable E, which references an event external to the action itself. E 
is the event indirectly brought about by the action, which is tantamount to being caused.  
LoA2 is defined as the level of abstraction for describing causation by information (see 
section 6.1) when judging another agent’s doings. LoA2 employs an objective perspective; now the 
epistemic agent is not identical with the acting agent as at LoA1. Also as opposed to LoA1, which 
features unanalysed semanticisation of information, LoA2 needs a structural account for why a piece 
of information itself can sometimes be considered as the cause of an event, rather than the physical 
signal merely carrying that information. It does require some account of identity, e.g. identity as 
persistence, too. But at this level of abstraction, the identity needs to span the roles of information 
addressee, acting agent, and beneficiary of feedback (which can be physical or referential) 
originating from the action. This is the case if the agent embodies a cybernetic feedback cycle. The 
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required notion of identity across time makes Markovian models insufficiently expressive5 and 
therefore incompatible with this LoA.  
LoA3 is an objective view that does not feature and does not need a concept of identity of 
any sorts. Accordingly, this is the LoA that is concerned with depicting efficient, or Markovian6, 
causation (Markovian LoA, ‘LoA3’). What corresponds to immediate action at LoA1 is at LoA3 an 
(uncaused) assumption of a value of the cause-variable, which is tantamount to ‘wiping out 
equations’ (see section 4.2) for the special case of modular systems. Variables of LoA3 are 
instantiations of causally relevant properties (see chapter 6.3).    
LoA3 covers, in its simplest form, efficient causation in the sense of a simple dependence of 
an effect on a hypothetical action by the agent who is also the one judging the action. My 
interpretation of the agency-account of causation is tantamount to saying that this LoA evaluates 
binary causal propositions in the same way as LoA1 does, except for dropping the identity condition 
of LoA1. Application of LoA1 gives meaning to a judgment that concerns efficient causation involving 
two variables. Much of 6.3 and subsequent sections deal with extending this LoA, such that more 
complex causal models can be constructed. By adding further constraints to causation, different sub-
concepts of causation can be constructed, which all retain the basic notion provided by the first-
person LoA. 
Between these LoAs there are relations (explained in more detail in chapter 7). LoA1 can 
always be applied to evaluating a binary LoA3 claim. LoA3 can always be applied to LoA2, since no 
matter whether information is disseminated or an efficient (non-informational) cause is arbitrarily 
set, the repetitive measurement of an effect will give rise to a regularity (since regularity will be 
shown in section 6.3 to be a necessary characteristic of causation). However, doing so changes the 
explanatory focus, and the kind of causal explanation that LoA3 delivers might be in conflict with the 
expectation of an interlocutor that asks for an explanation according to LoA2. 
3.1.2 The limits of the method of levels of abstraction 
The method is useful for designing concepts, when concepts are seen as intimately connected with 
models of evaluating judgmental claims, but there is no deeper ontological import in the way the 
method of abstraction is applied in the course of my analysis. I give two examples that show the 
limits of the approach.  
First, as it will be seen in sections 6.1.1 and 6.2.6, an interesting question is whether an 
intrinsic property of a physical signal or its relational property of carrying information is the 
explanatorily relevant property for explaining observed behaviour. My suggestion will be to look at 
different ways of representing the information internally, such that for a specific representation a 
suitable computation needs to be implemented by an agent in order to extract the matter of fact 
that determines the adequacy of the agent’s subsequent behaviour. If the signal’s representation is 
arbitrary, it cannot be causally relevant; instead it will merely be a reference to the causally relevant 
property, which is realised elsewhere. But the arbitrariness of the representation can only be shown 
by comparing an ensemble of agents, or, alternatively, a class of similar situations (see 6.2.2), 
therefore it depends on an extrinsic property of the signal whether the agent processes the 
                                                          
5 Since Markovian models like Bayesian networks forbid cyclic structures in graphs, identity has to be asserted 
extra-logically by a corresponding interpretation of the variables involved. There is no symbol for and no 
relevance of identity across time in Markov chains. 
6 Markovian means memoryless causation in this context, in contrast to the causation via referring back to a 
past event, which LoA2 depicts. Thus, I am not implying with that term that the full implications of the causal 
Markov condition are satisfied, if LoA3 is applied. 
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information semantically or merely seems to do so. The latter will be the case if the agent’s internal 
mechanism is configured in such a way that the right response to the causally relevant matter of fact 
is brought about, but no semantic processing of information ever happens – in other words, if the 
agent could not represent the relevant matter of fact by other means than those given by the rigid 
way the internal mechanism is wired. If we build an artificial intelligence and the ethical question 
arises whether the intelligence works rather like a mindless toaster or rather like us, the scheme 
resulting from applying the method of abstraction would not settle the matter since it seems that we 
would need an intrinsic, not an extrinsic criterion of being semantically enabled. In other words, the 
policy-maker raising the question would hardly be satisfied by the claim that an answer to his 
question depends on how to look at the problem, which is, according to the method of abstraction, 
relative to a LoA. At least such an answer will be as unsatisfying as a pan-psychic account of toasters 
or a materialistic account of how human beings process information. Nevertheless, in the section 
concerning concept acquisition I will rely on the scheme given by LoA2, but in the sense of a 
necessary, not a sufficient criterion for the successful acquisition of the concept of agency. 
 The second problematic use of the method of abstraction concerns the reduction of entropy, 
crucial to my suggested model of a paradigmatic action. Reducing uncertainty concerning a 
contingent matter of fact can be modelled by reduction of informational entropy, and informational 
entropy in turn allows for using infinitely many different levels of abstraction (e.g. measuring the 
height of a person with arbitrary precision). But this knowledge can refer to physical matters of fact 
that are independent of how we model the concerned system. In particular, the physical entropy of 
a system relative to its surroundings determines whether certain thermodynamic processes are 
possible. For example, whether the wheels of a perpetual motion machine will turn by themselves 
does not depend on our way of modelling the machine, but on its absolute state. This holds true as 
well for the general background assumption about our physical world, i.e. the continuous rise of 
entropy. 
The two problems are similar in that in these cases we do not seem to be free to choose a 
level of abstraction in order to get to the core of the problem; rather the problems seem to be 
‘absolute’. Regarding the point of ‘absolute questions’, I therefore do not concur with Floridi’s point 
that these kinds of questions cannot be meaningfully asked.   
As an example that shows the limit of levels of abstraction (see Floridi (2008)), consider the 
question whether a software agent can be deemed autonomous, interactive, and adaptive, if its 
observable behaviour has these features. This example is discussed in Floridi (2010), section 4.1. 
According to Floridi’s account, once the code of the software agent were revealed, it would thereby 
be shown that it has been ‘simply following rules’ and the ascribed features would have to be 
jettisoned. This might be enough to choose an appropriate ‘stance’, in a Dennettian sense, in order 
to describe the system, but does not inform us about how the system experiences itself. A solution 
that purely relies on levels of abstraction turns on the unwarranted assumption that an agent is free 
to impose a level of abstraction concerning its own state. I would even claim that these problems 
generally show the limits of purely informational approaches to science or metaphysics – at least if 
information is understood, as in this thesis, as a relational (or referential) notion. 
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4 Theories of causation 
There are currently many different causal theories that are still being developed further. I’ll present 
two different ways of mapping the theories, in order to get an overview of them. The first approach 
will be called ‘vectorial’ and describes a more abstract view, which maps causal theories by means of 
their properties, according to which they can be distinguished from each other. The approach that is 
more orientated to the classification found in the literature on causality will be referred to as the 
‘denotational’ one.  
 
Vectorial description 
The dimensions of description belonging to the vectorial view can be given as follows: 
 
1. theories of event-based causation vs. theories of property-based causation (very 
similar to, and sometimes also referred to as token- vs. type level causation, or 
singularist vs. regularity theories of causation),  
2. theories of productivity vs. theories of relevance (the same dichotomy is sometimes 
represented as theories of dependence vs. theories of difference-making), 
3. theories of causal mechanisms vs. theories of probabilistic causation (quite similar to 
productive causation vs. relevance-causation, but rather pertaining to different 
methodologies of finding causal structures),  
4. epistemic theories  of causality vs. ontologically committed theories of causality.7 
 
Regarding 1. ‘Event-based’,’ token level’ or ‘singularist’ theories of causality posit that two relata A 
and B are causally connected via an intrinsic relation, which is called ‘causal’. When attributing this 
property to the considered relation there is no reference to other instances of the same relation, or 
to instances of similar relations like the one between A and B. ‘Property-based’, ‘type level’ or 
‘regularity’ theories of causality claim that the causal aspects of a relation between two relata are 
deducible only from other instances of the regularity, or from the fact that the relata are 
instantiations of abstract entities. In other words, according to those latter theories, a causal relation 
is an extrinsic feature of the connection between A and B. 
 
Regarding 2. Theories of causal productivity claim that causes engender their effects, and are 
therefore ‘productive’.  Examples of causal over-determination and examples of causal pre-emption 
do not contradict those theories, since causes are considered sufficient for the effect, rather than 
necessary. On the contrary, theories of relevance (also known as theories of dependence or 
difference-making) stress that a cause must be counterfactually relevant to, or necessary for, the 
effect.   
 
Regarding 3. Not entirely independent of 1 and 2, there are two different methodological 
approaches to investigate causation. One starts from looking for mechanisms connecting cause and 
effect, while the other is based on the concept of probability. Mechanistic approaches consider 
probabilities merely as an indicator of a causal connection and, in most of these approaches, 
                                                          
7 More independent characteristics can be found, e.g.: reductionist vs. non-reductionist theories, unified 
theories vs. theories of causal plurality, Humean regularity theories and non-Humean property or law-based 
theories of causality 
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probability plays only a peripheral or no role at all. Conversely, probabilistic theories often abstract 
from mechanisms.  
 
Regarding 4. The difference between epistemic theories of causality and ontologically committed 
theories can be paraphrased by the question whether causality should be considered to be ‘in the 
system’ or ‘in the model’. Since a model can always be attributed to an epistemic agent, epistemic 
theories aim to solve the problem of how an agent acquires knowledge of a causal connection 
between two relata, whilst ontological theories aim to clarify what criterion qualifies a connection as 
causal, independent of any observer. 
 
Denotational description 
The four pairs of categories outlined above form dimensions of characterisation, which, when 
combined according to the corresponding values, can help to locate a specific causal theory. The 
alternative, denotational way of referring to a specific theory uses the names usually found in the 
literature. This approach yields the following list of causal theories as prominently discussed, but the 
list is far from being exhaustive:  
I) theories of probabilistic causation,  
II) process theories,  
III) invariance theories 
IV) manipulation theories,  
V) mechanistic theories,  
VI) the theory of epistemic causation, and  
VII) counterfactual theories of causation.  
 
A brief description of all the mentioned theories which features their more distinguished elements 
follows.  
 
I - Probabilistic causality: the probabilistic theories’ starting point is the observation that a cause C 
raises the probability of the effect E taking place: Pr(E|C) > Pr(E|not C). In the strong variant of the 
probabilistic approach, this formula is the basis for reducing causality to probability. In weaker 
versions, the stipulation of reducibility is given up. However, a strong connection between 
probability and causality is maintained. 
 
II - Process theories describe causality by means of their time-dependent feature, i.e. as a process. A 
causal interaction involves the exchange of an entity, which can be a ‘causal mark’ (in Salmon 
(1984)), or a ‘conserved quantity’ (in Dowe (1992)). 
 
III - Invariance theories employ the notion of ‘invariant generalisations’ that can be observed in 
causal systems. Depending on the specific theory, those ‘invariances’ can refer to the stability of a 
functional relationship between parts of a system against disturbances, or against interventions on 
exogenous elements of a model. Similarly, relative to the further characteristics of a concrete causal 
theory, the invariances can be interpreted nomologically, or mechanistically.8   
                                                          
8 Some authors, like Cartwright (2004), assert that ‘invariance theories’ are a category of their own. The 
description I delivered is meant to indicate that ‘invariance’ can also be seen as an aspect of theories that 
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IV - Manipulation theories are based on the claim that ‘causes can be used to bring about their 
effects’. In the strong version, manipulation is confined to human agency. An example of the strong 
version can be found in Price and Menzies (1993).The weaker version considers instead the notion of 
interventions as direct influences on some system parts. Woodward (2003b) further weakens this 
requirement by including hypothetical interventions, which relates this particular manipulation 
theory closely to the counterfactual theories. 
 
V – Mechanistic theories focus on mechanisms, which play the role of a necessary substrate of any 
cause’s influence on its effects. 
 
VI - The theory of epistemic causation developed by Williamson (2005) is a Bayesian theory.9 It is 
related to probabilistic theories of causality, but is distinguished from them by strictly adhering to 
the ‘degree-of-belief’ interpretation of probability. Also, it incorporates rationality principles, like 
maximum equivocation and belief update, which, combined with background knowledge, describe 
the evolution of causal knowledge of an epistemic agent. 
 
VII - Counterfactual theories are committed to the identity ‘A causes B = If A had not happened, B 
would not have happened’. In order to compare the actual world with the corresponding 
counterfactual one, a metric is needed, which, in Lewis’ case, is the ranking of possible-worlds, 
elaborated in Lewis (1979). 
 
In order to provide an example of how to square these theories with the aforementioned four 
dimensions of characterisation, consider that most of the variants of probabilistic theories of 
causality in (I) are based on a concept of type level causation, and they describe causes as relevant 
rather than productive.  Whether they are epistemically or metaphysically committed depends on 
the specific variant of probabilistic theory, in particular on the interpretation of probability. As 
another example, process theories of causality in (II) are metaphysically committed: they describe 
productive causes and events in space-time, and they operate on token level. 
 
Prominent work and authors  
Following the aforementioned classifications, I will present an overview over the relevant work on 
causation done by some prominent authors.  
 The origin of the regularity view on causation is often traced back to the work of David 
Hume (1748). According to Psillos (2002), Hume’s analysis of the problem of causality resulted in two 
causal concepts, one pertaining to causality in the mind and one pertaining to causality in nature. 
Modality enters in the former, but not in the latter concept, since causality in nature is nothing but 
regularities.  Two important subsequent adherents of the regularities view on causation are John 
Stuart Mill and John Mackie. Mill (1843) presented a more elaborated version of a regularity theory 
by distinguishing a set of causal factors (rather than one causal object, like Hume) as positive 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
could be attributed to another category. The other denoted categories seem more like theories of their own 
distinct kind, not overlapping as much with the others. 
9 Williamson (2005) refers to epistemic causality as a form of ‘objective Bayesianism’, which, according to 
Williamson, has its origin in the writings of Bernoulli, Laplace and John Maynard Keynes. 
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conditions, and the absence of negative conditions as necessary (and sometimes sufficient) to 
produce the effect. He therefore combines the productive and difference-making view on causation. 
To the inferential methodologies, he contributed the method of agreement: ‘If ABC bring about abe, 
and CFG bring about efg, then c is the cause of e’, and the method of difference: ‘If ABC bring about 
abe, and AB only bring about ab, then C is the cause of e’ (ibid.). Mackie (1974) further refined Mill’s 
ideas by treating causes as ‘INUS conditions’ – insufficient but non-redundant parts of an 
unnecessary but sufficient condition. Psillos offers another modern variant of the regularity theory in 
Psillos (2002).  
The aforementioned theories are all regularity theories and are grounded in the idea of 
‘Humean supervenience’, according to which causation is construed as a relation that supervenes on 
observable, spatio-temporal relations. By contrast, there are non-singular approaches to causality 
not based on Humean supervenience, represented by David Armstrong and Fred Dretske, among 
others. In Dretske (1977) a view is elaborated that takes singular causal events as instances of 
relations between universal properties. Armstrong (1983) is a strong realist concerning universal 
properties by positing existence not only of first-order universal properties, but of hierarchies of 
properties. Observable regularities are explained by relations between the universals themselves, 
which gives his theory a modal quality that the theories grounded in supervenience lack. According 
to Gillies (2002), regularities, mathematically formulated as probabilities, are indicators of causation, 
but causation must itself stand as an independent and irreducible concept. 
The first, influential singularist theory of causation was developed by Ducasse (1968). 
Paraphrasing his account, a cause of particular change E is another particular change C that alone 
occurred in the spatio-temporal environment of E. Other, modern theories of singular causation 
include the process theories of both Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe. In their theories, the truth 
maker of a particular causal claim is derived from observation of the intersection of two world-lines 
of objects that either exchange a causal mark or a conserved quantity, respectively, whilst there is 
no reference to a regular succession, or to a law of nature.  
The aforementioned process theories are also theories of causal productivity. A similar, but 
methodologically different account is Stuart Glennan’s theory of causal mechanisms.  This theory of 
singular causation and causal productivity is defended in Glennan (2009). Likewise, Machamer, 
Darden and Craver’s mechanistic theory (Machamer, Darden et al. (2000)) holds that causes are 
productive, but unlike Glennan’s, their concept of mechanisms cannot be said to be based on a 
singularist view.10  
While both the process and mechanistic theories fit more naturally with the productive view 
of causation, the probabilistic theories are all theories of causal relevance (or difference-making). 
However, the two characteristics of causal theories, of being based on probability or on causal 
relevance, are not identical as can be seen with counterfactual theories, which are theories of 
difference-making but appeal to counterfactuals rather than probabilities. Moreover, the 
counterfactual stance relates to the singular case rather than regularities or universals. A similar 
precaution stops one from relating all probabilistic theories to theories of regularity. When 
interpreted as chances, probabilities raising an effect can refer to the propensity of a single event.  
Representatives of probabilistic theories of causality are Patrick Suppes (cf. his seminal work, 
Suppes (1970), in which the basic idea of causes as probability-raisers are introduced), Christopher 
                                                          
10 Russo and Williamson call such theories “top-down” as opposed to “bottom-up”, like Glennan’s. The former 
corresponds to a generalist, the latter to singularist approach. 
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Hitchcock, the early Nancy Cartwright, and authors who work in the field of causal Bayesian 
networks, which should more adequately be called causal Markov networks. Peter Spirtes, Clark 
Glymour and Richard Scheines (Spirtes, Glymour et al. (1993)) developed causal Bayesian networks 
in parallel to Judea Pearl. Spirtes et al. developed the first algorithm for inferred causation (‘PC-
algorithm’). They also formulated a set of assumptions (minimality, faithfulness and the causal 
Markov condition; see section 4.2.1 for details) that must be satisfied for correct application of 
Bayes nets methods. Since their work is focused on quantitative questions of causation, they do not 
extensively discuss the problems revolving around different interpretations of probability. However, 
since they are, like Judea Pearl, mainly interested in a calculus for causal inference, their concept of 
probability is best understood as related to frequencies of actual observations.  
Judea Pearl is one of the developers of Bayesian belief networks (see Pearl (1988)), which he 
subsequently applied to causal contexts. He also devised a mathematical theory of interventions, in 
particular the so-called ‘do-calculus’. The latter is an extension of conventional statistics, which is 
unable to express the difference between evidential and interventional information.11 Another 
paramount achievement of his is the treatment of counterfactuals in the context of Bayesian 
networks. The later Pearl changed his stance with regards to the interpretation of probability in a 
causal model, and interprets connections between nodes of a causal graph physically, despite his 
scientific background, which lies in the degree-of-belief favouring Bayesianism (cf. Pearl (2001) for a 
detailed account of this change of stance). Most of the theorems of his major work, Pearl (2000), 
require causal background knowledge or causal beliefs in addition to measured data, and therefore 
he does not address the fundamental epistemic causal problem of bootstrapping the build-up of 
causal knowledge. However, his work is interesting with respect to the development of a unified 
causal theory, since it straddles both the mechanistic-vs.-probabilistic categorisation, as well as the 
dependence-vs.-productivity categorisation. That being said, a constraint in his approach is that he 
considers only modular systems, which comply with the causal Markov condition. James Woodward 
considers his work (see Woodward (2003b)) to be complementary to Pearl’s. It addresses the 
philosophical implications in more depth, and focuses more on causal explanation as opposed to 
Pearl’s focus on causal inference. Hausman and Woodward (1999) developed an invariance theory of 
causality that is applicable to modular systems. They analyse the common implications of structural 
equation systems, which are causally interpretable, as well as the causal Markov condition. This is 
the pivotal condition of Bayesian networks and other theories derived from the probabilistic 
approach. It should be noted, however, that both Woodward and Pearl do not further justify their 
assumption that structural equation systems and probabilistic models based on correlational data 
are equivalent ways to describe causal systems. The accounts of the two authors differ, however, in 
their interpretation of what a mechanism is (see section 4.2.5). Both Pearl’s and Woodward’s 
theories are probabilistic and mechanistic theories. Similar to Salmon’s process theory, which is 
sometimes referred to as ‘mechanistic’ (e.g. in Psillos (2002)), one should notice that this attribution 
could cause confusion with those causal theories for which mechanisms are the central object of 
enquiry, like Glennan’s and Craver’s.  
Whereas Pearl departed from the original programme of probabilistic causation in favour of 
a more ontologically committed approach, Nancy Cartwright developed a sceptic stance against one 
of the structural constraints connected to the programme. This constraint is the ‘screening-off’ 
                                                          
11 This distinction refers to observational data and data acquired in experimental settings respectively, e.g. in 
the context of randomized clinical trials. 
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principle, which is one of the corollaries of the Markov condition. This scepticism is explained in 
Cartwright (1999a) and Cartwright (2001), then in more technical detail, and in response to Hausman 
and Woodward (1999), in Cartwright (2002). Her own account is one of causal plurality, developed in 
Cartwright (1999b). In Cartwright (1999b) and Cartwright (1989) she also introduces the concepts of 
‘capacities’ and ‘nomological machines’, which supply the situational contexts for capacities to be 
productive. Her approach is explicitly singularist. 
  All of the aforementioned theories are ontologically committed to some degree. Pearl, 
Gillies, Armstrong, Glennan and Kevin Hoover (who outlines his causal theory in Hoover (2001), and 
subsequently applies it to econometric questions) are particularly committed to some form of 
realism in their theories. The contrasting approach can be described as ‘epistemic’, or ‘model-
relative’. Its recent advocates are Jon Williamson and Steven Sloman (cf. Sloman (2005)). Williamson 
started with a genuine Bayesian and empiricist approach, but recently turned his attention to 
incorporating mechanisms into his causal theory, making this theory another variant of a hybrid 
between a mechanistic and probabilistic theory. However, it remains an epistemic theory. According 
to the Russo-Williamson thesis in Russo and Williamson (2007), the role of mechanisms is that of a 
second pillar, next to probabilistic difference-making, on which to ground causal inferences.  
Problems of current causal theories  
One way to show the shortcomings of causal theories is by means of devising counterexamples, a 
strategy often used in the literature. Every causal theory formalises the concept of causation to 
some degree of precision. If a considered situation is judged to be causal according to the formal 
concept of a theory, whilst it is judged to be non-causal according to the general understanding of 
the term, the theory produces a type I error, or false positive, with respect to a causal claim. If the 
converse is true, the theory produces a type II error, or false negative. In both cases, the range of the 
formal causal concept differs from the range of the un-formalised concept. The following list 
arranges some counterexamples that can be found in the literature as type I error and type II error 
counterexamples against theories with corresponding properties.  
1.1 Regularity theories 
Type I error counterexamples: the stock counterexamples against regularity theories involve 
non-causal associations, also known as ‘spurious correlations’, or correlations in a time 
series, see for example Eliot Sober’s much discussed example of covarying Venetian sea 
levels and British bread prices  (Sober (2001)). 
Type II error counterexamples: intuition asserts certain causal relations that have no 
observable instance, see Christopher Hitchcock’s example that ‘eating one kilogram of 
uranium 235 causes death’  (Hitchcock (1995)). 
1.2 Singularist theories 
If a single causal event is considered an instance neither of a regular association, nor of a 
type level property, nor of causal law, type I and type II error counterexamples can be 
constructed showing that the causal concept becomes vacuous in terms of difference 
between a causal and a coincidental association.   
2.1 Theories of causal relevance 
Type II error counterexamples: unsophisticated theories of causal relevance do not capture 
cases of causal over-determination and causal preemption, since, in these cases, the cause 
does not make a difference to the effect. Here is an example from Hall (2004): ‘Two children, 
Billy and Suzy, are throwing rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s rock hits the bottle first, just before 
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Billy’s. Suzy’s rock causes the bottle to break, even though Billy’s would have done so if she 
had missed.’ I discuss causal over-determination in section 7.1.3 
2.2 Theories of causal productivity 
Type II error counterexamples: cases of causation by omission, e.g. the statement ‘my failing 
to brake caused the accident’ from Glennan (2009). The reasoning behind examples of this 
kind is that negative causal factors cannot be considered ‘productive’ to bringing about the 
effect. 
3.1 Probabilistic theories of causation 
If a difference between informational and causal relevance of a cause to an effect is denied 
(as argued by Hausman and Woodward (1999)), examples of non-deterministic causation 
with effects of a common cause are type I error counterexamples12  against probabilistic 
theories, e.g. Cartwright’s factory example, described in Cartwright (1993). I discuss this 
example in section 4.2.4. 
Type II error counterexamples involve cases in which a productive event is an instance of a 
factor that generally lowers the probability of the effect. One such example is due to 
Deborah Rosen (cited from Hitchcock (2002)): ‘A golfer badly slices a golf ball, which heads 
toward the rough, but then bounces off a tree and into the cup for a hole in one.’ This 
example will be dealt with in detail in section 7.1.3.  
3.2 Mechanistic theories 
The process-based variants of mechanistic theories face the type I error counterexamples of 
causal irrelevance, of which one instance is given in Hitchcock (1995): a pool player chalks a 
cue stick, strikes the cue ball with the stick, the cue ball strikes the eight ball, which drops 
into the pocket. In the course of this process the cue stick transfers a chalk mark from the 
stick to the ball and from the first ball to the second. The chalk mark counts as a ‘causal 
mark’ according to Salmon’s process theory and as a ‘conserved quantity’ according to 
Dowe’s theory; however, the mark is causally irrelevant to the effect. 
Type II error counterexamples against mechanistic theories that define mechanisms as 
complex aggregations of causal intermediaries between cause and effect are examples that 
imply causal relations that depend on fundamental laws, or examples of higher-level 
causation for which a mechanism is not clearly identifiable, or unknown. Such cases are 
found in epidemiology or econometrics.  
 
The counterexamples in the list indicate that the concepts of causation proposed by a causal theory 
fare well in certain classes of systems, whilst they fail to imply correct interpretations of causal 
events in other systems. The above list has been given mostly for doxographical reasons. Of course, 
proponents of theories that are problematic in some respect have reacted to the problems, but it is 
not my intention to cover these kinds of debates in further detail. What I find interesting to notice, 
however, is that, in the above list of authors, no one seems to be engaged in ‘conceptual analysis’ in 
a proper sense.13 They also do not impute this endeavour to their perceived opponents, which, one 
would expect, implies that specific counterexamples are not to be considered as critical blows to a 
                                                          
12 The false positive account is due to attributing a causal relationship between the two effects, which are 
actually causally independent. The false attribution results from the conditional and unconditional 
dependence of the two effects, from which a causal relation follows according to the logic of probabilistic 
causation. 
13 An exception might be Hume himself, if we interpret his project accordingly. 
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theory. But often this conclusion is drawn from counterexamples. For example, the agency-theory of 
causation is often readily dismissed just by pointing to its alleged inability to deal with examples of 
causation that do not involve human agency. 
Next to devising counterexamples, one can raise more generic caveats against every theory 
of causality. Based on the denotational mapping, I will present some of these caveats in the 
following paragraph. 
Probabilistic causality was made problematic by numerous counterexamples. This forced 
continual adjustments of the original simple approach of explaining causes as probability, which lead 
to a considerable complication (see Hitchcock (2002) for a survey). Many original proponents of this 
approach have abandoned it in favour of other approaches.  It also inherits the ongoing debate on 
the nature of probabilities, the concept to which proponents of this theory hope to reduce 
causation. Process theories have a very confined scope of application (mostly physical processes) due 
to their low level of description, which involves the identification of causal marks or conserved 
quantities. Invariance theories struggle with disentangling the two tasks of conceptual clarification of 
causation and the methods of identifying causal structures. In the case of manipulation theories, the 
variant of agent manipulation theories needs an account of how to accommodate cases of causation 
where human agents are not involved, whereas the broader theory that depends on ’intervention‘ 
seems question-begging with regards to the question of how to define intervention in non-causal 
terms. The theory of epistemic causation, like many other theories, lacks a discussion about the 
nature of the causal relata, since merely treating these as variables in an agent’s model seems to be 
an unsatisfying interpretation. Also, some critics of epistemic causality hold against it its non-
commitment to metaphysical foundations of causation. 14  
 
  
  
                                                          
14 As opposed to other theories of causation, it is difficult to find our construct counterexamples 
against one or the other type of theory from the dichotomy of epistemic and ontologically 
committed theories, which is why they are missing in the above list of type I and type II errors. For 
example, a prima facie suggestive move would be to try to construct a counterexample against an 
ontologically committed theory if a causal explanation in this theory turns on causal properties that 
never manifest themselves, such that the license to employ the property in the explanation depends 
on a belief in the existence of the property. But since the empiricist dogma, which requires 
observability of an existing property, is rarely maintained by most contemporary philosophers, this 
criterion will not do.  
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4.1 The choice of difference-making for addressing the conceptual 
problem 
To address the conceptual problem of causation, one of the desiderata would be that the theory 
should provide a simple criterion for what determines a causal judgment, whose simplest form is the 
assertion whether a causal connection between two observables exists or not. Difference-making 
theories offer such a prospect. Consider the concepts of correlation, or covariance. There is a clear 
recipe for finding out whether two observables are correlated, consisting of a stage covering their 
measurement, and a mathematical procedure of calculating the statistical relationship. Also, there 
already is a ‘difference-making’ in an evidential sense involved, such that when we see the one 
observable, the likelihood of correctly predicting the value of the correlated variable is increased. 
But correlation is not causation. Nevertheless, if we could find an additional factor to be added to a 
confirmed correlation of two observables, the prospect of simplicity of the approach to the 
conceptual problem would probably be satisfied. More complicated specifications of how to 
evaluate a causal judgment would then, hopefully, correspond to a more specified concept of 
causation, derived from the simple root-concept given by difference-making.  
There are several theories of difference-making on offer, as was seen in the previous 
section. Probabilistic causation started from the observation that causes raise the probabilities of 
their effects, but to distinguish evidential from causal difference-making turned out to be an 
insurmountable difficulty, such that probabilistic causation is now a dead research paradigm (see 
Pearl 2000)). The counterfactual theories of causation tie causation to counterfactual propositions. 
Hardly anyone doubts that counterfactuals play some role in causation, and even those theorists 
that explicitly endeavoured to get along without them (Salmon (1994)) had to retract their original 
attempts. But the evaluation of counterfactuals either require starting from an elaborated calculus 
(Lewis (1973)) or are extensions of existing frameworks to accommodate the token level 
counterfactual case (Pearl (2000), chapter 7). Although this is no argument against the validity of 
these theories, they do not satisfy my desideratum of providing a simple conceptual basis from 
where to proceed with a conceptual reconstruction of causation. 
With this the manipulationist theories remain in the set of theories to choose from. 
Manipulation offers a simple notion of telling apart correlations from instances of causation, at least 
in order to rule out those cases when spurious correlations are due to a common cause. Imagine a 
simple arrangement of two observables, a switch and a light bulb. A manipulation, leaving open at 
this stage whether due to agency or due to an objective intervention, targeting the switch, enables 
the manipulator to control the state of the light bulb. We can introduce the slight complication that 
the system behaves probabilistically, in order to accommodate a wider range of cases. With the 
modification, the light bulb sometimes changes its state in any of the two possible directions, going 
on from off, or vice versa. And even the switch can be allowed to change states by itself. Still, after a 
number of trials, a manipulator can tell whether she feels empowered to control the light via the 
switch to some degree, or not. I argue that this is a sufficient criterion to underpin a causal 
judgment.  
A manipulator in such a setup does not need to have any concrete idea of a mechanism 
connecting the two observables. We can think of some kind of lever and some other observable 
manipulated by the lever as in no visible or even conceivable way connected to each other. The 
feeling of control would still be there, as long as the manipulator receives the information about the 
change of state of the indirectly manipulated observable. That is why we can at this stage, while we 
are looking for simple criteria to underpin a causal judgment, rule out mechanisms. 
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There are some further observations corroborating that this approach might serve as an 
appropriate starting point of conceptual reconstruction of causal judgments. Consider the case of 
watching a Harry Potter film. Scenarios that feature the casting of a magic spell always involve the 
wielding of a wand, sometimes underpinned by the recitation of Latin phrases, and then something 
else at another place happens. Although we have no idea of the mechanism connecting the two 
events, we are able to tell that the spell caster was the one causally responsible for the subsequent 
occurrence. We therefore judge that a causal relation obtains between the two events, although a 
magical causal connection can be seen as the very opposite of a mechanistic connection, in which 
case we would probably deny that magic was at work. In that sense, the example is even more 
strikingly in favour of a manipulationist view of causation than cases in which we are, for now, just 
unable to identify some mechanism. Causation as manipulation thus seems to survive the journey to 
a counterfactual world like Harry Potter’s.  
A similar point concerns those scientific-mechanistic explanations that have supplanted the 
unscientific attempts of explaining natural events based on the workings of god(s) or other 
anthropomorphic powers. But causation has not been introduced by these new explanations; rather 
it is the case that mechanistic causes have merely replaced gods as causes.  
An observation related to these previous examples concerns what one might want to call, 
echoing Menzies (1996), the ‘platitudes of causation’, except that, for now, they are merely 
platitudes of manipulations. These are the locality of manipulations (the target of the manipulation 
is distinct from other observables), its asymmetry (there is manipulability only from the cause to the 
effect, but not vice versa), and its regularity (for probabilistic cases, manipulability implies that the 
cause is generally an appropriate means to bring about the effect; for deterministic case, this would 
be true a fortiori). I will, in section 6.3, try to recover all three platitudes as properties of causation, 
via an objective description of agency and its subsequent identification with causation. 
At the current stage of the argument, I am implying that manipulation is at least a specific 
case of causation. But even against this weak claim the scenario of Newcomb’s paradox (Nozick 
(1969)) can be held. In this decision game, a player is given the choice of taking home either a box 
whose content he cannot see, or that box and an additional second box, visibly containing a 
thousand dollars. The opponent player consists in an intelligence that can predict the first player’s 
choice with absolute precision, and it will make sure that the opaque box, which is part of the prize 
in any case, is empty if the first player chooses greedily, i.e. chooses to take both boxes. Now it 
seems that the player’s choice is a manipulation that affects the state of the second box – it is empty 
given the greedy choice, and it contains a million dollars given the modest choice. The conditions of 
manipulability of the effect (the state of the second box) via the cause (the choice) are met; 
therefore the two events must be related as cause and effect. But this contradicts the causal 
intuition that the state of the second box has already been fixed before the moment the choice is 
made. Hence the manipulability criterion conflicts with a strong intuition about causation, which 
says that a manipulation cannot influence the past, i.e. the moment when the prize money was put 
inside the box. Newcomb’s paradox does not undermine the manipulability criterion, though. 
Manipulability implies that an agent can arbitrarily manipulate the target – in fact, that is what an 
agent should do given it wants to make sure the effect stems from its  action, not from a possible 
common cause of the action and the putative effect. But Newcomb’s setup primarily considers a 
hypothetical rational decision problem. It asks us what we would do, given that we are told the rules 
34 
 
of the game and shown our options. Replace the situation’s pondering of the dominance principle 
against the expected utility principle by a ‘decision’ to abide by the result of a coin toss, or any other 
device that produces genuinely random result, and a predicted decision will become an inconsistent 
idea, given we assume an ordinary structure of time without backwards causation. Backwards 
causation would mean that the choice would cause the prediction to have been according to the 
chosen alternative, which does, however, not contradict a causal interpretation of manipulability.  
That being said, I do not consider further the possibility of backwards causation at any stage 
of my argument. Next to the idea of logical or mathematical dependence, considered as an idea 
independent of causation, I also take the arrow of time to be an extra-theoretical constraint from 
the point of view of a judging agent. That means that the causal arrow is logically aligned only to the 
arrow of thermodynamics, but not to the temporal arrow (cf. Price and Weslake (2009), for a 
discussion of the relationships between the different arrows).15 With the temporal arrow fixed, we 
can assume the past to be fixed and out of reach for any agent-manipulations. For the Newcomb’s 
paradox, this entails that the case of an intervention causing something to have been different, can 
be excluded as a possible alternative. In this regard I concur with the defeatist stance of Tim 
Maudlin, who also resorts to positing the reality of the directed time as an additional constraint in 
Maudlin (2007). 
  
                                                          
15 I am emphasising that the connection which I see between the arrow of thermodynamics and the arrow of 
causation differs from how Huw Price thinks about that connection. See sections 6.2.2 and the summary 
section 9.2 on that issue. 
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4.2 Analysis of Markovian models of causation 
In this section I will examine an important class of probabilistic difference-making theories that also 
allow for the integration of a notion of intervention. These are the theories of causal Bayesian 
networks and structural equation models, which both obey the causal Markov condition. Since I am 
interested in the connection between causation and manipulation, I will scrutinize in particular, but 
not exclusively, the work of the authors James Woodward and Daniel Hausman, who believe that 
the causal Markov condition is grounded in our notion of intervention. I will keep an eye on the 
conceptual problem of causation, but in this section I will also deal with the epistemological and 
ontological problems, in order to assess the relevance of all aspects of the theories and for a better 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the remaining theories to choose from. After 
discussing some canonical problems of the causal Markov condition I will examine whether this 
condition can be said to follow from some concept of intervention, which will be answered in the 
negative. Instead, the so-called ‘modular systems’ complying with the causal Markov condition are 
particular causal systems that satisfy additional constraints not following directly from the idea of an 
intervention.  
4.2.1 The causal Markov condition 
In most examples of causal relations, causation entails a correlation between the causal relata. 
Probabilistic theories of causation rely on this fact to formulate causal relations by means of 
conditional probabilities. The probability of an effect is raised or lowered if one conditions on one of 
its causes, depending on whether the cause brings about or prevents the effect, respectively. Two 
effects of a common cause are, barring specific circumstances, correlated with each other. However, 
the principle of the common cause (Reichenbach (1956)) implies that, with such a structure, the 
cause screens off one effect from the other. Likewise, distal causes are screened off from effects by 
conditioning on proximate causes of the effect. Both cases comply with the intuition that further 
information about other effects or distal causes does not increase our expectation of the occurrence 
of the effect, once we are informed about its direct causes. 
Reichenbach considered the relata of a causal relation to be event types. Common causal 
language is generally more flexible, interpreting the relata also as objects, properties, or facts, 
whereas Causal Bayesian Networks (Pearl (2000), p. 21; henceforth CBN), which share some of the 
principles of probabilistic theories of causation, uniformly represent relata as random variables. 
Since CBN are directed acyclic graphs, the notation of graph theory is used to express the pivotal 
structural condition of a causal model, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (henceforth CMC). 
CMC enables one to express, in a single formula, the structural constraints of unconditionally 
correlated effects of common causes, the principle of the common cause, and the screening-off of 
distal causes. One can make use of these probabilistic constraints to infer, to some degree, the 
causal structure on the basis of observational data. However, in the general case, the correct causal 
graph cannot be identified from a set of possible graphs that could all explain the observed data, 
unless more information is gathered or additional assumptions are made. Among the latter we find 
temporal data, prior causal background knowledge, knowledge of mechanisms, or interventional 
data. Except for interventions, these sources of information about causal structure circumvent the 
epistemic problem of inferring the model from data, while interventions presuppose additional 
causal knowledge, which also concern the problem of when to presuppose that CMC holds, as the 
further analysis will show. 
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CMC is  central to the work of Spirtes, Glymour et al. (1993), who formulate the condition as 
follows: 
 
Let G be a causal graph with vertex set V and P be a probability distribution over the vertices 
in V generated by the causal structure represented by G. G and P satisfy the Causal Markov 
Condition if and only if for every W in V, W is independent of V\(Descendants(W) ᴜ 
Parents(W)) given Parents(W). (p. 29) 
 
Hausman and Woodward (1999) formulate a similar, but weaker, condition, which they also call 
causal Markov Condition (abbreviated by CM). Note that Steel (2006) discusses the ramifications of 
the deviation from the formulation of Spirtes et al. These are significant in some contexts, but not 
relevant to this chapter and will be disregarded in the following pages. Here is Hausman and 
Woodward’s formulation: 
 
For all distinct variables X and Y in a variable set V, if X does not cause Y, then  
P(X|Y  Parents(X)) = P(X|Parents(X)). (p. 523) 
 
In this definition, Parents(X) denotes the subset of V containing all the direct causes of X in V. In 
order to make explicit the implications of CM, Hausman and Woodward (1999) formulate two 
corollaries of the CM, which they call CM1 and CM2: 
 
CM1 If X and Y are probabilistically dependent, then either X causes Y or Y causes X or X and 
Y are effects of some common cause Z in the set of variables V. 
CM2 If Parents(X) […] is non-empty, then, conditional on Parents(X), X is probabilistically 
independent of every variable except its effects. (p. 524) 
 
The two corollaries express the unconditional dependences and the conditional independences of 
causal relations, respectively. CM1 implies that both cause and effect and two effects of a common 
cause are correlated, whilst CM2 expresses the principle of the common cause and screening-off of 
distal causes by proximate causes. The structural condition derived from CMC by conversion is called 
faithfulness (Spirtes, Glymour et al. (1993), p. 13), or stability (Pearl (2000), p. 48). This condition 
implies that the only independences, in a causal model, are those that can be derived from the 
graph. For example, a CBN that features faithfulness has no unconditional independence between 
two variables of which one is the descendant of the other, a property that would not necessarily 
follow from CMC alone. CMC requires a condition called causal sufficiency, which posits that all 
common causes of variables in V are themselves in V.  
Often, CBN are discussed in connection with a modelling technique called structural 
equation models (SEM). A SEM consists of a set of equations whose variables are evaluated in an 
order that reflects the causal influences between the observables of the modelled system. If the 
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equations are all linear, a parametric description of the system can be written in the following 
form:16 
 
X1= u1  
X2= a21 X1 + u2 
… 
Xn= an1 X1 + an2 X2 + … + an(n-1) Xn(n-1) +un  
The Xi are the causal variables of the model, the aij represent the strength of the causal influence of 
Xj on Xi, and the ui are error variables, which encapsulate causal influences that are not part of the 
model. A SEM requires knowledge of the functional relations between variables, and thus it is often 
modelled on the basis of further background assumptions that are reasonable in the given domain. A 
CBN can also be constructed on the basis of conditional probabilities alone. Apart from this 
representational issue, the two models can be treated as equivalent within finite ranges of the 
continuous variables. A proof of the equivalence of the two formulations can be found in (Druzdzel 
and Simon (1993)), and, accordingly, many authors, including James Woodward, Daniel Hausman, 
Judea Pearl, and Jon Williamson, treat the two paradigms as alternative but equivalent formulations 
of the same set of problems. If a causal graph is constructed on the basis of a SEM, the compliance 
of the graph with CMC requires assumptions about the error terms of the equations. In models with 
deterministic causal relations, CMC is valid only if the error terms are independent of each other in 
all combinations. 
Different constraint-levels can be formulated in the context of a SEM, and they reflect 
different levels of expressiveness of a corresponding causal graph. Higher expressiveness means that 
more information about the system can be read off the graph. Those constraint-levels can be called 
level invariance, modularity and coefficient independence in order of ascending expressiveness, so 
that the latter level implies the former. Notice that Hausman and Woodward (1999) use the same 
denotations with slightly different interpretations; see footnotes concerning level invariance and 
modularity. Here is a brief presentation of the levels. 
Level invariance of an equation states that the equation remains invariant under 
interventions on the underlying system. If the functional expression does not represent correctly the 
direction of the causal influence, or if a variable is intervened on for which there is an unrepresented 
causal connection that passes through this variable, then level invariance is not satisfied. In the 
following sections, I will denote by ’LI‘ the constraint-level at which every equation of the model is 
level-invariant.17 
                                                          
16 The parameters are indexed according to matrix notation. The left and right subscripts of the parameters 
denote the indices of the corresponding free variables and dependent variables respectively. 
17 Notice that LI is to be understood as the ’constraint-level of level invariance‘ rather than ’level invariance‘ 
simpliciter, as defined by Hausman and Woodward. They define level invariance as a property of an equation, 
not as a property of a system of equations. Also, notice that a better choice for this condition would probably 
be to call it ‘invariance under intervention’, since ‘level invariance’ suggests that the equation remains 
invariant if one of the right hand variables changes its value no matter for which reason. Probably, Woodward 
and Hausman have refrained from calling it ‘invariance under intervention’ because their notion of an 
intervention already requires, as they believe, a modular system, which is subject to a stronger constraint. I 
have chosen to keep things simple and stay closer to Woodward and Hausman’s chosen terminology. 
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Modularity (MD) says that in every equation of a SEM, a left hand variable can be set to a 
specific value within an allowed range of possible values, without disturbing any other equation of 
the system, including those equations where the intervened on variable appears as a free variable 
(on the right hand side). This is often interpreted by saying that all variables are determined by 
independent mechanisms, which can also be independently manipulated. 
Coefficient invariance (CI) entails that no coefficient in the system is a function of another 
coefficient, in particular, coefficients within a single equation of a SEM. If this condition is satisfied, 
the causal model represents disjunctive causes exclusively.  
On the basis of the technical vocabulary defined above, we can now consider the list of 
problems affecting CBN and CMC.  
4.2.2 The problems of Causal Bayesian Networks and the Causal Markov Condition 
In what follows, I will distinguish between three types of problems: epistemic, conceptual and 
ontological. Subsequently, I will analyse a list of canonical problems identified in the literature and 
map them to the three aforementioned types.  
 The epistemic problems consist in inferring the correct model of a system with unknown 
causal structure on the basis of different sources of information and structural assumptions. For the 
purposes of this section I will define the conceptual problems more generally than in the preceding 
and following chapters, as consisting in analysing the concept of causation and formulating criteria 
that determine a relation between two observables as a causal relation. This version is a bit more 
general since it is detached from the context of grounding an agent’s judgment concerning a causal 
relation. Finally, the ontological problems address the question of whether causal relations are a 
feature of the real system as opposed to the model that represents it.  
 When a causal structure is to be inferred on the basis of observed probabilities, additional 
assumptions must be made, like relying on CMC and the related conditions of faithfulness and causal 
sufficiency. The common characteristic of the problems denoted by ‘epistemic’ is the deviation of 
the inferred model from the correct model. One should notice that, in such cases, there is no 
controversy involved about what the correct model, e.g. a causal graph, should look like. This 
contrasts with the conceptual problems. Those concern the question of what characterises a causal 
relation, which, in turn, has a bearing on what a correct causal model of a specific system should 
look like. The conceptual problems are partly descriptive, partly normative. They are descriptive in 
so far as formal definitions of criteria of causal relations attempt to capture what we naturally mean 
by ‘causation’; they are normative in so far as, concerning more controversial aspects of causation, 
and especially the notion of modularity, a decision on the conceptualisation is required. The 
ontological problems are speculative from the perspective of graph theory and statistics, since they 
concern additional assumptions made about the properties of causal systems that can neither be 
expressed in those kinds of models nor be derived from the measured data. For example, this 
concerns the question whether there is irreducible causal indeterminism. We can discuss 
conceptually both deterministic and indeterministic causation, as long as the concepts are coherent. 
Whether the former or the latter is, ontologically speaking, vacuous, is a different issue. Therefore, it 
is crucial to distinguish the epistemic problems from those problems that concern conceptual 
disagreement, and, again, the latter from the problems that depend on ontological commitments. 
Based on the conceptual clarifications given so far, the following two lists of problems of CBN 
and CMC found in the literature can be discussed. Together, they provide a basis for a unified 
taxonomy. While Hausman and Woodward (1999) consider problems affecting CMC, Cartwright 
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(2004) presents a list slightly broader in scope, by considering problems concerning CBN in general, 
which can result from breaches of CMC, faithfulness or causal sufficiency. Hausman and Woodward 
defend CMC, whereas Cartwright argues that CMC cannot be endorsed as a general structural 
condition for causal systems.  
 According to Hausman and Woodward’s formulations, the list of cases where CMC 
encounters problems can be given as follows: 
HW1: the probabilistic dependency between X and Y might be merely accidental; 
HW2: a dependency may arise when one mixes two subpopulations in which X and Y are 
causally independent; 
HW3: dependencies that do not reflect causal connections may arise when the wrong 
variables are measured; and 
HW4: correlations in quantum mechanics appear not to have any causal explanation. 
According to Cartwright’s formulations, the list reads as follows: 
 C1: positive and negative effects of a single factor cancel each other; 
 C2: factors can follow the same time trend without being causally linked; 
 C3: probabilistic causes produce products and by-products; 
C4: populations are over-stratified (e.g. they are homogeneous with respect to a common 
effect of two factors not otherwise causally linked); 
C5: populations with different causal structures or different probability measures are mixed. 
 
Notice first that C2 is a particular instance of HW1, and that HW2 directly corresponds to C5. Next, it 
will be shown that there are two basic categories of problems: HW1/C2, HW2/C5, C1 and C4 are 
epistemic problems, whereas HW3, HW4 and C3 will be discussed as predominantly conceptual or 
ontological problems, although they also have an epistemic aspect. The first category, the 
predominantly epistemic problems, show the shortcomings of CMC when it is part of an algorithm of 
inferring causal relations from data. Regarding the question of the importance of CMC to the concept 
of causation, this category of problems can be dealt with in less detail. C3 and HW3 require the most 
comprehensive philosophical discussion, the result of which will be to show that three relevant 
constraint-levels of causation can be formulated, of which only the two stronger ones satisfy CMC. 
The weakest constraint-level does comply with an intervention-based concept of causation; however, 
it does not imply the ‘arrow-breaking’ (Steel (2006)) account of interventions. HW5 refers to the so-
called EPR-paradox (Einstein, Podolsky et al. (1935)) and involves paradoxical implications of a 
seemingly causal connection between the measurements of two entangled particles at distant 
locations. Since this problem requires an in depth discussion of possible interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, and since it seems to concern predominantly the ontological level, I will not discuss it in 
this chapter. 
4.2.3 The epistemic problems  
The following list is a categorisation of the epistemic problems that underscores the common 
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features of the problems belonging to a specific group: 
 
EP1: the basis of causal inference consists of a probability distribution table that can be, 
under general assumptions, considered ‘improbable’. Such a table leads to wrong 
conclusions about the underlying structure that produces the statistical data. 
EP2: the set of considered variables itself is not informative enough. More variables must be 
incorporated into the causal model to prevent a distorted causal picture. 
Other epistemic problems (which are not part of the aforementioned list from Hausman, 
Woodward and Cartwright): There can be other reasons for why the structural constraints of 
observational data alone are insufficient to infer the correct causal graph. Among those are 
observationally equivalent causal structures, or deterministic structures which do not allow 
the screening-off of spurious effects 
 
The following table provides an overview of the categorisation based on the introduced 
nomenclature: 
Category 
corresponding canonical problem in Hausman 
and Woodward's list, or Cartwright's list 
related  epistemic problems 
EP1 
HW1/C2, C1 (given the cancellation of positive 
and negative effects is accidental) 
other forms of breaches of 
faithfulness of data 
EP2 
HW2/C5, C4, C1 (given the cancellation of 
positive and negative effects are designed or 
brought about by selection bias) 
breaches of causal sufficiency 
Other 
epistemic 
problems 
- 
observational equivalence, 
deterministic structures with mutual 
screening-off of spurious effects 
 
Table 1: Overview of the epistemic problems 
The common feature of all EP1-problems is the lack of informativeness of the probability distribution 
governing the observed variables with respect to the relations of probabilistic dependence and 
independence. EP1 captures accidental dependencies, breaches of faithfulness of data, and 
accidental cancellation of positive and negative effects. With EP1-problems, the epistemic agent 
cannot rely on the probabilistic relations alone to infer the correct target model.  EP2 captures 
breaches of causal sufficiency, mixing and over-stratification. It also captures cancellation of positive 
and negative effects, given that those effects are not accidental, but caused by selection bias or 
purposeful design, respectively. All EP2-problems feature a set of considered variables that result in a 
distorted causal model. 
Given their nature, the epistemic problems can be solved on the basis of further background 
information and further assumptions, but not on the basis of assuming CMC, faithfulness, and causal 
sufficiency alone, which merely enable the exploitation of probabilistic dependence and 
independence. Incorporating additional assumptions, or resorting to other sources of information 
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like causal background knowledge, interventional data, temporal data, enables the correction of the 
model structure (e.g. rejection of a dependence as non-causal, or reversal of a direction).18 
In EP1, the epistemic agent is misguided in applying CMC and the related structural 
conditions to the probability distribution, because a deviation of the correct model from these 
conditions is taken to be ‘improbable’. The improbability of the data can be either due to accidental 
dependencies between the observables, or because the system configuration itself is unlikely. 
Accidental dependencies arise if a sample-correlation does not represent a population-correlation. 
Either those non-causal dependencies are genuinely accidental, or they are due to a selection bias. 
The latter problem, however, belongs to EP2, not EP1, since the experimenter, who selects the 
observational data, exerts a causal influence on the variable values, and should therefore be 
considered as part of the causal model. 
Besides unconditional, non-causal dependences, misleading data can result from mixing two 
heterogeneous sub-populations. Seemingly paradoxical results of such a mix have been described in 
statistics as ‘Simpson's paradox’ (Simpson (1951)). The particular consequence for causal 
relationships is that a statistical indication of dependence can turn into independence. The reason 
for that is that faithfulness of the data is assumed, and unconditional independence of causally 
related variables is not expected. Nevertheless, it can result from the influence of the third variable. 
Either the third variable is a common cause of the other two causally related variables (EP1, example 
2), or it is part of a second causal path between the other variables, which is Cartwright's problem of 
‘cancellation of positive and negative factors’ (EP1, example 3). In both cases, misled by the 
assumption of faithfulness, plausibility reasons countenance the false inference that the third 
variable might be a common effect of two independent causes (see Spirtes, Glymour et al. (1993), 
page 41). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 It follows that the discussion of epistemic problems given here merely covers their classification, and not 
how they are solved. Solutions to the problems exist, but the scope of this section is neither the possible 
extensions of the Markov condition, nor its backing up with further techniques, in order to infer correct 
models. Likewise, a discussion of why the target models are the correct ones, would be out of place. In each of 
the individual cases, the target models, from which the inferred models differ, can be considered correct. 
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EP1 
Correct Model Inferred Model 
EP1, example 1: 
accidental dependencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
or 
 
 
or 
 
 
EP1, example 2: 
 
 
EP1, example 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Examples of EP1 
 
A characteristic of EP2 is an unobserved confounding variable. In such cases, a positive causal 
influence appears as if it were a preventative, and vice versa. Either the unobserved variable is a 
common cause, which is a breach of ‘causal sufficiency’ (see EP2, example 1) or the unobserved 
variable is the effect of one of the observed variables and the cause of the second (EP2, example 2).  
EP2, examples 3 and 4, are instances of Simpson's paradox, due to ‘mixing two heterogeneous 
subpopulations’. Simpson's paradox is given a causal explanation (as in Pearl (2000), chapter 6), 
because the population-variable is causally linked to the other two variables. In both examples, the 
two observed variables appear to be independent, although they are actually causally linked. As with 
examples 1 and 2, this can be due to the omission of either a common-cause-variable (causal 
insufficiency), or of a second directed path that includes the confounder.  
In example 5, the inferred causal structure appears to be level invariant, but in fact it is not, 
as it can be seen once X1 is intervened on. The model, which merely represents one causal 
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connection between X3 and X2, could not make sense of such an expected behaviour of the system.  
If a causal system features cancellation of positive and negative factors, then, if the 
cancellation happens accidentally, the criterion of faithfulness, but not the criterion of causal 
sufficiency, is breached. However, if the cancellation is brought about on purpose, the problem can 
be dealt with similarly to the problem of selection bias, which would be an instance of causal 
insufficiency with respect to an extended 4-variable causal graph, including a variable for the 
manipulator. Over-stratification can be dealt with similarly to causal sufficiency. Yet it is not a 
common cause, but a common effect which is conditioned on. This is the reverse of EP2, example 3 – 
two independent causes appear to be causally related.  
 
EP2 
Correct Model Inferred Model 
EP2, example 1 
 
 
EP2, example 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EP2, example 3 
 
 
EP2, example 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EP2, example 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: EP2, featuring three variable problems with the confounder absent from the model. A causal arrow 
with ‘+’-sign denotes a positive causal influence, a ‘-‘-sign denotes a negative connection  
Successful application of the screening-off criterion requires non-degenerated conditional 
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probabilities. Different values of different variables must occur in a sufficient number of 
combinations in order to have the proximate cause screen off distal causes and secondary effects 
from any single direct effect. If the data features such kinds of combinations, the correct undirected 
graph and all the v-structures (Pearl (2000), p. 19) can be inferred. This is the case of table 4, example 
1. The directions of the arrows in the causal graph, with the exception of v-structures, are non-
decidable if only observational (non-experimental) data are available. If one cannot condition on 
sufficient combinations of values, the joint probability table is not informative enough to allow the 
inference of the correct skeleton. Such is the case with deterministic causal relations without 
unrepresented additional causes. Observational data alone then do not allow holding one of the 
three variables fixed, while varying the other two. The result of screening-off tests in such a case is 
mutual screening-off in all combinations, from which no structure can be inferred. Table 4, example 2 
presents yet another case, one in which we happen to know the causal direction between three 
variables. In such a situation, a minimal candidate of a causal model would be incorrect, because it 
will leave out a possible direct causal connection from X2 to X3. Such a case of breach of level 
invariance is described in Hausman and Woodward (1999)p. 543). 
other epistemic problems 
Correct Model Inferred Model 
Example 1 
 
 
 
Example 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Examples of other problems classified as epistemic 
4.2.4  The ontological and conceptual problems 
The ontological and conceptual problems will be discussed in direct correspondence to the problems 
C3 and HW3: 
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Category 
corresponding canonical problem in 
Hausman and Woodward's list, or 
Cartwright's list 
indeterministic causation with joint 
effects 
C3 
measuring the wrong variables HW3 
 
Table 5: Overview of the ontological and conceptual problems 
 
4.2.4.1 Indeterministic causation with joint effects  
As we saw before, two distinct corollaries can be formulated on the basis of CMC, which Hausman 
and Woodward called CM1 and CM2. It is instructive to formulate two subsequent corollaries based 
on CM2, one concerning screening-off of distal causes, the other concerning screening-off of joint 
effects: 
 
CM2.1 with respect to knowing whether the effect occurs, knowing a distal cause does not 
add information to knowing a proximate cause, unless there is an additional causal 
connection from the distal cause to the effect; 
CM2.2 knowing additional effects of common causes does not add information to knowing 
the common cause. 
 
The problem discussed in this section concerns essentially CM2.2. The corollary of CMC could be 
further explained as follows: additional effects are not causally relevant to one considered effect, but 
knowing about an additional effect, so one might think, could contribute to a better prediction of 
whether a considered effect has been brought about. This, however, would contradict the causal 
Markov condition, which posits screening-off once we condition on the common cause. CMC makes 
no difference between causal and informational relevance, and therefore, negates informational 
relevance of other effects.  
Probabilistic causation involving products and by-products and its implications to CMC have 
been brought to attention by means of an example featuring a factory in Cartwright (1993). The 
factory produces two chemicals, a product and a by-product, according to a genuinely probabilistic 
process. The example therefore involves three random variables C, E1 and E2, denoting the cause and 
two effects, respectively. The specification of the probabilities is set as follows: P(E1, E2|C) = 0.8 19, 
P(not(E1),not(E2)|C) = 0.2, therefore P(not(E1), E2|C) = P(E1,not(E2)|C)=0. According to the 
background story, the probability of P(C) is implied to be around 0.5. P(C) is required as an 
independent piece of information, since C is designated as the exogenous cause-variable. Likewise, 
the probabilities for the two effects conditioning on not(C) would be needed as independent 
parameters for a full specification, but these pieces of information are not relevant to the argument 
against CMC, which is already implied by the given partial specification. The example therefore 
                                                          
19 P(C) and P(not(C)) is shorthand for P(C=true) and P(C=false), respectively. 
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features four independent probability parameters, and inferring the causal relations based on CMC 
would yield a graph with two causal connections, one between E1 and E2, and one arc connecting 
either E1 with C or, E2 with C. However, since the cause-effect relationships are provided with the 
example, and are set to be (C causes E1) and (C causes E2), the correct causal graph features, rather 
than the inferred structure, a fork-like structure with an outgoing arrow from C to E1 and E2, 
respectively, and no arrow between E1 and E2. The factorized form of the joint probability function, 
causally ordered, is therefore P(C, E1, E2) = P(C) P (E1, E2|C). This factorized form is not further 
reducible since there is no screening-off between E1 and E2. The cause-effect relationships are given, 
thus the example does not expound the problems of inferring causal relations of any kind. 20 What is 
instead provided by the example is an already interpreted causal system, represented by a causal 
model that does not comply with CMC.  
The reason for claiming that the causal structure of the example is a violation of CMC is given 
by the inequality between P (E1|C, E2) = 1 and P (E1|C) = 0.8, which follows from the probability 
specification. To defend her counterexample, Cartwright (1993) argues that the causal relations are 
specified in the form of P (E1, E2|C) and not by P (E1|C), P (E2|C), independently. Thus, since the 
independence of the two effects E1 and E2, conditioning on C, only follows for the special case of 
 
P(E1, E2|C) P(not(E1),not(E2)|C) = P(E1,not(E2)|C) P(not(E1), E2|C), 
 
violation of CMC follows, because the indicated equality is not reconcilable with the probability 
specification. Cartwright (1993) suggests that no further constraints can be imposed on the data by 
saying that ‘nature must fix a joint probability over the whole event space. [...] Nothing in the 
concept of causality or probabilistic causality constrains how it should be done.’ The latter statement, 
however, is exactly what is at stake, and could be refuted according to causal concepts that differ 
from the one that Cartwright seems to favour. 
The factory example has been criticised, in order to re-instantiate CMC, on the following 
grounds: 
1. A different interpretation of probability can be employed for which CMC holds. 
2. The causal specification is alleged to contradict the probability specification because product 
and by-product are not distinct variables, which is said to be required by CMC. 
3. The example can be attacked on speculative grounds, because:  
a. it can be claimed to be vacuous; or 
b. it is stipulated that a more informative set of variables can always be found in cases 
analogous to the factory example, and employing such a kind of variable set restores the 
CMC 
i. either by incorporating a further variable that turns the fork of the original 
causal model into an interactive fork, 
ii. or by incorporating two pseudo-hidden variables, thereby showing that the 
example violates the assumption of independent error-variables.  
Concerning 1., one can directly criticise the conclusion that the example is a counterexample against 
CMC by interpreting the probabilities in CMC as pertaining to physical chances. This replaces 
evidential relevance by causal relevance for the evidence variable that is conditioned on. The 
                                                          
20 If it did, the problem would fall into class EP2, since a wrong structure would result from assuming the causal 
Markov condition. 
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distinction between causal and informational relevance relates to what are sometimes called 
interventional and evidential probabilities (e.g. Sloman (2005)). Given this interpretation of 
probability, P (E1|C, E2) = P (E1|C) also holds true for Cartwright’s factory, because E2 is of no causal 
relevance regarding the chance of E1 occurring. This is obviously different from being a factor in 
chance-fixing E1. Of course, P (E1|C, E2) > P (E1|C) continues to hold true in an interpretation of 
informational relevance, in accordance with the probability specification. Hausman and Woodward 
do indicate the option of interpreting the factory in this way in Hausman and Woodward (1999), but 
they reject this kind of interpretation of CMC.  
Hausman and Woodward insist that causal and informational relevance are the same 
because of an alleged incompatibility with the condition CM1. Accepting the full specification of the 
example is therefore not an option in an attempt to defend CMC. According to their argumentation, 
either a more informative cause specification can be found, from which E1 or E2 follow 
deterministically, and in which case CMC would be true (see also 3.b.i.). This corresponds to the 
solution by the so-called ‘interactive fork’ (see Pearl (2000), page 62). Or the causal dependence of 
(E1, E2) on C is genuinely indeterministic. In this case, it can either be posited that E1 and E2 are not 
distinct, or they are distinct and therefore E2 can be intervened on without directly influencing E1. 
They subsequently undertake a case distinction for the latter case between the two relevant 
possibilities: P (E1| C & set E2) = P (E1|C & E2), or P (E1| C & set E2) = P (E1|C), where ‘set E2’ stands 
setting rather than observing E2. Both possibilities are subsequently rejected. 
Arguably, the distinction between causal and informational relevance occurs more naturally 
if, in contradiction to the usual approach of theories of probabilistic causality (see Hitchcock (2002) 
for an overview), a causal concept attributes a crucial role to state transitions occurring in time. It is 
according to such a notion of causality that E2 can provide additional information about E1, due to the 
property of being a document of a probabilistic process that has, in fact, happened, rather than 
being a factor in chance-fixing the event that is about to happen. That being said, this way of 
restoring CMC does not solve the epistemic problem of uncovering the structure for a system whose 
causal specification is unknown, rather than conceived, as in the case of the factory. 
Concerning criticism 2 in the above list, one part of the argument against the difference of 
causal and informational relevance used in criticism 1 hinges on the idea that E1 and E2 might not be 
distinct variables. If this can be proved to be true, it constitutes an independent argument against 
the example, which would be violating the correct specification of variables.  Hausman and 
Woodward see a strict connection between CMC and independently manipulable mechanisms in 
which one of two effects of a joint cause can be brought about by intervention without influencing 
the mechanism between the cause and the second effect. They call this assumption ‘MOD’ in 
(Hausman and Woodward (1999)), and it states the following: a direct intervention on one variable 
invalidates the equation that defines the variable as dependent, but leaves all other equations intact, 
including those in which the variable intervened on appears as an independent variable. If such an 
intervention is possible, then CMC is satisfied. MOD, if applied to a graph-theoretic model, implies an 
’arrow-breaking‘ notion of an intervention. Following this account, if an effect is brought about by a 
mechanism that hinges only on the cause-variable, then another effect of the same cause that is 
brought about by another, independent mechanism cannot bear any relevance on the first effect, 
and hence, conditioning on the common cause, the second effect should screen off. If this is not the 
case, then the mechanism is indeed one and the same for both effects, which should then be 
represented as a joint variable rather than two distinct variables. The example they employ for such 
a kind of joint variable is the atomic decay, which produces the emission of two protons and two 
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neutrons that, together, form the joint variable of an alpha-particle. 
Hausman and Woodward (1999) propose a proof that MOD implies CMC. Cartwright (2002) 
rejects this proof by showing that MOD does not bear any relevance in the derivation of CMC from 
the additional assumptions, from which CMC follows anyway. The disagreement, which the factory 
example can help to retrace, ultimately results from different notions of an intervention, the crucial 
concept implicit in MOD.  Applying the MOD condition to a parameterised model of the factory 
specification underscores that MOD does not bear on the validity of CMC, if MOD comes with the 
wrong notion of intervention. The model in Cartwright (2002) (variable denotation is adapted here 
for the sake of consistency) 
 
C = uc  
E1=  aE1 C + uE1             (eq. 1) 
E2=  aE2 C + uE2 
 
uses two binary random variables to specify the probabilistic connection between C and (E1, E2), with 
the following distribution: P(aE1 = 1) = P(aE2 = 1) = 0.8 and P(aE1 = 1 |aE2 = 1) = 1. The error term uc is 
not relevant for the current discussion, and uE1 and uE1 are set to 0 according to the specification21. 
Depending on one’s specific notion of a proper intervention, one can argue that MOD is applicable to 
this model – one can intervene on C (but, since C is the root node of the model, that is the same as 
conditioning on C, and therefore provides no relevant information); the interventions on E1 and E2 are 
likewise possible, e.g. via manipulating the error-terms. No equation, except the one that determines 
the variable intervened on, is invalidated. But this intervention is completely uninformative as for 
determining the independence of mechanisms, since both E1 and E2 only appear on the left side of 
the equation. Hausman and Woodward disagree with such a conclusion since they endorse a 
necessary condition of an intervention as defined in Spirtes, Glymour et al. (1993). The necessary 
condition is the characteristic of the intervention of breaking all causal connections from the 
previous (pre-intervention) causes to the effect, whose value is set by the intervention-variable, 
which is typically the, or part of an, error variable. Since there are good reasons to think that the two 
parameters aE1 and aE2 are not only correlated, but co-referential, it would follow that it is not 
possible to break the causal connection from C to E1 without breaking the connection from C to E2. 
Therefore, while it is possible to vary E1 by varying uE1, this would not count as a proper intervention. 
Independently of which definition of intervention should be applied to MOD in the factory 
example, one could still accept the conceptualisation of distinct variables as effects of independent 
mechanisms. One would thereby by-pass the epistemic problem and argue conceptually. However, 
this severely limits the scope of applicability of a CBN. Considering the alpha-particle example, the 
two neutrons and the two protons could engage in different causal relations in descendant nodes in 
an extended causal graph that traces further causal interactions. It is unclear how the treatment of 
such products and by-products by means of a joint variable would handle those kinds of 
                                                          
21 Alternatively, one can also mathematically model the same situation by correlating the error terms uE1 and 
uE1 of the two effects of C instead of the two parameters aE1  and aE1, which then would have to be set to 1 
unconditionally. That would create the same probability distribution. In order to keep the analysis less 
complicated, I ignore the variant of correlation the error terms. 
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circumstances. The strategy of finding a proximate and deterministic common cause of both effects, 
which might be possible for non-subatomic (e.g. chemical) reactions resulting in product and by-
product, does restore CMC. However, it conflicts with the underlying semantics of causal paths as 
independent mechanisms. 
A different strategy from the two aforementioned ones is to accept the consistency between 
the probabilistic and the causal specification, and also endorse the informational interpretation of 
CMC, but to attack the example on ontological grounds. 
Concerning criticism 3.a, a straightforward way to attack the probabilistic and causal 
specification of the example is to deny its occurrence in the real world, as suggested by Glymour 
(1999). In her response, Cartwright (2002) refers to macro-level examples from scientific practise, 
which are, in turn, rejected by Hausman and Woodward (2004). Whether those examples are 
accepted or rejected ultimately hinges on additional definitions of conditions that causal relations 
must satisfy, and therefore amounts to a conceptual decision.  
Regarding 3.b.i, a view which is a bit less strict implies that the kind of structure outlined in 
the factory example does exist on the level of coarse-grained variables, but that those variables can 
be replaced by more informative variables that restore CMC. This strategy interprets the factory case 
as an example of an ’interactive fork‘ (see Pearl (2000)). The probabilistic part of the causal 
connection between common cause and joint effects is disposed of by formulating an indeterministic 
relation between the cause-variable and a new, now proximate and common-cause-variable, which is 
connected, deterministically, to the joint effects via the fork-structure. This view invariably leads to 
the requirement to apply a CBN at the level of deterministic proximate causes for every fork-
structure with arrows that do not represent independent mechanisms. 
Using the interactive fork, however, is a measure of last resort for all causal theories whose 
underlying ontology is based on mechanisms, which is the case for Pearl as well as for Hausman and 
Woodward. Considering causal forks like the one of the factory example, CM2.2 can be valid due to 
two very different reasons: either because the causal relations of the fork are deterministic, or 
because the mechanisms, by which the common cause brings about the two effects, are 
independent of each other. Employing the interactive fork refers to the former; it makes CMC, as 
Cartwright (2002) puts it, ’trivially true‘, since the complete information about whether the effect will 
occur is encapsulated in the cause-variable, leaving no additional informational relevance that the 
other effects could contribute. Whichever additional variable is integrated into the model in order to 
produce the interactive fork, it is not guaranteed that this integration turns the incoming arrows into 
the two joint effects into distinct mechanisms, which is how the mechanistic ontology interprets the 
arrows. The deterministic relation merely conceals the fact that the mechanism might in fact be the 
same for both effects.  
As far as criticism 3.b.ii is concerned, Steel (2005) applies the concept of pseudo-hidden 
variables to the factory example, in order to show that a premise of CMC, independence of error-
variables, or, according to Steel’s terminology, exogenous variables, is not satisfied. The concept of 
pseudo-hidden variables is designed to make deterministic and indeterministic systems more easily 
comparable. Steel endorses Cartwright’s specification according to eq. 1, but interprets the 
coefficients aE1 and aE1 as parents of E1 and E2, respectively, not as direct causes. This unconventional 
treatment of causal graphs has certain advantages, since it allows one to apply knowledge about the 
behaviour of systems in deterministic models to indeterministic ones, but the inclusion of parents 
that are not also causes of the descendants does complicate somewhat the interpretation of the 
causal graph. Moreover, identifying the probabilistic coefficients with parents of variables in a graph 
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is itself an interpretation in which one does not necessarily have to follow Steel. Besides those 
conceptual problems, Steel’s approach, similar to the interactive fork solution, raises the same 
epistemic problem of identifying the pseudo-hidden variables with concrete observables, such that 
CMC could be restored on their basis. 
Very likely, other cases similar to Cartwright’s factory involve connections between joint 
effects that are non-causal. When product and by-product are interpreted as a chemical compound 
that is decomposed into its parts in the course of a chemical analysis, the relation that results in a 
probabilistic correlation is not causal. One could argue that graphs, for which the only connections 
between correlated variables are causally interpreted arrows, will necessarily distort either the 
causal picture, or lead to the wrong conclusion about the probabilities that the graph produces. 
Accordingly, one would have to rule out such variables prior to a causal analysis that is based on 
probabilities. The next section discusses this and similar problems that involve measuring the wrong 
variables. 
4.2.4.2 Measuring the wrong variables 
Whilst the previous section discussed the problems with the second of the two corollaries of CMC, 
and identified it as the more problematic one, this section is wider in scope and addresses the 
problem of the appropriateness of the variables in the first place, to which CMC can be applied.  
Hausman and Woodward (1999) refer to several examples for which wrong variables are part 
of a causal model. Among them is an often cited example from Salmon (1984), according to which 
two billiard balls share a quantity of momentum determined by a third ball that is struck by the cue, 
as well as some other examples that are taken from (Arntzenius (1993)). Examples with an analogous 
structure can be found in Cartwright (1989) and in chapter 4 of Williamson (2005). What all the 
examples have in common is a breach of CMC due to the screening-off condition failing in the light of 
non-causal dependences between common effects variables. Those non-causal dependences can be 
logical, mathematical, semantic, or based on non-causal constraint-relations. 
In order to reject those kinds of variables as a valid basis for a causal model, Hausman and 
Woodward employ the concept of independent manipulability, according to their MOD condition. 
The concept of independent manipulability hinges on the concept of an intervention. The latter can 
be interpreted as an introduction of an additional cause-variable into the causal model that enables 
one to set the value of an individual variable. The introduced cause behaves like an error variable in 
so far as it is independent of all other hidden cause-variables. Also, it switches off the influence of all 
other explicit causes of the variable it intervenes on. In the structural equation, this relates to 
substituting the function of all pre-intervention variables that determine the dependent variables by 
the function describing the newly introduced intervention variable. According to Hausman and 
Woodward, if mechanisms are independently disruptable, proximate causes screen off both distal 
causes and additional effects of the proximate causes from their effects, which validates all 
corollaries of CMC. Therefore, a necessary condition of appropriate variables posits that all effects 
are results of independent mechanisms. If effects are related according to one of the 
aforementioned non-causal relations, such independently working mechanisms do not exist, and the 
non-causally related variables should be ruled out or treated as a joint variable instead.  
 This definition of intervention according to the EI-criterion is analogous to the one given in 
Hausman and Woodward (1999), to which several authors have replied. It is defined as follows:  
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(EI) A necessary and sufficient condition for a process I to count as an intervention on the 
value of some variable X possessed by some individual i with respect to some second 
variable Y is that I changes the value of X possessed by i in such a way that if any change in 
the value of Y occurs, it only occurs through the change in the value of X and not via some 
other route. Graphically, this amounts to the requirements that  
(i) I is the only cause of X – all other arrows into X are broken,  
(ii) any directed path from the intervention variable I to Y must go through X,  
(iii) any directed path from any cause Z of I that goes through Y must also go through X, 
and  
(iv) I leaves the values taken by any causes of Y except those that are on the directed 
path from I to X to Y (should this exist) unchanged. 
Cartwright (2002) further refines the definition of an intervention by adding the restriction that no 
mechanisms, or functions, are altered while intervening on a target variable. Even though this 
extension prevents some wrong conclusions about causal structures that would arise when EI is 
applied, Cartwright rejects the very approach of an operational definition of appropriate variables.  
 Steel (2006) criticises the arrow-breaking account of intervention, since in practise the other 
causes that are not part of the intervention will often merely be conditioned on, rather than 
controlled for. Bogen (2004) expressed scepticism whether atomic interventions on a single target 
variable are possible in practise. The conditionals in the definition of EI are counterfactual. 
Counterfactual elements in causal theories have conceptual advantages, since it is necessary to cover 
such examples of causal relations for which it is not possible to intervene on the cause. Also, some of 
the aforementioned problems are thereby accounted for. But the strategy raises the epistemic 
question of whether the methodology is logically complete, given some causal structures are 
unknown a priori, an issue which Woodward, in his alternative EI-account of interventions, purports 
to solve. As Psillos (2002) emphasizes in his analysis, Woodward’s amalgamated account suffers from 
the same problems of circularity as the pure interventionist and counterfactual accounts.  
It remains to be seen whether a non-circular account can be developed based on the idea of 
independently disruptable mechanisms, but it seems doubtful that this is possible without the 
screening-off criterion implicit in CMC, since it provides significant information to distinguish 
different possible causal models. This may be the reason why many authors are unwilling to give up 
this structural condition of models that are based on causal graphs and probability distributions. 
Williamson (2005) proposes an alternative, epistemic account of dealing with the 
aforementioned counterexamples against CMC, the ‘qualified causal Markov condition’. According to 
this formulation, CMC need not be satisfied in all circumstances, and is subject to a causal 
epistemology of an agent. The qualified CMC is embedded in a framework that distinguishes causal 
belief and probabilities, which are interpreted as degrees of belief. Since the quantitative causal 
analysis is constrained a priori by the agent’s causal belief, which are represented as directed acyclic 
graphs, the agent is able to rule out the non-causal constraints that would otherwise invalidate the 
causal inference due to the failure of CMC. 
Summing up this discussion of CMC and the way it is linked to interventions, I can neither 
agree with Woodward and Hausman's idea that CMC is grounded in interventions, nor that a correct 
causal model requires CMC. Modular systems, as can be shown by means of a SEM, satisfy the causal 
Markov condition. A reasonable physical interpretation of independent equations, espoused by 
Woodward and Hausman, are independently manipulable mechanisms. But simple deterministic 
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systems, like Pearl’s example of ‘(wet grass) causes (slippery grass)’, also comply with CMC, and there 
is by no means a ‘mechanism’ between the relata that could be manipulated or switched off. On the 
other hand, the commonsensically correct causal model of Cartwright’s factory (see diagram 4.2), 
which also complies with a manipulationist interpretation of the causal concept, does not require 
CMC. It seems that the idea of independently manipulable mechanisms is a precaution to prevent 
the conflation of explanatory relevance with causation, but the criterion is too strong and not as 
strongly linked to CMC as Woodward and Hausman hope it is. Modular systems are particularly nice 
to handle causal systems, but the constraint would be too strong if we take it as a necessary 
condition for causation. If the conditions of CMC, faithfulness, and causal sufficiency are met by the 
data, the epistemic task of discerning causes and effects circumvents some of the problems that 
otherwise arise. However, given a variable set that is to be ordered causally, there is a priori no 
reason to assume that those conditions are generally met, in particular, since CMC abstracts from the 
nature of the causal relata.  
4.2.5 Criticism of the objectivist difference-making theories 
I have mentioned some problems of various theories already in the course of the overview of 
theories of causation at the beginning of the chapter. To these I have added the particular problems 
stemming from the assumption of the causal Markov condition. Now, since I have opted for the 
manipulationist approach in section 4.1, this section will be the place to distinguish further the 
theories within this class. The interventionist approach and the agency-approach can be considered 
as subclasses of manipulationism, as it was suggested by Woodward (2009). I will the call the former 
‘Objective Interventionism’ to further stress the aspect in which the two approaches differ. I 
attribute the authors studying causal Bayesian networks, like Judea Pearl and Peter Spirtes, Clark 
Glymour and Richard Scheines, and the philosopher James Woodward to the class of Objective 
Interventionism. In a nutshell, the problem addressed in the remaining parts of the chapter consists 
in the way the account of interventions can serve as a basis to solve the conceptual problem of 
causation successfully. I will start with a closer look at the work of James Woodward. 
4.2.5.1 James Woodward 
James Woodward construes one of the aspects of his theory as ‘interpretive or semantic’ (see, for 
example, Woodward (2008), Woodward (2003a), or the introductory chapter and page 38 in 
Woodward (2003b)). Although he does not, as my thesis does, explicitly tie the idea of such an 
analysis to interpreting causal judgments, he is likewise ontologically uncommitted and suspicious 
about an ultimately real level at which causation operates (see, for example, Woodward (2007); also 
page 36 in Woodward (2003b)). His interpretative or semantic aspects seem to refer to disclosing 
the meaning of certain technical concepts that belong to modelling paradigms that he himself 
espouses, like causal Bayesian networks and structural equations as considered in the previous 
sections. The directed acyclic graphs of Bayesian networks feature arrows that assign different roles 
to the nodes at their heads and tails respectively and therefore indicate a connection that is stronger 
than just an observable correlation between the two variables. In a completely analogous way, 
structural equations indicate, besides equality in values, different roles of the terms at the left and at 
the right hand side of the equation. It seems that Woodward’s account of interventionism seeks to 
provide the semantics of this asymmetry. This motivation of his would be in line with his view that 
there is a certain lacuna (see endnote 19 of Chapter 2 in Woodward (2003b)) in the accounts 
provided by Pearl and Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines, whose accounts he endorses to a large extent 
apart from this perceived lacuna. In his view, interventions, if taken merely as intuitively understood, 
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primitive notions, cannot be the basis of providing the semantics of a causal arrow in a causal graph, 
and therefore cannot be the basis of the semantics of the causal relation itself.  
It is instructive to look at a correspondence between Woodward and Pearl in (Woodward 
(2003a) and Pearl (2003)) regarding that issue. Woodward, in his critical notice, first quotes Pearl 
(2000), according to whom an intervention (dubbed PI) can be defined as follows:  
(PI) The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single variable, say Xi, is 
forced to take on some fixed value xi. Such an intervention, which we call ‘atomic’, amounts 
to lifting Xi from the influence of the old functional mechanism xi = fi (pai, ui) and placing it 
under the influence of a new mechanism that sets the value xi while leaving all other 
mechanisms unperturbed. Formally, this atomic intervention, which we denote by do (Xi =xi) 
or do (xi) for short, amounts to removing the equation xi = fi (pai, ui) from the model and 
substituting Xi = xi in the remaining equations. (p. 70) 
 
Woodward endorses PI to some extent, but identifies two problems of an account of intervention as 
given by PI: one concerns the aforementioned semantic (or interpretive) aspect, the other an 
epistemological aspect. The conceptual problem, as I call the former aspect, consists in the fact that 
Pearl takes the notion of a causal mechanism (as represented by an arrow or a functional 
relationship) as primitive and defines the notion of an intervention in terms of this primitive, thus 
losing any possibility of using the notion of an intervention to characterize the notion of a causal 
mechanism or relationship.’ (Woodward (2003a), p. 330) The epistemological problem derives from 
the fact that an intervention is allegedly defined relative to a graph whose structure is already 
known to be correct, and therefore such an intervention cannot serve to construct the graph in the 
first place.  
I will discuss EI, which is relevant to Woodward’s necessary and sufficient condition of what 
it means to say that one variable causes another (Woodward (2003b), page 45), alongside his 
criticism of Pearl’s definition. I will also consider the epistemological next to the conceptual problem, 
since the qualitative question of when one is entitled to draw an arrow from one variable to another 
has an importance for the conceptual question as well.  
 Woodward’s assessment of Pearl’s account is not entirely correct in both regards. Regarding 
the epistemological problem, he correctly observes that in the examples of the relevant chapter 3 in 
Pearl (2000) the correct causal graph is already given, and the calculations refer to quantifying the 
amount of causal influence of one variable on another. Probably, this is because Pearl assumes that 
some pre-interventional data about the joint distribution of variables in a considered system are 
always available, and in that case his criterion of ‘stability’ (Pearl (2000), p. 24) require that an arrow 
(or at least an undirected edge) is drawn between two variables. Having said that, it seems that 
nothing in the mathematical formalism of Pearl’s do-calculus stops us from drawing an arrow if an 
intervention really changes the target value distribution – or even if an updated calculation based on 
observational data brings that to light. But this would be merely tantamount to correcting an error in 
the causal inference that constructed the graph in the first place according to the criterion of 
stability. This is also indicated by Pearl’s reply (p. 343 in Pearl (2003)).  
The second element of Woodward’s scepticism – we are still dealing with the 
epistemological problem – seems to derive from Pearl’s criterion positing that an intervention 
leaves ‘all other mechanisms unperturbed’. Woodward’s concern is again with the mechanism 
connecting the putative cause with the putative effect. An experimenter might not know whether 
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there is a mechanism between two observables, so that she uses the intervention to discover a 
possible connection. At that point, an unfortunate misunderstanding kicks in. In Pearl’s view, leaving 
mechanisms unperturbed means leaving variables unperturbed, since these are equivalent to 
mechanisms. One equation in a structural model, interpreted as a mechanism, determines a 
variable, so in Pearl’s reading there is no existence independently of each other. Woodward 
obviously has another understanding of mechanism. A mechanism can be a part of one equation 
that determines a variable (see also the analysis in Hausman and Woodward (1999)) such that 
perturbing a mechanism could mathematically consist in the change of value of one parameter in a 
term of an equation. This might truly be a possible confounder that could mislead an experimenter 
into thinking an intervention on a variable has changed its putative effect as well, while in reality the 
intervention has changed the parameter of a mechanism connecting one of the effect’s actual 
causes. But Woodward’s example does not corroborate that this is his point, or at least his would be 
a badly chosen example. Woodward considers a paradigmatic example of an inappropriate atomic 
intervention, administering a drug in order to test its effect on recovery of some patients, without 
administering a placebo as well to a control group. The care the patients perceive to be receiving by 
being treated by the doctor introduces an additional mechanism from the act of administering the 
drug. It is a causal influence not passing through the cause-variable to be tested – the chemical 
effect of the drug. Therefore, it breaches condition (ii) in EI. Of course, there is no practical ideal 
intervention in this case, which would directly realize the consumption of the drug by the patient, 
which is why both EI and PI are not directly applicable. Practically, that is why the placebo is 
administered, such that the information the ideal intervention would have delivered can be 
approximated. The problematic point about Woodward’s criticism is that Pearl has a means of 
dealing with this kind of structure as well, his ‘backdoor criterion’ (Pearl (2000), p. 79), which 
includes Woodward’s criterion (ii). Crucially, Pearl’s criterion does not presuppose any more 
structural prior knowledge about the causal graph than Woodward’s list does, and thus Woodward 
has not raised any issue against Pearl’s account.  
This brings us to the second type of concern, the conceptual question whether we can define 
causation in terms of interventions. It is evident that Woodward thinks his treatment regarding this 
question is more adequate than Pearl’s. Pearl uses his notion of intervention interpreted as 
replacing mechanisms governing a variable as primitive. Woodward is worried that something is lost 
by doing that. The question, however, is: What do we gain by introducing an intervention variable I 
that is explicitly ‘causally’ related to the cause-variable in the original system, with respect to the 
interpretive question? Does Woodward have in mind a recursive definition of causation? But there is 
no supplementary element in his definition of intervention that stops the recursive regress at some 
point, as it is the case with other recursive definitions. For example, natural numbers can be 
recursively defined (see, for example, Jeffrey (1967)), by means of the successor function, but they 
require the primitive of ‘zero’ as an anchor point. Woodward does not provide any hint in that 
regard, and so his motivation for insisting that I must be connected causally to the system variable 
rather than treating intervention as a primitive remains unclear. 
I share Woodward’s basic concern, though. It seems to be about the question how the 
whole process of maintaining and updating causal knowledge was bootstrapped initially. The 
suspicion is that knowledge of a causal structure would not have been there if interventions of some 
sort had not been performed before, which, in turn, cannot depend on the knowledge of the causal 
structure intervened on. But some prior causal knowledge seems to be required for interventions. 
Woodward’s conviction that interventions do somehow bootstrap causal knowledge appears time 
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and again in his work. For example, the non-interference with a mechanism connecting the putative 
cause and its effect is not part of Woodward’s definition EI, since he wants to have the knowledge of 
a connection posterior to the intervention. There has been a debate between Woodward and 
Cartwright about this point (Woodward (2008), Cartwright (2002)) and I would be inclined to 
espouse Woodward’s view rather than Cartwright’s. But the idea of a proper intervention can be put 
into question nevertheless. 
There seems to be neither a real practical nor a real theoretical purpose that his definition of 
EI could serve – at least not over and above PI. In the clinical trials example, EI identifies 
administering a drug as an inappropriate intervention, since it introduces a confounder. But it does 
so only given we know the problematic structure beforehand. Also, in Woodward (2003b) and other 
works by Woodward there are no recommendations that allow circumventing such problems 
mathematically. On the other hand, EI is also insufficient to ground the meaning of causation, since 
it is a circular definition that does not allow defining causation recursively. But then both the 
theoretical and the practical use of this notion are in doubt, which leaves little room for any other 
sense of use.  
I also want to challenge the theoretical value of the definition specifically from the 
conceptual perspective and raise a concern that has, to my knowledge, not yet been highlighted. 
Apart from the additional constraints on the intervention according to EI, there is the simple 
conceptual question whether something like an atomic intervention (Pearl’s wording, but 
Woodward’s notion essentially copies that aspect) is possible at all, at least in the way Woodward 
defines it, i.e. by representing it as an additional variable. Woodward says that this variable is added 
to the model, and can be thought of as a kind of ‘switch’ (Hitchcock and Woodward (2003)). It has 
the values ‘on’ and ‘off’, and if we put it on, the cause-variable will be ‘on’, or will increase its 
positive value, or the event it stands for will become more likely to happen. The intervention 
variable does that in virtue of being a new, direct cause of the system’s putative cause-variable in 
the considered system. What is the semantic use of such a variable? How does it assume its values 
‘on’ or ‘off’? Supposedly by an arbitrary choice of the experimenter or by being directly tied to a 
random generator that outputs a value of a binary randomization function (for example, see 
Woodward (2003b)). But why not put the putative cause-variable ‘on’ or ‘off’ directly, if the point is 
the semantics of the drawing of an arrow between the putative cause and effect in the original 
system? At this point, keep in mind again Woodward’s explicitly expressed concern with semantic 
issues in contrast to any epistemological questions. In terms of semantics, there is no insight to be 
gained from the explicitly causal connection between I and A. For all (semantic) means and 
purposes, the way I and A are connected is identical to how A and its effect B are connected.  
In every example Woodward uses throughout the works cited in this section, I is a direct 
cause. But this is of no help, since direct causes are, according to Woodward’s definition, model-
relative. Due to his non-commitment regarding ontological questions, there is no hint in 
Woodward’s work that he considers a bottom level to exist where a direct causal connection cannot 
be further fine-grained by allowing the consideration of additional intermediate causes. But other 
senses in which the causal connection between I and A could have a somehow distinguished status 
compared to other kinds of causal connections are not identifiable in Woodward’s work, and 
therefore again the question of the semantic use of I arises. 
In order to distinguish correlations from causation, we want to have the cause reflect the 
assumption of an arbitrary value that differs from the value it has had before or would have without 
a manipulation. But then the intervention should not be represented by a variable on a par with the 
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other variables of the considered model, which implies the same level of observability as can be 
ascribed to the other variables. Once that is done, the only possible connection between the 
intervention variable and the target variable is a causal connection, whose semantic grounding the 
intervention was supposed to deliver. In contrast with objective interventions, agency might be of 
very limited use in concrete causal modelling. But it might also fulfil exactly the role that Woodward 
wants his interventions to play in his semantic, or interpretive, context: grounding the meaning of a 
causal judgment at an atomic level, as an unanalysable, non-causal connection between an agent’s 
free decision and an inter-subjectively observable action. Without resorting to the first-person 
perspective, as the agency-approach does (see section 5.19), it is difficult to make sense of the 
intervention variable. In particular, in which way can the intervention variable have no causal 
predecessor? Here another conceptual means that Woodward often makes uses of comes into play: 
a random generator. Either the result of a randomization is used to fix the value of the intervention 
variable causally, or the intervention variable is the result of this randomization.22 In either case, the 
result of the randomization is an inter-subjectively observable event distinct from the target of the 
intervention A, in which case the connection between I and A can again only be causal.  
Woodward asserts that his account is not viciously circular because the explanation of when 
there is a causal connection between A and B does not involve mentioning that causal connection 
(e.g., Woodward (2009), p. 254). But it should be clear that the kind of basic semantic grounding that 
agency proposes cannot be achieved by Woodward’s variant of Objective Interventionism.23 
Therefore, in terms of the conceptual problem, Woodward’s account adds little if anything to Pearl’s 
account, which he criticises because it presupposes that the experimenter knows the causal 
structure already.24 Woodward’s intervention presupposes a lot of causal structure too, apart from 
knowledge about the specific connection between A and B. But this is a far cry from explaining 
causation as such on the basis of interventions. 
4.2.5.2 Judea Pearl 
From the conceptual standpoint, I have two objections to raise against the theorists of causal 
Bayesian networks like Judea Pearl, Peter Spirtes, Clark Glymour, and Peter Scheines. First, they 
content themselves with mathematical notions, when it comes to defining causation via 
interventions. Regarding this matter I concur with Woodward that such an account is conceptually 
incomplete. According to Pearl, causality has been defined according to probabilities and causal 
graphs, or alternatively, on the basis of structural equations. These are interpreted as mechanisms. It 
seems that this interpretation is supposed to take into account that causation, or at least its relata, 
are part of the observable, physical world – otherwise there would be no difference between 
causation and causal inference. Still, even with the interpretation of equations as mechanisms there 
remains a lacuna in the account, which relates to the question of what exactly happens when we set 
                                                          
22 It is worth noting that, for Woodward, variables are the relata of causation. Therefore, there is no further 
need to distinguish the cases of a relatum, like an event, mapped to a variable, and a relatum being that 
variable. 
23 Price (2007) speaks of interventions, objectively understood, as ’Trojan horses’ for perspectivalism. I am very 
sympathetic to that interpretation. Price extends perspectivalism to the problem of grounding causal 
asymmetry in its temporal alignment, while I confine myself to the problem of the role of subjectivity in 
evaluating agent probabilities. 
24 For the sake of fairness, I need to say that in many other aspects Woodward’s theory of causation does add 
a lot to Pearl’s theory. 
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a variable to an arbitrary value. This operation can be defined relative to a mathematical model, but 
what is its equivalent in the physical world? The set-operation seems to contradict what we consider 
to be the ‘principle of causality’, namely that every event has a causal predecessor (different 
formulations, though all capturing the same idea, can be found in Norton (2003), Russell (1913), 
Eagle (2007), Hitchcock (2007)). My interpretation of the agency-approach will make use of 
computational models that could be realised by causal Bayesian networks, which makes my account 
look similar to Objective Interventionism in this regard. But these models are interpreted as the 
private property of the judging agent. The intervention of the agent, including its motivation for 
intervening, needs to be described according to another model. In this way, setting a variable to an 
arbitrary value can be interpreted while preserving the principle of causality (see chapter 7, where 
the idea is cashed out in terms of changes of levels of abstraction). 
A second objection against this variant of Objective Interventionism is connected to the 
upshot of the analysis of section 4.2. It is their incorporation of the causal Markov condition as an a 
priori constraint of causation.25 This entails that they have to reject correct causal models like the 
causal structure of Nancy Cartwright’s probabilistic factory example. I have discussed it in all 
mathematical details in section 4.2, so here I will just add a more commonsensical aspect. 
Qualitatively, the causal structure of the example has a V-shape with two effects and their common 
cause. The cause (the production process of a factory) brings about the occurrence of product and 
by-product. According to a pairwise evaluation of the process, (a) the production process causes the 
product, and (b) the same production process causes the by-product. Visualisation of (a) and (b) 
individually by means of causal graphs yields: 
 
Diagram 4.1 
Merging the two diagrams into one yields: 
 
Diagram 4.2 
This merging is licensed by the identity of the two cause-variables of diagram 4.1. But the 
corresponding causal graph is to be rejected according to Objective Interventionism, since every 
                                                          
25 In accordance with that interpretation, Pearl (2000) writes on page 44 that the ‘Markov assumption is more 
a convention than an assumption, for it merely defines the granularity of the models we wish to consider as 
candidates before we begin the search.’ 
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causal graph must comply with the causal Markov condition. As 4.2.4.1 has shown, this is not the 
case with the specific mathematical configuration of this example, so the causal graph is not a graph 
of a causal Bayesian network, and therefore not a valid graphical model.  
There are reasons for assuming the causal Markov condition to hold. Among others, without 
it the algorithms of causal inference will not be able to deduce the causal structure for probabilistic 
configurations like the factory example. But the conflict between intuitively judged correctness of 
diagram 4.2 and the causal Markov condition can be interpreted as evidence that the causal Markov 
condition is not directly required by a concept of causation derived from manipulability, but has to 
be seen as an additional constraint to be added to the constraints directly following from 
manipulability.  
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4.3 Problems and objections against the agency-theory 
4.3.1 Circularity 
The agency-approach to causation shares the challenge of conceptual circularity with the 
interventionist approaches. James Woodward admits that his own theory is circular, but not that it is 
viciously circular (see previous section). Since Woodward, on the other hand, raises the objection of 
circularity, unanimously with some other writers, against the agency-theory of causation, it seems 
that this theory, in his eyes, embeds that vicious kind of circularity. 
There are several accounts of agency on offer. In line with the general tendency of 
conceptual minimalism of my approach I will discuss the alleged problems of agency by looking at 
the account by Peter Menzies and Huw Price, who propose a concrete conceptual equation between 
causation and agency. According to Menzies and Price (1993), an ‘event A is a cause of a distinct 
event B just in case bringing about the occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a free 
agent could bring about the occurrence of B’. The account can be read as a reductive analysis of 
causation on a metaphysical level, while I will, again, interpret the above characterisation of 
causation, more conservatively, on a conceptual level only, i.e. in terms of analysing a causal 
judgment.  
Applying Price and Menzies’ ‘agency-formula’, as I will refer to the above characterisation 
henceforth, the judgment ‘A causes a distinct event B’ can be equated with the judgment ‘For me, a 
free agent, A would be an effective means to bring about the occurrence of B’.  Circularity allegedly 
enters the agency-account, since at least the concept of ‘bringing about’, which occurs twice, seems 
to require the causal concept, our explanandum. Moreover, assuming ‘bringing about’ is indeed a 
causal concept, a second problem occurs: the problem of regress. Consider the first occurrence of 
‘bringing about’ in the agency-formula: ‘the free agent brings about A’. Now, suppose that relation is 
causal and can be broken down into its constitutive elements by the agency-formula. Let us denote 
the second occurrence of ‘free agent’ that thereby arises by C. Then a two-fold application of the 
agency-formula to the causal claim ‘A causes B’ would yield that this claim meant something like ‘a 
free agent, bringing about an occurrence C, such that A effectively follows from C, would thereby 
render the occurrence of A an effective means to bring about B’. Iteration of this procedure of 
substitution leads to a never-ending regress of conceptual analysis. Thus, construing the operation 
of bringing about by the free agent in causal terms raises a conceptual circularity and a conceptual 
regress problem. 
4.3.2 Anthropomorphism 
Anthropomorphism is the second usual objection raised against agency. The content of this 
objection is the prima facie limited scope of (human) agency, and therefore the agency-theory’s 
difficulty to accommodate instances of causation that lie outside the reach of any agent. In 
particular, it seems problematic to explain causal intuitions concerning the distant past. Hausman 
(1997) distinguishes the objection of limited scope explicitly from anthropomorphism in a second 
sense, viz. the anthropocentrically interpreted asymmetry of causation. 
4.3.3 Two additional concerns 
One caveat against picking difference-making as the starting point for developing an account of 
causation needs to be spelled out explicitly. Sometimes this caveat is formulated by stating that 
difference-making, which includes agency among a wider class of approaches, ‘conflates 
epistemology with the metaphysics of causation’ (Menzies and Price (1993), page 188). But this is 
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just a particular variant of a wider concern, namely that the difference-making aspect of causation 
does not capture the essential nature of causation, but merely a corollary of causation, or one of its 
emergent features. Given the metaphysics of causation, causes happen to make a difference to their 
effects. That does not mean that causation is essentially difference-making. I take it that this 
objection impacts not only the metaphysical or ontological problem, but the conceptual problem of 
causation, too, although to a somewhat smaller degree. To illustrate the point, one may adapt an 
example from Kant (1787):  
‘A straight line between two points is the shortest,’ is a synthetic proposition. For my conception of 
straight contains no notion of quantity, but is merely qualitative.’ 
It is not spelled out in the section containing the quoted sentences what Kant means by his 
qualitative criterion of what it means to be a straight line, but one can assume that it turns on a 
notion similar to constancy of direction of a line we are drawing between its two endpoints. Thus, 
what corresponds to predicating a concept synthetically or analytically in Kant’s original intention of 
his example concerns an analogous distinction to be made in the present context: we can predicate 
a concept by one of its corollaries, or analyse what is contained in the concept. Some philosophers 
doubt that any meaningful difference exists between the two operations (see Quine (1951)). But one 
should at least keep that caveat in mind, since its denial is at least counterintuitive. The property of 
tracing the shortest distance between two points might be sufficient and necessary to identify a 
straight line, and as good a criterion as saying ‘the straight line is the one connecting two points 
while not changing its course’. Still, the latter criterion seems to follow more immediately from the 
concept of ‘straight’ than the former, and therefore it seems to more correctly capture what is seen 
as its essential property. Notice that the property of tracing the shortest distance between two 
points is not just a good indicator for having a straight line, like an animal’s capacity to fly being a 
good indicator for being concerned with a bird (despite the existence of penguins and bats). In 
contrast, the criterion is without exception sufficient and necessary for belonging to the class of 
straight lines (at least within Kant’s geometrical context, the Euclidian geometry). That is why the 
strategy of looking for specific counterexamples will fail in that case, given that a priori this method 
is a good strategy for demonstrating the accidental nature of a non-essential property.  
Clearly, the example concerns the conceptual problem of a straight line, and one cannot 
eschew the problem by delegating it to a metaphysical level to be dealt with at another time. 
Therefore, if one takes the distinction to be problematic in this geometrical case, the question arises 
whether there is a similar relation of causation’s property of difference-making with another, more 
directly given property of causation, from which the difference-making logically follows. Concerns 
like these, although with a more metaphysical or ontological than conceptual flavour, have been 
expressed in the context of causation by Cartwright (2001), Psillos (2002) on page 103, or Mumford 
(2009), who writes that standard approaches to causation like those based on counterfactual 
dependency or probability-raising capture what is ‘symptomatic of causation, not constitutive of 
causation’. 
 Since my approach explicitly allows an operational definition of causation, the problem 
seems to be less severe in the conceptual than in the ontological context. As far as causation 
understood at type level is concerned, there does not seem to be a serious issue for difference-
making approaches. However, explicating what is meant by ’actual cause‘ will raise problems that 
seriously challenge the approach. I will outline my own solution to that problem in section 7.1.1. 
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The second caveat concerns the subjectivity of a causal judgment based on agency. If I can 
manipulate the state of a light bulb via manipulating the state of the switch, then there is hardly a 
question, from my own viewpoint, whether a causal connection exists between the two, whichever 
physical realisation the connection might have. But the agency-theory makes the bold claim that all 
causal judgments have this shape. How can the subjectivity of the personal judgment be squared 
with the much wider scope that such a judgment is assigned according to the agency-theory? There 
is a sense of identity of the causal agent, for example a human agent who actually performs the 
manipulation, and the epistemic agent, who formulates a causal judgment based on her own 
experiences of manipulation, rather than being just an observer. But causal judgements often have 
inter-subjective relevance and they seem to require objective criteria, not just underlying subjective 
impressions. We are thus caught in a dilemma. Either we have to opt for an extensionalist ontology, 
which accepts only objects that are reconcilable with observational facts. Then we have to make 
sense of the difference which the identity of causal and epistemic agent makes for the causal 
judgments, on the basis of the non-subjective terms of the extensional ontology. Or we can embrace 
the subjectivity, and accept the identity as a ground of unity of the experiencing subject and its 
agency. But then we have to make sense of the seeming objectivity of causation.26 This thesis takes 
the second horn of this dilemma.  
I take it that, in the light of these two additional caveats, there will probably be residual 
doubt whether causation can really be explained in terms of agency, no matter how successful the 
analysis will be from this point. I will in the following section analyse causation in terms of agency, 
then provide an account of how I think the concept of agency arose from our natural history, which 
makes it look as if agency is in turn, via its secondary intension, reduced to regularities. This might be 
the case, but I am not sure whether this reduction still covers a dedicatedly conceptual, rather than 
ontological, reading of the problem. Also, regularities and causation are different concepts. If a 
concept of agency can be shown to be integrated into a picture of nature comprising only 
regularities, this would be a good sign, as long as the agency-notion of starting a new causal history 
is preserved. I will argue that it is preserved (section 6.2.8), and that this is exactly why causation 
needs to rely on agency. Therefore, the direction of dependence is conceptually fixed according to 
my hypothesis. Still, someone might argue that the concept of causation comprises something 
different. An appropriate analogy might be the perseverance of the notion of gravitational mass, 
which persists as an independent concept even after we have learned that the theory of relativity 
explains its identity with inertial mass (not just identity of their values, which has been 
experimentally shown by Galilei already, but of their concepts). If agency and causation are an 
analogous case, then in the end it is up to everyone’s posterior intuition whether causation and 
agency are different concepts or not. 
4.3.3.1 Recapitulation of the state of the argument and outlook on further sections 
Interpreting the equation ‘causation = agency’ on a dedicated conceptual level that gives meaning to 
a causal judgment seems to be a more cautious approach compared to the alternative of tackling 
ontological questions in the course of the analysis. But there are further downsides. The agency-
                                                          
26 An example of an approach that tackles the first horn of the dilemma is Quine (1969). An example of tackling 
the second horn is Williamson (2005). But Williamson’s ‘objective Bayesianism’ has a different focus than 
mine. While I see the central challenge in making sense of the identity of agency across time, Williamson 
focuses on how objective values of degrees of belief can arise, given we start from a personal set of beliefs of 
causal agents, which implies a subjective degree of belief interpretation of probability. 
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account seems implausible to many philosophers and is therefore rather unpopular. It is also rather 
surprising for the layman. Thus the equation does not seem to report the simple fact that causal 
agents explain their judgment based on the concept of agency. A normative reading of the account 
seems to circumvent that problem, but prompts the question what the normative force would 
consist in. If agents make use of intuitions concerning agency while forming judgments, even if 
causal judgments involving natural forces rather than human agents are concerned, then the 
account would have some normative force. Empirical evidence might be sought in order to 
corroborate such a claim, but this thesis goes another way and draws heavily on the argument 
(expounded in section 5.1) that agency has the virtue of being a non-circular theory of manipulation. 
It takes the advantages of the manipulationist approach without suffering from the obvious 
circularity of Objective Interventionism. The section that immediately follows that section is an 
expedition into the thermodynamics of causation, which will serve two purposes. It gives an account 
of how to objectify agency in order to get a concept of causation that allows the construction of 
more informative models of causal relations than what the agency-account in its bare sense allows, 
i.e. qualitative, subjective judgments concerning a binary relation between two variables. But the 
section also serves the purpose of giving further support to the idea that our causal judgments do in 
fact involve intuitions concerning agency, by looking at the conditions under which we judge agency 
as observers. Simple organisms, living organisms, act on a very basic level already. These 
considerations allow retracing how the acquisition of the concept of causation might have taken 
place. If an account of non-circular concept acquisition were successful, that would be a further 
piece of evidence that agency intuitions underlie our causal intuitions – if further plausible 
arguments can be made that concept acquisition based on agency feeds into concept application 
based on agency (see Ahmed (2007)). This part of the argument is speculative, though, and the 
connection between concept acquisition and concept application is only indicative, not compelling. 
Even with the prospect of phylogenetic concept acquisition the question of conceptual priority 
cannot be clearly settled, and it seems to touch intricate, transcendental questions time and again. 
But even independently of the question of concept acquisition we can synthesise a concept of 
natural action in such a way that it serves the purpose of tackling the second horn of the 
aforementioned dilemma. Natural actions can be embedded into an objective view of the world, and 
the identity of causal and epistemic agent will be replaced, from the perspective of an external 
observer, by the identity of information processor and actor. This will give us the constraints we 
need to go beyond the ‘agency-account taken at face-value’. The basic idea I am following is the 
same by which Huw Price is guided in Price (2007), although the structure of his argument is a bit 
different from mine. 
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5 The Problem of Circularity 
In section 4.2.5 we have seen the problems of Objective Interventionism concerning the project of 
solving the conceptual problem of causation. Circularity cannot be circumvented, because 
‘intervention’ is a causal concept, and regress cannot be circumvented, because the atomic 
intervention cannot be atomic. This raises the question whether the notion of agency fares better 
than the notion of intervention, given that the common basis of both approaches is the idea that a 
manipulation helps in distinguishing correlation and causation via different evaluations of 
conditional probabilities in each case. The starting point of the new interpretation of agency that I 
am defending is based on Menzies and Price’s formulation of the agency-theory (Price and Menzies 
(1993)), according to which ‘an event A causes a distinct event B’ can be equated with the judgment 
‘For me, a free agent, A would be an effective means to bring about the occurrence of B’. If we apply 
this ‘agency-formula’ to a causal judgment we can explain what we actually mean by the judgment. 
This is one way of making sense of the conceptual problem of causation. The question of circularity 
then clearly hinges on whether the notion of ‘bringing about’ is causal or non-causal. Apart from this 
question the concern has been raised whether ‘free agent’ and ‘means (to an end)’ could be causal 
notions (see Ahmed (2007)). 
5.1 Circularity of ‘bringing about’ 
This section will concentrate on the two occurrences of ‘bringing about’, and I will show that 
applying two different interpretations to each of the occurrences yields a non-circular analysis of 
causation. These interpretations entail a conceptual structure of causation that is analogous to Fred 
Dretske’s semantic information theory with its conceptual analysis of ‘becoming informed’  (Dretske 
(1981)). According to this theory, the process of becoming informed consists of two parts that are to 
be clearly distinguished: the transfer of information via a physical channel, and the subsequent 
formation of a semantic structure, called ‘digitalisation’. Leaving out any one of the two parts 
renders the concept of becoming informed incomplete (see section 5.2). My interpretation of the 
agency-formula was inspired by this bi-partitioning of something (causation) that prima facie seems 
monolithic. Both accounts, the one covering causation and the one covering becoming informed, are 
exactly analogous to each other in this respect. Building on the conceptual foundation to be 
developed in this section, it can be shown that informational and causal views on events can be 
integrated into a combined account, according to which information channels and causal 
mechanisms are identical. Digitalisation and direct action are parts of causation by information 
(section 6.1), a concept that further binds becoming informed and causation to each other. 
Causation by information is relevant because it helps us make sense of the seeming contradiction of 
construing some events as actions, while at the same time allowing them to be effects of causes. 
Causation by information will also be seen to be an important step toward a natural account of 
agency in section 6.2 and its sub-sections. Both of these aspects will be crucial for my overall 
argument. 
In line with this outlook, this section of the thesis is structured as follows. The first sub-
section will be concerned with Menzies and Price’s agency-theory of causation, and I defend my 
interpretation of this theory against the objections of conceptual circularity and conceptual regress. I 
will offer a new interpretation of the notion of ‘bringing about’, and will then illustrate the 
applicability of this interpretation by an example situation. The subsequent sub-section will be an 
interpretation of Dretske’s account of the flow of information and the subsequent formation of a 
semantic structure by digitalisation (both taken together henceforth simply referred to as ‘becoming 
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informed’). The interpretation is selective and also simplifying with respect to the overall theory of 
knowledge and the flow of information given in Dretske (1981). The intention behind this 
simplification is again to highlight the conceptual aspects of the problem to explain becoming 
informed, while Dretske’s original aim is the development of a full-scale ontological account of 
information. What the conceptual problem exactly means in the context of becoming informed will 
be covered in the corresponding section. I will illustrate the applicability of this interpretation by 
picking up the example situation of the sub-section dealing with agency, and this time applying the 
informational rather than the causal perspective. 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be seen as self-sufficient conceptual analyses of their corresponding 
concepts, with special focus on avoiding the problem of conceptual circularity. But they also serve as 
a foundation for clarifying, in section 6.1 and the subsequent sections, a wider range of problems 
that involve the relation between information and causation. First and foremost, we require an 
answer to the question concerning the source of the analogous structure that has arisen from the 
preceding sections. Information and causation will be shown to be systematically tied to each other 
by the notions of causation by information and informed action. Information flow and causal flow 
are seen as identical, as are information channels and mechanisms. Which of the views is assumed 
when describing an agent’s interaction with the observables of a channel depends on purpose and 
context. The section will also expound how it is possible – and why it is not a contradiction – that an 
agent can understand its own action as an action, although the action is judged to be dependent on, 
and even caused by, information. 
In interpreting the agency-formula in the conceptual sense I probably depart from Menzies 
and Price’s intentions. They do not distinguish the conceptual and the metaphysical level of the 
problem. For example, on page 188 of Menzies and Price (1993), they say an objection needs to be 
addressed that ‘Agency accounts confuse the epistemology of causation with its metaphysics’. Later, 
picking up that very objection, they ask rhetorically: ‘Doesn’t the agency-approach to causation 
confuse the epistemology of causation with its conceptual analysis?’ (p. 192) It seems they 
distinguish only the epistemological from the metaphysical-and-conceptual level, conflating the 
latter two. In contrast, I assign the conceptual level of the problem a dedicated treatment.27  
The suggested interpretation of the first occurrence of ‘bringing about’ (the free agent’s 
bringing about A) is to see it as an immediate and free action, relating an agent’s free decision with 
an observable event without any intermediate observables in the model determined by the context 
of the utterance of the judgment. The immediacy of the action circumvents the circularity and 
therefore also the regress problem. I will first offer a logical proof of this claim and then illustrate it 
by means of an example. Suppose that bringing about were a causal notion. Then ‘the free agent 
brings about A’ can first be turned into ‘the agent’s free decision brings about A’, by virtue of 
substituting the first of the two relata by ‘the agent’s free decision’, according to my suggested 
interpretation of the relatum related to A. Substitution of ‘brings about’ by ‘causes’, by virtue of the 
assumption that the relation is causal, yields ‘the agent’s decision causes A’. But applying the 
agency-formula to analyse this putative causal relation would amount to the proposition ‘bringing 
                                                          
27 Since the meaning of ‘metaphysics of causation’ depends on how one understands the term ‘metaphysics’, it 
might be argued that Menzies and Price really mean ‘conceptual analysis’ by the term ‘metaphysics'.  In that 
case no issue needs to be raised. In order to make sure that the explanation of what underlies a causal 
judgment is properly distinguished from the question of the reality of causation independently of its observers, 
I contrasted the conceptual problem from the epistemological and the ‘ontological’ problem. That being said, 
whenever I use the term ‘metaphysics of causation’ I mean the ‘ontology of causation’, not its concept.  
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about the occurrence of the agent’s decision would be an effective means by which a free agent 
could bring about the occurrence of A’. Finally, we substitute by ‘the agent’s free decision’ in the 
same way as before, which results in a proposition about the agent’s free decision to bring about a 
decision to bring about A. But the decision to decide to bring about A is the decision to bring about A 
already. The attempt to analyse ‘to bring about’ in the way we analyse ’to cause’, on the basis of the 
agency-formula, yields a repetition of vacuous relations between identical relata. Thus, a semantic 
interpretation renders the agency-formula inapplicable at this point, for the very reason that the 
relation of bringing about is not causal. 
The series of substitutions and its result can be interpreted in two ways. Either the first 
instance of ‘bringing about’ is not a causal concept. Thus the agency formula is, from the point of 
view of agency-theory’s own logic, not applicable. The circularity and regress objections would be 
rebutted. Or my suggested interpretation of the first relatum, construing it as a decision of the free 
agent rather than the agent itself, is incorrect. But that this relatum is something distinct from an 
observable, something which is true of the two causally connected relata (A and B), lies at the heart 
of the agency-theory. Unfortunately, the way in which the agency-theories are often dismissed in 
overviews over theories of causation leaves the question of the first relatum, on which the circularity 
objection hinges, unexplored. Objective Interventionism, with its ‘intervention variable’, which is 
causally connected to the variable representing the cause of the causal claim, definitely makes the 
wrong logical move at this point. 
Besides resulting from a free decision, I suggest to interpret the means A as a direct action. 
Both points require further explanations. The agent’s freedom from coercion will be explained in 
section 6.2.8, where it will be made plausible why the decision to act cannot be an observable of the 
model that the agent uses to judge the efficacy of its own intervention. Similarly, the agent’s 
‘bringing about’ is immediate relative to the agent’s own model, while it can appear to be mediated 
from the point of view of an external observer.28 An agent’s model implies that the chain (or, more 
generally, the web) of observable causal events starts only after the immediate action has occurred. 
I understand the claim of the agency-formula, interpreted on the conceptual level, to imply that an 
agent can formulate a causal claim ‘A causes B’ already, and therefore has some causal concept. But 
the agent, at this stage, does not necessarily need to have the ability to analyse his causal concept 
further (see again chapter 3 on this point). This is where the agency-approach suggests: ‘When you 
say ‘A causes B’, what you actually mean is ‘I, a free agent, can use A as a means to bring about B’’.  
We grant the agent (possibly just the illusion of) immediate access to A according to its 
model, whereas the way B is connected to A is something the agent must be able to justify further. 
As indicated above, a minimal justification can be a belief in a dependence relation between the 
observables. This interpretation leads to the (only seemingly) paradoxical view that ‘raising one’s 
arm’ can be given a causal and a non-causal interpretation. It is causal, since we can tell a plausible 
mechanistic story explaining how this event unfolds. This, however, is the perspective of an external 
observer. An external observer might even be able to pin down where and when a decision-event 
takes place in the brain of the acting agent. In that case not only the immediacy of the action, but 
also the causal history of a ‘free’ action would be gone. But from the perspective of the acting agent 
who also models the event as her own action, both the immediacy and the property of starting a 
new strand of causal history are implicitly given by the concept of action. The identification of event 
                                                          
28 Crucially, these changes of perspective do not correspond to a simple zooming-in into a more fine-grained 
model, since not only the number, but also the quality of the relata of the model changes during such a 
transition (see section 7.1) 
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A as object of immediate action on the one hand and as part of the continuous chain of events 
according to the principle of causality on the other hand, leads to conflicting intuitions similar to a 
Kantian antinomy. In chapter 7 I will explain by means of different levels of abstraction, which 
correspond to the above different perspectives, how the conflict can be explained further.29  
To illustrate the freedom from coercion and the immediacy of action in a causal model, I will 
describe an example situation that involves agency. The example affords both a causal and an 
informational interpretation, which is why I will pick up the example again in the sub-section about 
information-flow and becoming informed. The example features Alice, who pays a visit to Bob. She 
wants him to open the door and hence looks for a way to inform him about her presence. A good 
way to do that would be to make the doorbell ring. But she cannot do that directly. What she can do 
directly is depress the button and thereby exploit her background knowledge about the causal 
connection between button and bell. Depressing the button is an adequate measure to make the 
bell ring, in order to inform Bob about her presence, such that eventually he will open the door. The 
strategy is very straightforward and commonsensical. But in order to plan an action explicitly one 
has to resort to some kind of model of the situation in question.30  
The given situation involves just a sequence of events (featuring no side effects, branching, 
etc.), which are – putatively causally – connected. At this stage it must be decided only on how fine-
grained such a model has to be in order to represent the sequence of events adequately. In this 
case, an adequate partitioning might be the highlighting of some conspicuous events, such as: D 
(depressing the button) – R (ringing doorbell) – V (Bob’s vibrating eardrums) – and, finally, B (Bob’s 
reaction). Alice’s goal is to cause Bob’s reaction. Connected to devising a strategy to accomplish that 
task is the conceptual problem of how Alice could underpin the underlying causal judgement, given 
that she is prompted to utter her causal beliefs explicitly. It is then, according to the assumption of 
the agency-approach, possible to equate her explicit causal judgment ‘Depressing the button causes 
the ringing of the bell’, and, by virtue of transitivity, ‘Depressing the button causes Bob’s reaction’, 
with the judgment: ‘Alice believes that her bringing about the depression of the button is an 
effective means to make the bell ring’. 
One could raise the question how exactly the agent intends to depress the button. Given the 
initial model of evaluation, the model according to which Alice plans her action explicitly, there was 
no need to answer that question in more detail: she does it simply by depressing the button. The 
explicit question of how to proceed at this point raises the need to create a different model. An 
adequate answer that follows the new context could be: ‘You depress the button by touching it with 
your outstretched finger’. The model that Alice used to plan her action considered the button as an 
object under her direct influence. However, given a new context has been fixed by the question 
‘How can you depress the button?’, and a reflection is forced upon the agent about what it actually 
is that she can directly influence, the hand has become the immediate object of intervention. The 
movement of the button has become subject to a mechanism that connects the hand and the 
button, a mechanism that she hopes will work for the sake of her final intention. The impenetrability 
                                                          
29 See also Floridi (2010) for discussions of how the Kantian antinomies relate to the method of levels of 
abstraction. 
30 ‘Planning an action’ is, in this context, to be understood as explicitly planning an action, such that the plan of 
action can be subsequently justified and explained to others. This is to make sure that the agent possesses at 
least an intuitive concept of causation and can be prompted to utter his causal beliefs about the situation. 
Understood in this way, planning and explaining match each other, apart from the difference given by the 
prospective and retrospective stance, respectively. 
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of matter can be seen as establishing the required ‘mechanism’ between hand and button, and this 
will bring about the depressing of the button indirectly. In a normal context, there is, of course, no 
need to take into consideration a more proximal object than the object we can immediately reach by 
stretching out our arm. An analogous reasoning in the informational (rather than causal) context 
makes us consider the object causing the sound to be the one we are acoustically interacting with 
during an auditory perception, rather than with our auditory sense organs. The shift to a new model 
of evaluation, which is prompted by the question that seeks to go into more detail concerning the 
action, is, in the terms of section 3.1 and chapter 7, a change in the level of abstraction. It often 
helps, in order to prevent confusion, to give an answer at the same level of abstraction at which the 
question was asked, and likewise make a shift to another level of abstraction transparent during the 
course of a discussion. Chapter 7 will come back to this point once the levels of abstraction for the 
different kinds of judgment will have been made available. 
The above considerations show that the assignment of the role of immediate object is 
subject to the required level of detail of the model. There is no need to consider a specific kind of 
object rigidly as the immediate object. Certainly, normally there is no X such that the proposition ‘I 
bring about X, as a means to bring about the movement of my hand’ is true. We normally just move 
our hand and there is no intermediate event we can arbitrarily bring about such that it follows that 
our hand moves. Accordingly, it would neither make sense to plan our action on the basis of bringing 
about such an X, nor to explain our past action involving hand movements on the basis of an 
intermediate X. However, in a scientific context – under a change of the level of abstraction – there 
is certainly such an X to be tracked if we mean by X an observable (nervous, or biochemical) signal 
that precedes the contraction of our hand muscles. Even pragmatically such a change in the model 
might occur, e.g. when people have to learn to control artificial limbs by means of computer-brain-
interfaces. On the other hand, given that the mechanism between agent and distal object is very 
tight and a task is repetitively performed, the agent might treat the distal as the immediate object, 
thereby simplifying the model. In our situation, it might appear to Alice that she can influence the 
bell directly, only to be frustrated by an eventual failing mechanism, which forces a change in her 
way of modelling this type of situation.  
Keeping in mind this context-sensitivity, we can recapitulate that the solution to Alice’s 
causal problem ‘How can I cause Bob’s reaction?’ involves the selection of an adequate immediate 
object. Such an object is adequate if it can be considered directly accessible by the agent and if it is 
connected to the desired final state by a chain of correlated observables (D-R-V-B). Whereas, in the 
informational context, we are interested in backwards correlations (e.g. what observing R tells us 
about the prior D), in the causal context we are interested in forward correlations (e.g. what will 
happen to the bell, and finally, concerning Bob’s reaction, given that we now manipulate D). 
Obviously, the issue of context sensitivity also applies to the second part of the modelling decision, 
which concerns the numbers of observables to be taken into account. That is where V might drop 
out of the model as gratuitous. 
The scheme that describes the creation of an agent’s causal model resembles a two-stage 
process that will be revisited in the subsequent section, covering the process of becoming informed. 
A causal agent that faces a situation with several variables must build a model at a level of 
abstraction that is appropriate to context and purpose. The agent can perform an intervention on 
one of her immediate objects, and she will select the intervention that is most likely to result in a 
beneficial outcome. Whereas complete control of the direct object is assumed, affecting the indirect 
(distal) causal object, or the event involving the indirect object, is dependent on the correct workings 
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of the mechanism that connects direct and indirect object. The details of the mechanism are subject 
to various empirical constraints, and the agent’s knowledge about the functioning of the mechanism 
might reduce to just a belief in the dependence of B (indirect object) on A (direct object).  
A similar thing happens in the semantic information theory (see next section), where we 
take apart the physical and the semantic aspect of becoming informed, in order to address both 
aspects separately from each other. At some point, describing the flow of information by the 
constraints of a physical channel has to stop, in order to shift to a semantic perspective. If this shift 
of perspective doesn’t happen, a concern of regress similar to that afflicting the agency-account 
arises for the semantic information theory: tracking the flow of information of a perception further 
and further inside the agent’s brain, we will eventually encounter the observable reaction of the 
agent (who is, in such a context, considered as an object of investigation), and no semanticisation of 
information ever seems to happen. This informational variant of the regress problem is discussed, 
for example, by Dennett (1991), page 49. Similarly, the solution to circumvent the circularity and 
regress objection against the agency-account of causation requires a shift of perspective from a 
mechanistic point of view, or at least a view relating observable regularities, towards a view that 
relates a free decision to act with an observable event resulting from the decision. This would be my 
suggestion for how to interpret the relation between the ‘free agent’ and the A.  
The immediate action, which is identical to the ‘means’ (=‘A’) in the agency-formula, has the 
property of immediacy by virtue of the fact that, from the point of view (or within the model) of the 
agent who evaluates the causal claim, there is nothing in between the decision to act and the 
immediate object, or immediate event, A.31 To catch up the most obvious example of such an 
immediate action, consider again that (usually) we cannot bring about an X, such that then our arm 
rises. Instead, we bring about the rising of our arm, without even being able to further explain that 
ability.  
Two additional explanations and qualifications might be helpful. First, it seems that the 
immediate action A should always be identified with voluntary bodily movement. However, in the 
story about Alice’s desire to inform Bob about her presence at the door, the immediate object 
initially considered was the button, not the hand that operates the button. A change in the model by 
incorporating the hand was required only after asking a further question that was not tractable 
within the old model. Fixing the model at the right level of detail depends on context and purpose, 
which in the context of explaining causal judgements in turn depends on what counts as a 
satisfactory explanation. It seems that the level of satisfaction of an explanation depends both on 
constraints from the considered situation and on factors we can decide, just like the selection of 
what the immediate object is. The notion of a constraining affordance is of help here. The limbs of 
our body over which we have voluntary control make them a natural choice of immediate object, 
but in most contexts the direct control will be extended to at least the range of things we can reach 
with them. There is little sense in assigning a degree of probability of our successfully depressing a 
button, just like we would not assign a probability to the movement of our hand towards the button 
– except if special circumstances obtain.32 By contrast, what we expect to happen once we have 
depressed the button is outside of our control. We have done what we can and now have to rely on 
the chain of unfolding, merely observable, events to work in our favour. 
                                                          
31 As it is usual practice in the literature on causation, I abstract from the differences between objects and 
events if they are considered as causal relata. 
32 For example, someone might want to prevent us from reaching the button. 
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The second qualification is just the reminder that, in my interpretation of the agency-
formula, analysing the causal relation by splitting it into immediate action and correlated 
observables is meant as a solution only to the conceptual problem of causation. We can now explain 
what we mean by the judgment ‘A causes B’. The metaphysical problem of causation ontologically 
understood, i.e. the question: ‘what is the X, the Humean secret connection, between the A and the 
B, such that they seem to be necessarily correlated?’ is left unanswered. The agency concept 
requires regularities rather than explains them. Likewise, epistemological problems, such as how to 
proceed in order to disclose the causal structure of an unknown system, are not addressed. To 
indicate the problem, consider that Woodward (2003b) explicitly forbids, in his definition of 
interventions, any side effects of intervening on A in a suspected ‘A-causes-B-structure’, in particular 
side effects influencing B. That is because, by probing the structure by means of the interventions, 
we want to know whether any causal influence reaches B via A, not through the intervention itself. 
In the agency-formula, we have a similar, but less precisely formulated idea, reflected by the fact 
that the agent assigns A as the object of immediate action, while B is her indirect object, to which a 
probabilistic value needs to be assigned. The agent might be right or wrong in the attribution of the 
roles of cause and effect to the considered variables, but the analysis in terms of agency, 
conceptually understood, is pitched at the right level no matter whether the agent is right or wrong, 
since it is the agent’s judgment that we want to explain in non-causal terms. The agent that 
performs the action (even if only hypothetically) is identical to the agent who judges the causal 
connection.33 Under general assumptions, we can assume that if an agent mistakenly believes she 
brings about B via its direct object A, while for all other observers she brings about B directly, then it 
is reasonable to assume she will find out eventually and change her model accordingly.34 Still, it must 
be granted that the agency-approach alone is much too crude for deriving a methodology for causal 
analysis, given the epistemological problems that the Objective Interventionist approaches try to 
solve. Each of the two manipulationist approaches serves a different purpose, and one must choose 
the adequate approach depending on whether one is more interested in questions concerning the 
causal structure of specific systems, or interested in the analysis of the concept of causation and its 
acquisition as such. 
 
  
                                                          
33 This is the crucial difference between the agency-approach and the objective interventionist approaches. 
The license to judge that the causal influence comes from A is due to the fact that A is the intervening agent’s 
direct object.  
34 Interestingly, on page 193, Menzies and Price (1993) cite the fact that it is a virtue of agency-theories to 
account for the fact that an agent can err in his judgement. But this remark of theirs suggests a conceptual 
reading of their solution, rather than clarifying the ‘metaphysics’ of causation. (I suspect, however, that Price 
would not concur with my assessment) 
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5.2 A parallel analysis – Becoming informed 
Dretske (1981) outlines how a message that contains a contingent matter of fact can be 
communicated from a sender to a recipient, such that it can subsequently underpin a belief state 
associated with the recipient of the message.35 Contingent matters of fact are understood as matters 
of fact, which, for all we know, could have turned out differently, which is why we can only learn 
about them via a corresponding signal reaching us from where the fact occurs, but not by other 
means, e.g. by means of a deduction from information we already possess.36 For an explanation of 
how a signal, or message, is transferred through time and space, Dretske makes use of the concept 
of a Shannon information channel (Shannon (1949)). In Dretske’s reception of that concept, any 
physical structure can serve the purpose of being a substrate for an information channel as long as it 
features the following structural constraint: the catalogue of alternatives at the receiving side, of 
which one is realised after the transfer, must allow a faithful mapping to one of the alternatives at 
the sending end of the channel, which corresponds to the specific event that is to be communicated. 
The condition ensures that an observer can infer what happened at the source based on the 
received information at the receiving end of the channel. This condition will be called henceforth the 
non-equivocation condition. 
Examples of designed channels are telephone lines: what the listener hears corresponds to 
what the speaker at the other end has said. The way in which animals leave traces (footprints, 
broken twigs, etc.) when they move about can count as a natural channel, and a tracker can extract 
the information about the whereabouts and conditions of the animals that caused the traces. With 
the concept of the channel the flow of information, the passing of the information from one relay 
station to next, is covered. The subsequent step that completes the process of becoming informed is 
the extraction of information. In the phone call considered before, the voice is first turned into an 
electric signal and is then passed through various different relay stations, until it is finally understood 
by a listener, rather than passed further along. 
In Dretske’s information-theoretic model, the semantic quality that information acquires by 
the second stage of the process (the ‘understanding’) is covered by the concept of ‘digitalisation’ of 
information.37 Digital information and analogue information are defined relative to each other. 
Below are their definitions and a few examples to illustrate the point (quotations in this section are 
from Dretske (1981)). 
Analogue and digital information: ‘A signal (structure, event, state) carries the information that 
s is F in digital form if and only if the signal carries no additional information about s, no 
information that is not already nested in s’s being F. If the signal does carry additional 
information about s, information that is not nested in s’s being F, then the signal carries this 
information in analogue form.’ (p. 137) 
The definition makes use of nested information: ’The information that t is G is nested in s’s 
being F = s’s being F carries the information that t is G.’ (p. 71) 
                                                          
35 To avoid confusion, I use the contrastive pairings of ‘sender’ and ‘recipient’, when agents communicating via 
a channel are concerned, and ‘source’ and ‘receiver’, understood as correlated events that are connected by a 
channel. 
36 Dretske does not use the denotation ‘contingent matters of fact’ literally, but it is adequate for the kinds of 
fact that his theory describes; therefore, I am going to use this denotation henceforth. 
37 This is not to be confused with the ordinary meaning of that word, as the subsequent definitions show. 
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Dretske’s examples of analogue and digital include a picture that contains, among other objects and 
persons, the depiction of a woman. Since there is more in the picture than just the woman, the 
picture represents the fact that she is part of it in analogue form. A digital form of this piece of 
information is the proposition: ‘The picture contains the depiction of a woman’. This proposition 
abstracts from all the other details of the picture, and once it has replaced the picture as a container 
of the information, the rest of the information included in the picture is unrecoverable. The 
proposition does allow us to infer more from it, e.g. that a human being is in the picture, but this 
piece of information is only nested in the proposition (the former follows logically from the latter) 
and therefore does not undermine the fact that its form is digital. Another example of nestedness is 
the information that a geometrical figure is a square, which contains, as nested information, the fact 
that the figure is also a rectangle. Generally speaking, logically weaker pieces of information are 
nested in logically stronger ones.  
Yet another way to understand the distinction is to consider digital and analogue gauges. 
Looking at a hand of an analogue gauge enables the conversion of the information into a 
representation by a digital number, and the closer you look at the hand, the more digits of precision 
the digital representation allows. But given we are left with only the digital number, the level of 
precision is fixed, and the analogue information is irreversibly lost. This loss of information during 
digitalisation contrasts with the preservation of information that we associate with the Shannon 
channel, and it is a decisive step to explain cognition. As Dretske puts it, ‘a cognitive system is not 
one that renders a faithful reproduction of its input in its output. Quite the reverse. If a system is to 
display genuine cognitive properties, it must assign a sameness of output to differences of input. In 
this respect, a genuine cognitive system must represent a loss of information between its input and 
its output.’ (p. 183) 
We pick up the example situation of Alice visiting Bob once more, and the protagonists are 
this time sender and recipient of transmitted information. Analysing the example, I will focus on the 
conceptual problem of becoming informed, which I define as follows: how can an agent explain the 
judgment ‘I have become informed of the contingent matter of fact F’? Answer: by stating ‘I have 
perceived the signal r, which tells me that F has happened at the source of the physical channel that 
transmitted the information about F.’ In other words, my becoming informed can be conceptually 
equated  with  the perception of a signal and the transmission of information through a physical 
channel. The motivation for this equation will be explained in the rest of this section. 
As an illustration of the concepts, I will reuse the example from section 5.1 with Alice, the 
visitor, who pays a visit to Bob. Alice arrives at Bob’s door. At his door she depresses the button of 
the doorbell. The bell rings, and Bob gets informed that someone stands in front of his door. Turning 
to the conceptual problem, we could now prompt Bob to account for his belief state. Two things 
seem to require an explanation: his belief concerning the perception of the doorbell and the belief 
mediated by the perception, which implies the presence of someone at the door. The proposed 
solution uses two relations. One relation is between a catalogue of observable events at the source 
and a catalogue of observable events at the receiver e.g. ‘button is depressed/is not depressed’, and 
‘bell ringing/not ringing’. The relation allows a one-to-one-mapping, and is therefore a function, 
from the receiver-events to the source-events. The second relation is between a catalogue of events 
at the receiver and a subsequent semantic structure, e.g. a proposition such as ‘I hear the doorbell 
ringing’ (stemming immediately from the perception), or ‘Someone is at the door’ (via inference 
from the previous proposition). Making use of this bipartite scheme of becoming informed in a 
specific situation implies the identification of a direct object (henceforth also called ‘the object of 
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the digitalisation’) and an indirect object (connected to the direct object via an information channel). 
The object of digitalisation is the received information signal, which is given in analogue form. On its 
grounds the semantic proposition is formed by digitalisation, e.g. from the ringing doorbell we can 
form the semantic proposition: ‘I hear the doorbell ringing’. 
Application of the scheme to the example of Alice and Bob yields that the bell is Bob’s 
obvious choice as object of digitalisation, since it is his object of perception. Perception is an act that 
we do not further analyse under normal circumstances; we can therefore form a digital structure, 
like a belief or a proposition, on the basis of the object of perception without further ado. It is, of 
course, correct to say that the sonic waves travelling through the air from the bell to Bob’s ear, and 
likewise the vibration of his eardrums, are part of the same physical information channel that the 
ringing bell belongs to. But, whereas – in ordinary contexts – it makes sense to say ‘I heard the 
doorbell, therefore someone has depressed the button’, it does not make much sense to say ‘My 
eardrums are vibrating; therefore someone has depressed the button’. Accordingly, the explanation 
of our belief state does not have to go into further detail at this point – the object of perception is 
the agent’s best choice as object of digitalisation, and these two kinds of object will match in a 
normal context of explanation. The further matters of fact are then inferred on the basis of the 
agent’s knowledge about the information channel, and with that second step the explanation of the 
belief state ‘Someone is at the door’ is complete. 
This scheme of explanation takes for granted both that our sense organs work the way they 
are supposed to, and that the button-bell mechanism works the way it is supposed to, viz. such that 
the non-equivocation condition of an information channel is satisfied. In a default context, the 
assumptions are reasonable and, correspondingly, the explanation as to why we feel informed 
should be satisfactory. It needs to be emphasized that a satisfactory answer depends on the type of 
question asked: of course it is a perfectly reasonable assumption that there is an information 
channel, not only between button and bell, but also between bell and eardrums, eardrums and X 
inside our skull, and it might be an interesting scientific question to determine X. But the relation of 
digitalisation is not to be described by a channel, i.e. coupled systems that transport relevant 
differences through time and space. Rather, it is a relation between an observable and a semantic 
structure. The selection of the object of digitalisation therefore marks the end of viewing the process 
of informing by means of a channel and the entrance into viewing it under non-observable, semantic 
categories. This change of views, however, corresponds to a change of context: at some point there 
is the expectation that a different conceptual scheme must be employed in order to render a 
satisfactory explanation; the physical scheme has to transition into a mental scheme, in order to 
explain agent-behaviour in an adequate way. 
The way we applied the template of ‘becoming informed’ to the example is not meant to be 
rigid, but can vary according to context and purpose of the required explanation. Given that our 
sense organs work the way they do, it is a constraining affordance to choose the object of 
perception as the object of digitalisation, but in explaining a judgement it is still an agent’s decision 
to bipartition the process in a way tailored to a specific situation and the combination of context and 
purpose. For example, it would indeed be an awkward application of  the concept of ‘hearing’, if one 
applied it to the vibration of one’s own eardrums, but it is conceivable that one could learn to refer 
to such kind of event in more detail, such that inference to external  distal events becomes possible 
on the basis of such a referencing. But before it would make sense to apply the perceptual scheme in 
this way, one would expect a strong shift to an alternative context-purpose combination, compared 
to a more ordinary situation. The same holds true if the more distal event, the depressing of the 
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button, D, receives the status of the direct object of digitalisation. R, the doorbell’s ringing, is much 
more likely to be identified as the direct object, and knowing D via R is a matter of causal inference. 
Given we are not deaf and our ears are not plugged, we have quasi-direct auditory access to a 
doorbell. If it rings, we will hear it. At least we do not have to take into account whether the air will 
transmit the sonic waves in a specific situation – it will do so in the usual circumstances. Door 
buttons are much more likely to fail to bring about the desired effect of R, and in this situation (at 
the latest) we learn that we do not in fact hear the button itself. Again, the identification of direct 
and indirect object is not a rigid scheme across different situations, but in normal contexts the 
choice naturally arises from the way our perception works. For someone it might make sense to 
think of a context-purpose combination where the mechanism connecting bell and button is so 
infallible that a simplification of the model does make sense. Then the two collapse into one object, 
and one hears the button, therefore someone is at the door. 
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6 Thermodynamics of acting and information processing 
The preceding paragraph is an attempt to defend the claim that Peter Menzies’ and Huw Price’s 
version of agency-causation can be given a reading that does not lead to a vicious circularity or 
vicious regress on the conceptual level. However, this was merely a defence by logical means. We 
have assumed that all the concepts are already in place and have meanings that are readily 
exploitable for a logical discussion. The import of agency-causation will be increased significantly if it 
could be made plausible how the concept of agency can arise in nature. A conceptual account 
merely requires making explicit the grounds of a causal judgment, by analysing the causal relation 
into its elements of a direct action and a subsequent, correlated second event. But the normative 
strength of this account would be reinforced if it were at least plausible that a judgment of causation 
is genuinely grounded in a judgment of agency, rather than just allowing a truth-preserving 
substitution of an agency-statement for a causal statement. The question of concept acquisition is a 
not so convincing aspect in Price and Menzies (1993), relying on the idea of ‘ostension’. I will argue 
in this section that a teleo-semantic account is more plausible than an account based on ostension. 
The teleo-semantic account that I am suggesting turns on both the necessity of acting, necessary for 
the very existence of the agent, and the sense of identity of actor and processor of information 
about the contingent environment.38 
Next to the question of concept acquisition and its import for the normative strength of the 
account, the agency-formula has at least two further questionable elements, besides the still to be 
dealt with anthropomorphism. It contains a reference to a free agent, a qualification that needs to 
be made further sense of. And the formula appears to be applicable to only a very confined range of 
examples, namely binary relations between two observables. But causal judgments seem to require 
the accommodation of much more complex judgments than binary relations. 
Finally, there is more reason for dealing with Dretske’s semantic information theory and the 
agency-theory of causation in a parallel fashion than merely exhibiting their curious similarities. In 
the following subsection, I will elaborate on the idea of mechanisms as information channels and 
vice versa, identifying one with the other. This has been foreshadowed already in the preceding 
section by the fact that we used the same example (the doorbell example) for both kinds of things. A 
logical next step is to look at the semantic aspects of both perspectives, viz. the informational 
perspective (looking at physical differences that allow inferring what has happened at an earlier 
time) and the causal perspective (considering differences that make some difference at a later time). 
If the semantically enabled agent that processes incoming information is also a causal agent that 
intervenes on the basis of the information, a new composite concept can be created, dubbed 
‘causation by information’. Again it is a desideratum to further justify this synthesized concept by 
looking at natural constraints on causation. It will be seen that actions are indeed informationally 
constrained like the new concept would have suggested. To summarize the points above, here are 
the four motivations to look at the natural origins and physical constraints of agency: 
 We need an explanation of causation by information and its inherent referentiality to past 
events. This phenomenon seems to allow causally inert facts of the past to become causally 
efficacious and also seems to contradict Markovian (‘memory-less’) pictures of causation 
                                                          
38 A teleo-semantic account similar to mine, although not directly grounded in thermodynamics, can be found 
in Dretske (1988); also see chapter 12 in Dretske (2000). 
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 We would like to have a more plausible account than ostension of the concept acquisition of 
agency. The idea of the section will be that if we can find the non-causal criteria for 
identifying an action then these could be the criteria to explain the acquisition of the 
concept of causation non-causally. This would corroborate the claim of the agency-approach 
that intuitions about actions actually underlie our intuitions concerning causation. 
 We want to understand what the criterion is for being considered a free agent. Similar to the 
problem of causation by information, we have in the agency-formula a concept that seems 
difficult to square with Markovian models of physical reality, and this fact calls for a further 
explanation. 
 We need further information about actions, in order to accommodate the agency-account to 
cases beyond the abstract, binary relation between two observables. I will try to achieve this 
by looking at the properties of natural actions. 
I will discuss the four motivations in the following sections in the order given above, starting with 
causation by information. 
The argument that I am trying to make at this point goes as follows: We have seen that 
agency can solve the asymmetry problem of causation; viz. from the first-person perspective the 
judgment of manipulation of a B via a direct action A is possible and well-grounded, since it does not 
require an objective truth-maker besides the subjectively felt control of B via A. In cases of causation 
by information we are able to judge whether an action has been taken by another agent. If the 
assumption is true that this judgment hinges on information processing, and in turn information 
processing is physically grounded, then by causation by information no discontinuity is introduced 
into a conceptual framework that assumes a causally inert past. What appears as a semanticisation 
is actually dependent on the physical processing of information that dispenses with any references 
to past events. The seeming lacuna that has been introduced by causation by information would 
have been closed. As for the question of concept acquisition, actions are also teleological; they tend 
to bring about a beneficial situation. If the actions in causation by information, whose constraints 
are examined in the present section, are of the same kind as the actions which we hypothetically 
perform while judging cases of efficient causation, then causes in general, by virtue of identity with 
natural actions, inherit the constraints of actions thus construed. The constraints that the following 
subsection will yield are properties typically ascribed to causation: locality, asymmetry, and 
regularity.39 Before the identity of agency and causation can be established, the physics of 
information flow and information processing and their bearing on the notion of action will have to 
be examined. 
  
                                                          
39 For a similar list, capturing the same idea of identifying typical properties of causation, see Menzies (1996), 
or Psillos (2002), page 6, 7.  
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6.1 Causation by information 
Given the conceptual clarifications of the sections 5.1 and 5.2, we can now turn to the question of 
what happens if the information processor is also the acting agent, and the information received 
constrains or triggers its action. This would tell us something about the relation between 
informational and causal processes. The doorbell example considered in the previous sections shows 
that the same chain of events can be seen as established by a causal mechanism, or alternatively by 
an information channel. Other considerations of sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggested that the notions of 
mechanism and information channel both allow for different ways of modelling a chain of events, 
depending on the level of detail required by the explanation. Conspicuous events like the vibration 
of a doorbell can be considered, under an appropriate alternative level of abstraction, as just one 
station within a – potentially continuous – spatio-temporal causal process (or process of information 
flow). To pick them out as distinct events seems to be a constraining affordance, dependent on the 
required level of details. These considerations apply to both kinds of channels, which suggests that 
mechanisms and information channels are physically the same kinds of things. On the one hand, the 
availability of information about a contingent fact at another place requires a causal mechanism to 
convey the information. On the other hand, an effect occurring at some place often40 allows 
abduction to the cause that brought the effect about via a causal mechanism, such that information 
about the occurrence of the cause is preserved. 
Furthermore, both the informational and the causal view featured operations with 
unobservable relata, which, respectively, mark an ’exiting from’ and ’entering into‘ the channel view 
on the events, i.e. the view that picks out correlations between observable relata. Having already 
identified mechanisms with information channels, it now makes sense to ask whether the 
informational and causal pictures can be even more tightly linked, by tying up these two semantic 
operations, digitalisation and immediate action, which, in the doorbell example, are at opposite ends 
of the chain of events. This linking leads one to the concept of causation by information, to be 
elaborated in the following paragraphs. Causation by information requires both the extraction of 
information from a signal and the subsequent acting on the basis of the information. Otherwise it 
was not the information contained in the signal, but rather other properties of the signal that were 
causally efficacious. Some examples will highlight the difference.  
6.1.1 Intuitions concerning mechanistically and informationally driven processes 
A typical example one can look at in order to study the phenomenon concerns the sunflower. We 
can construe the movement of the sunflower’s blossom following the trajectory of the sun as caused 
mechanistically by impinging sunlight. In this reading the relation between sunlight and movement 
of the blossom is like the relation between the button and ringing of the doorbell: the ringing is 
brought about by the button’s depression in the sense of Aristotelian efficient causation. According 
to this reading, the sunflower, like the doorbell, does not process information about prior events and 
reacts to them appropriately, but is rather forced to move according to a chain of efficient causes. 
The alternative reading is that the sunflower processes the information about the whereabouts of 
the sun based on the light that impinges on the flower. It extracts the information and then reacts 
appropriately. According to the mechanistic intuition, the sunflower is merely a part of a causal 
                                                          
40 If the mechanism conflates two kinds of causes into one effect, the condition of non-equivocation of an 
information channel is not satisfied. So, to be precise, mechanisms that are also information channels with 
respect to a set of possible causes must satisfy this structural condition. 
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mechanism. According to the informational intuition, it is an agent that processes information and 
acts both on the basis of this information and according to its vital purposes. A similar typical case   
which divides intuitions over whether a process is information-driven or driven by efficient (or 
mechanistic41) causation is the case of the thermostat. Some would say that it is a semantic device (it 
processes information about the ambient temperature in order to regulate it); some would say it is a 
simple causal device with no semanticisation (for a discussion, see Bogdan (1988)). We can call it the 
‘semantic stance’ (in analogy to Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’ in Dennett (1987)) if we impute the 
capacity of semanticisation to some system in order to describe its behaviour. 
There are certain criteria that make a difference to our intuition of whether we see efficient 
or information-constrained causation. For example, it would not be, to say the least, very 
straightforward to attribute the semantic stance to a billiard ball when we see it moving after the 
impact of the cue ball. As the analysis in section 5.2 has shown, and as 6.2.4 will confirm, 
information flow requires physical channels with relay stations that are physically affected by prior 
parts of the channel, and that pass that physical influence on to the next station. At the final stage, 
there is a kind of epistemic interaction with a signal. But a billiard ball seems to have no way (as far 
as we can tell) to physically represent ‘information’ about another approaching ball, such that it can 
then react based on that information by moving spontaneously. That is because the only observable 
way in which the billiard ball is affected by the event of the approaching cue ball, and therefore the 
only way in which the ball could represent physically the appropriate information, is its own 
movement. But this is its reaction already. The direct contiguity of cause and effect featured by this 
example is not, as one might think, a necessary criterion for why we are sometimes reluctant to 
impute the semantic stance, as the following example will show. 
Imagining a long series of dominoes we do not naturally think that the last domino falling 
‘extracts the information’ that the first domino in the series had been tipped over, on the basis of 
the ‘signal’ that the last but one domino is falling against it. In this example, there is not at any 
station a process of referencing back to past events, but only concatenations of Markovian pairs of 
events: once the proximate cause is instantiated, the previous events in the causal chain, including 
the distal cause, are irrelevant. For the last domino falling, the length of the chain is irrelevant.  
Contrast this with a letter that is written in Australia, to be sent to Europe. It refers to some 
contingent matter of fact,42 say the death of one of the addressee’s relatives, which can be seen to 
have caused the writing of the letter. The letter is then passed from one messenger to the next, 
which can be seen as intermediate relay stations, until it arrives at the final recipient. In explaining 
any behavioural reaction the reader of the letter might show (we can assume she will be emotionally 
affected), the intermediate stages including the most proximate cause seem to be irrelevant. The 
crucial difference is the event referred to in the letter, and the referential relation between letter 
and event seems to enable the causal power of the letter, not any of the intrinsic physical properties 
of the communication medium. This, as opposed to what happens to the series of dominos, is an 
example of causation by information. 
                                                          
41 I use the terms efficient, mechanistic or Markovian causation interchangeably when contrasting them with 
causation by information. All three expressions are adequate to highlight the aspect of memoryless causation, 
for which distal causes have no further effect once the proximate cause is set. 
42 Another remark concerning terminology: When I refer to ‘(causally relevant) past matters of fact’, I do not 
want to imply that these kinds of causal relata are not events. So, I do not use ‘matters of fact’ as a contrastive 
term in contrast to ‘events’. I refer to these relata by ‘matter of fact’ instead of ‘event’, since those are events 
whose existence is preserved as facts by being informationally represented and thereby have the potential of 
becoming causally efficacious. 
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One can look at another pair of examples, which both feature the same causal agent (a 
chemical agent in this case). This shows even more strikingly the connection between 
semanticisation of information and what we consider to be a thereby caused action on the side of 
the effect. Consider the two relations: 
(1) The toxic gas caused lung injuries as it spread in the building. 
(2) The toxic gas caused people to flee from the building.  
The first process does not involve semanticisation. But the second does, if we assume, for the sake 
of simplicity, that the people involved are fully aware of the threat, and could therefore account for 
their rushing out of the building. They understand that a threat to their health and safety is present 
and decide the best option to take is leaving the building as quickly as possible. Along with the 
semanticisation in (2) comes the feature of action, which (1) lacks. What has semanticisation to do 
with action as realizing one of several possible options? For sure, whereas one cannot say that it 
would be an option not to get injured given one inhales the gas, one can well say that, although 
contrary to one’s interest, it would be an option to stay in the building, rather than fleeing, thus 
becoming exposed. But attributing the ability to ponder alternatives requires the imputation of 
semantic capacities in order to make sense of the alternatives in the first place. The default way we 
can expect the scenario to unfold is that the spreading news about a toxic substance causes flight 
reactions – hence the causal connection in the judgment (2). But the semanticisation of that 
information by some involved agent ‘cuts through’ the connections of this mechanism (i.e. the 
spreading-news-mechanism), via which the toxic gas exerts its remote influence. By virtue of the 
semanticisation by digitalising the information, room is made for an alternative decision. No such 
cutting-through occurs if the gas is inhaled, because here the agent does not process the gas as a 
signal carrying information about another event. In short, if an agent, due to the lack of semantic 
capacities, cannot make sense of the situation it is in, then it cannot choose between different 
alternative actions either, because these alternatives would be meaningless for the agent. 
Therefore, imputing the capacity of choosing between alternative options implies imputing the 
semantic stance. 
To recapitulate the result so far, we have found that information is merely the carrier of 
some difference-making factor that was realised earlier. But information and past matters of fact do 
not simply stand in a relation of proximate and distal cause, although there is nothing wrong in 
saying that the past matter of fact caused the information referring to it. The simple relation of 
proximate and distal cause is instantiated in the series of dominos. The last but one, say, tips over 
the last one. The first domino of the series was the distal cause of the last one’s falling, and also a 
cause of the last but one’s falling. But if we assume that somebody’s hand had intervened on the 
first domino, such that the series of falls was started, we do not consider the first domino as a 
‘highlighted’ cause in any sense. The hand could have brought about the series of fallings at any 
number in the series. Causation by information works differently. Here, the way the signal takes 
makes not much of a difference, as long as the signal carries, by virtue of its structure, information 
about the past matter of fact. The people rushing out of the building filled with intoxicated air might 
have been informed via very different pathways, e.g. seeing the effect of the gas on someone who 
has inhaled it, being warned by others, hearing an evacuation alert signal, etc. 
Causation by information raises questions. It seems as if the causally inert past – and also 
counterfactual facts, via mis- or dis-information – becomes causally efficacious via information. That 
is a conceptual, and maybe an even ontological problem. Moreover, an epistemological problem we 
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have at this stage is that even if we count information, rather than its physical carrier, as a cause of 
action, we still have to explain why, by means of observations, we can tell apart efficient causation 
and causation by information. Why does the interaction with a physical signal differ from efficient 
causation, if we cannot tell whether it was information contained in the signal, or the physical 
properties themselves that cause the subsequent physical behaviour? Sure, we normally do not 
observe light rays, or sonic waves, or pheromones, but the cause object, which makes a remote 
difference only via these means. But even if the physical carriers of information are conspicuous, it 
seems we can tell the difference between the two types of causation. It is possible to ‘drill down’ to 
arbitrary levels of detail to track the physicality with both efficient causation and causation by 
information, but for the latter case we are running the risk of completely missing the story of causal 
relevancy. In causation by information, the object of the referentiality, the actual explanans, is 
dropped at some point. It needs to be underscored that this is a problem of judgment from the 
third-person perspective, because the first-person perspective (dealt with in sections 5.1 and 5.2) 
with its operations of semanticisation and direct action, does not allow such a drill-down, since the 
objects of semanticisation and direct action are immediately and unanalizably connected to the 
subject. 
When the agency-formula is applied to examples of efficient causation (for now: as it is 
intuitively understood in contrast to causation by information), we do not take the meaning of the 
free ‘action’ at face value, a fact that can easily be shown by applying the scheme to a chain of 
efficient causes. We need the notion of action to easily identify the cause-object as the source of the 
causal influence. But with the dropping of the agency-scheme we lose the action. This can be 
exemplified by a causal chain consisting of a billiard cue and two billiard balls, directly and indirectly 
affected by the striking of the cue. The causal chain thus can be represented as: A cue approaches a 
cue ball (event A), strikes the cue ball such that it roles toward the black ball (event B), which in turn 
brings about the movement of the black ball (event C). Or: A causes B, B causes C. To prevent 
concerns that the two B’s might not be identical, and thus not give rise to a causal chain, I will frame 
the event concerning the cue ball more carefully as moving on its actual trajectory for some distance 
in between the final position of the cue and the initial position of the black ball. Although the crucial 
part of B’s causal influence on C is its impingement on the black ball (let us call this B*), the rolling 
toward that very place is a necessary precondition of reaching that position, and therefore a cause 
of the latter. By means of causal transitivity, B causes B*, and B* causes C, therefore B causes C. 
Now, B is clearly an effect of A. We now apply the agency-formula: A causes B, iff A, brought about 
by a free agent, is an adequate means of bringing about B. That seems correct. Does B really cause C, 
too? Yes, since, according to the agency-account, if we bring about B by any means, of which the 
proper use of the cue would be one, then C would follow. B clearly has a dual role, as cause and as 
effect. As the role of effect shows, B’s movement cannot be spontaneous, although this is what its 
having the role of cause with respect to C depends on.  
We can do the same test with what would be judged a causal chain comprised of both 
causes and actions, independently of the agency-approach. Take a pair of amoebas, of which one, by 
virtue of its smaller size, qualifies as possible prey of the other. The appearance of this smaller 
amoeba in the range of perception of the bigger one (event A) leads to a movement of the latter 
towards the former, and eventually to the small amoeba being devoured (event B). Whatever 
follows causally from event B, e.g. the small amoeba being digested, can be designated by ‘C’. We 
first apply the agency-formula again: Setting A, say, by positioning the small amoeba within range of 
the big one, leads, in a regular fashion, to the bigger amoeba’s reaction of approaching the smaller 
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one. Bringing about B, perhaps in the fashion of remote controlling the behaviour of the amoeba, 
similar to experiments that have been performed on cockroaches (Holzer and Shimoyama (1998)), 
would lead to the process of digestion, as if the amoeba had acted on her own. The causal link 
between the processes has again been verified by this procedure. Now we drop the agency-scheme 
– do we get back, like with the billiard balls, the causes from the actions? Not this time, since the 
amoeba’s action of seeking and gobbling the prey remains an action according to our judgment. The 
only difference from our mode of evaluation is that, in the actual course of events, the action is the 
amoeba’s own action, not the experimenter’s actual action of invention, or the theorizer’s 
hypothetical action, in order to mathematically evaluate a causal claim. 
Thus it seems that we cannot drop some scheme of agency in the amoeba-type examples in 
order to get efficient causation. Even if actions are seen as an effect of a prior event, they seem to 
retain some aspect of spontaneity. We could, modestly, content ourselves in observing that there 
are some instances where we stick to the agency-scheme, if the cause object is somehow similar to 
ourselves, in the sense that it semanticises information and directly acts given a supposed goal. But 
if it were possible to determine some objective, structural criteria on what that judgment hinges, 
then it might be the case that these criteria are what underlie or own first-person perspectival 
notions when we impose the scheme of agency. The first- and the third-person perspective would 
mutually sustain each other. 
We have thus two questions that require an answer, the question of referentiality and the 
question of the free action. How can the seeming reference back in time to a past matter of fact be 
explained in causation by information? And – the epistemic aspect of the question – how could we 
determine the extension of the phenomenon as external observers? Secondly, might we be able to 
explain how the agent perceives its actions as ‘free’? Both phenomena seem to contradict 
feedforward models of causal determination like Markov chains. The answer to the second question 
depends of course on whether one believes that the two actions, the action of the free agent that is 
also a theorizer on causation, and the natural action that can be observed by another agent, are 
identical. When revisiting causation by information in section 6.2.6, I will try to give an answer to the 
question of referentiality that, while negating that a single Markovian model has a sufficient 
expressiveness to depict causation by information, asserts that higher order Markovian models can 
be given that explain the phenomenon. Regarding the question of action, I will argue for that there is 
some plausibility that the two kinds of actions are the same, and that therefore the mutual 
sustainment of first- and the third-person view on actions can be made plausible. This would have 
quite a remarkable consequence. It would assert that the contradiction between first- and third-
person perspectives does not need to be resolved, and that the objective third-person view would 
be left completely undisturbed by subjective considerations, while the latter could claim truth even 
if they seemingly contradict an objective view. Thus, the explanation suggested by this thesis would 
espouse a dual-aspect approach to causation. 
Causation by information is the key phenomenon that will guide the train of thoughts of 
large parts of this chapter. Looking for an adequate path to approaching ways to elucidate the 
phenomenon, I will first delve into the thermodynamics of spontaneous and non-spontaneous 
processes (section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2), on the basis of which a thermodynamic account of actions can 
be developed (section 6.2.3). The role of a paradigmatic model of a causal agent will be played by 
Maxwell’s demon (section 6.2.4). On the basis of that, I will try to demonstrate that actions by 
necessity need to be informationally constrained, such that the matter of fact that produced the 
information signal can be ascribed causal responsibility. And since the kind of intentional actions in 
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question require information that refers to contingent matters of fact, by necessity an information 
channel is required, with the endpoint of which the epistemic agent can interact. The link between 
agency and information will require a computational model that can be ascribed to the agent. From 
this model (section 6.2.5) it will follow that actions appear as unconstrained to the owner of the 
model, which will explain how ‘free actions’ can be embedded into a web-of-causes-and-effects-
view of the world. I will then show that the properties conventionally ascribed to causation (locality, 
regularity, asymmetry (section 6.3)) are attributes of agency as well, which gives further evidence for 
the link between agency and causation. On the basis of these properties, I will characterise a level of 
abstraction for efficient causation, which can be defined a posteriori as causation without identity-
relations. At that point, the reconstruction of causation is advanced to such a stage that the limited 
scope of binary judgements, which the agency scheme affords, can be extended so that additional 
structural aspects of causation can be taken into account, and it can even be outlined – this part will 
remain very sketchy, though – how other approaches to causation, which do not rely on agency, can 
be accommodated. 
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6.2 Natural agency and its properties 
As the examples considered in the previous section indicate, there is a tendency to consider 
semanticisation of information as a concomitant indicator of actions. How strong is this link? And is 
it of any use for the overall argument in favour of the agency-approach to causation, given the fact 
that semanticisation is as unobservable as action itself? From the first-person perspective, both 
semanticisation and action do not require objective truth makers. For me, the agent endowed with a 
first-person perspective, a message can have a meaning even in case it does not carry any truthful 
information. Analogously, if I find out that I can control a light via a button with which I can directly 
interact, I have verified a causal connection from my perspective. In both cases, my conclusions 
might be incorrect, but what I have established suffices to explain further judgements, viz. feeling 
better informed than before the reading of the letter, or feeling in control of an observable object. 
The preceding subsection, with its concept of causation by information, raised at least two further 
concerns. First, the agency-formula prescribes a concept of a ‘free agent’. To establish the first-
person impression of control of, say, a light via a switch, the corresponding free action indeed seems 
to be a necessary ingredient of the agency-formula. But now the putative action is one the judging 
agent does not perform itself, but it is ascribed to the agent in its role as object of the judgment, and 
its action is caused by information, viz. it is not free. Secondly, causation by information seems to 
contradict the causal Markov condition, which screens off more distal causes from the effect, whilst 
now the proximate causes seem to be irrelevant as long as they perform their function of relaying 
information about the distal cause, the matter of fact which is the actual cause of the observable 
behaviour. The dilemma of free yet caused actions also offer an opportunity, namely to learn more 
about actions. The notion of free action of the preceding section is useful in judgments from the 
first-person perspective. But it has remained unclear how the notion can be integrated into a 
naturalistic view of the world (understood in a Quinean sense). In particular, it is not straightforward 
to see how actions can be not only causes but also effects, since this is their causal role in causation 
by information. By virtue of the extensional identity of B in a causal chain A -> B -> C, where B has a 
double appearance as effect (‘-> B‘) and as cause (‘B ->’), we can hope to learn more about B as 
cause if we bring to light the constraints it is subject to as effect. This is information we have been 
lacking so far.  
By following this strategy, we will have to assume a perspective that does not make use of 
any first-person considerations. We therefore have to look into a theory that is devoid of that 
perspective. Among the possible theories for a physical underpinning of actions, the 
thermodynamics of anti-entropic processes seems a good candidate, since they identify processes 
that require an explanation from those that do not. Hence, they allow a causal interpretation. Anti-
entropic, or non-spontaneous, processes feature both the asymmetry and the locality that are 
properties of every-day examples of causation. From thermodynamics and causation I will then 
synthesize thermodynamic agency. In section 6.2.4 I am going to reuse a model scenario taken from 
thermodynamics, Maxwell’s demon, to show the link between information and causation from a 
physical perspective. The actions of Maxwell’s demon can be taken as a paradigmatic model of 
acting with certain properties. Via some considerations concerning the ancillary notion of 
centralisation and an internal computational model of an epistemic agent, I will revisit causation by 
information and give an explanation of this phenomenon on the basis of the new concepts. It is then 
possible to identify the kind of processes that are at the origin of our experience of acting, an 
account that goes beyond the notion of ostension.  We can then judge actions from both the first- 
and the third-person perspective, and we also know that both concepts are linked as much as they 
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can be linked across the divide of the first- and third-person perspective. From a third-person 
perspective, an observed action will turn out to be an efficient cause, and whichever the constraints 
of actions are, must be constraints of causes, too.  
6.2.1 Thermodynamics, spontaneous processes, and entropy 
It has been acknowledged for a long time that there is some connection between thermodynamics 
and causation, and that the causal arrow, the arrow of time, and the thermodynamic arrow of the 
increase of entropy are somehow linked (Reichenbach (1956), Lewis (1979)). At this stage we will 
exploit another conceptual pairing between causation and thermodynamics that suggests itself. In 
contrast to what seems to be a more common view, I will not interpret the temporal succession 
from cause to effect as a course aligned to the gradient of entropy increase, but instead will focus on 
anti-entropic processes, by interpreting them as those kinds of processes which are in need of 
explanation. The emphasis is thus put on the relation between two thermodynamic processes that 
have a certain structure.   
 In thermodynamics, there is a notion of spontaneous and non-spontaneous processes. A 
spontaneous process, considering a system as a whole, is one where the entropy of the system 
increases. Non-spontaneous processes, on the other hand, cannot be observed in an isolated system 
apart from small-scale fluctuations, since such an observation would contradict the second law of 
thermodynamics. If we do observe such a process, we would have to consider a second process of 
greater magnitude that is entropic and therefore spontaneous, and which could, by virtue of its 
greater magnitude, account for the decrease of entropy in the system we first observed.  
 Somehow, we are able to judge whether a process is spontaneous or not without having 
studied the theory of thermodynamics. For example, we can tell immediately whether a film is 
shown in correct or in reverse order. Interestingly, a reverse playback would be considered 
improbable, if, say, we saw an egg putting itself back together and jumping onto the table and into 
an eggcup. Nevertheless, we could intellectually square this with a deterministic trajectory of all 
single atoms involved, and the reversal in time of these single trajectories does not seem to have a 
bearing on the question of causation. Causal insufficiency of the observable factors cannot be the 
cause of the perceived improbability, for if the normal order of playback covers the total of a 
causally sufficient system (for example, when a camera’s perspective captures all parts of an isolated 
system), then its reversal should also be causally sufficient. Since the impression of improbability 
remains in scenarios which are causally sufficient, a Kantian account (Kant (1787)), which 
reconstructs the temporal order on the basis of causal asymmetry, seems to be implausible. If we try 
to ground the temporal direction on thermodynamics instead, there would still be the problem of 
explaining why we think temporally alongside the thermodynamic arrow of entropy increase, and 
why a breach of this way of thinking gives rise to impressions such as those that tell us that 
something about the picture of reverse playback must be wrong. I want to bracket that question, 
though, and again refer to my assumption of an arrow of time independent of causation, such that 
causal questions are only prospective. Thus, I can focus on the remaining question of how the causal 
and the thermodynamic arrow are related. 
 So, I will in this section accept the apparent fact that we can tell phenomenologically which 
processes happen naturally and which require further explanations, and relate these intuitive 
judgments to thermodynamic notions of spontaneous and non-spontaneous processes. If we focus 
on specific changes of parts of a bigger system, we can draw the connection between improbable 
developments of events and causes needed to explain the improbability. The most general regularity 
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that can be observed in the universe is its increase of entropy. Causal changes within a system 
depend on drawing boundaries of events, and the roles of agents and patients of these changes 
turns on whether the events are judged as happening spontaneously or non-spontaneously. 
The idea can be illustrated with some examples. After putting a glass of hot water on a table 
in a room at room temperature, we would expect the water’s temperature to settle at the ambient 
temperature, which would correspond to a state of thermal equilibrium of the combined system 
comprised of the glass of water and (the rest of) the room. If we allow some more time to elapse, we 
would expect the water to evaporate completely from the glass and the ambient humidity to rise 
accordingly. In contrast to this scenario, if the water’s temperature decreases below the level of 
ambient temperature, then we would judge that some specific cause must have acted on the water 
to account for this unexpected development of events.  
Switching to a mechanical example, we know that if a windmill starts moving although no 
wind is blowing, there must be another process somewhere else, connected to the shaft or the 
blades, that drives the movement.  
 Generally, any isolated system’s entropy is allowed only to stay at a constant level, or to rise, 
but not to decrease. An adiabatic, sealed container filled with oxygen at constant temperature is an 
example of a system of constant entropy, while the combustion of some additional fuel in such a 
container is an example of a process of entropy increase. Decrease of entropy can only be observed 
in parts of an isolated system. If the system’s boundaries have not yet been clearly defined, and a 
decrease of entropy is in fact observed, then the boundaries have to be expanded or redrawn such 
that another process of entropy increase of higher magnitude can account for the observed 
decrease of entropy.  
6.2.2 The connection between thermodynamics and causation 
When it comes to the connection between physics and causation, thermodynamic processes are a 
good candidate for conceptualising causal relata, and they also provide the explanatory means for 
why agency assumes conceptual priority over efficient causation. 
There is an explanatory asymmetry involved in the relation between the non-spontaneous 
process and the spontaneous process that drives the former. The spontaneous process happens by 
itself, without further need for an explanation, apart from a possible need for explaining the exact 
time at which an event has started to unfold. For example, when water starts evaporating from a 
previously sealed container, the fact that the seal was removed counts as such an explanation. But 
the process of evaporation itself happens for statistical reasons. If all the molecules reversed their 
course and strove to get back into the cask, that would be an observation that calls for further 
explanation. Similarly, if a meteor in free space continues to move along its set trajectory, we do not 
ask for a cause of this continuity, although we do see its movement as a ‘causal process’ (Salmon 
(1994)), if contrasted with the movement of a shadow. But if the meteor changed its course, this 
would prompt us to look for a cause. It is this narrower sense according to which I understand the 
relation of causation in this chapter. The asymmetry problem of causation thus construed consists in 
the non-spontaneous process requiring the spontaneous one, but not vice versa. 
 Likewise due to the second law of thermodynamics, the examination of any object under 
investigation requires in thermodynamics its division into system and surroundings. What is said in 
this section is, of course, about thermodynamics, but since what follows in the subsequent sections 
is more general yet still in line with thermodynamics, I will for the sake of simplifying the language 
refer to the surroundings by the more general name ‘environment’ throughout the rest of the thesis. 
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The notion of environment is important because often systems are not isolated, but constantly 
exchanging matter and energy with their environment. This is how changes of decreasing entropy 
become possible in the system at the cost of their environment, by exchange of heat. The fact that 
we have to draw boundaries around a considered thermodynamic event is also relevant because 
later on an aspect of commonsense examples of causation, its locality, will be linked to 
thermodynamic boundaries. 
Non-spontaneous processes, if observed in isolation, are surprising. In this context, other 
observations from studies of causality come to mind, like Hall’s default/deviant distinction, which 
are system behaviours that are considered normal and surprising respectively. They will be discussed 
further in section 7.1.4. (Hall (2007) gives Christopher Hitchcock partial credit for this conceptual 
distinction.) If we consider thermodynamic processes as special cases of events, then the non-
spontaneous processes count as the events that require explanations. A one-to-one correspondence 
between effects and non-spontaneous processes on the one hand, and the effects’ causes and the 
spontaneous processes that drive the non-spontaneous ones on the other hand, suggests itself, but 
is not strictly possible to adhere to. Certainly there are cases where this holds true, which is 
encapsulated in some sayings of the older wisdom of causality, like ‘effects cannot be greater than 
their causes’, or Leibniz’ interpretation of ‘causa aequat effectum’ (Leibniz (1695)). While converting 
one form of energy into another, as a fuel-driven electric generator does when it converts chemical 
energy into electrical energy, we get, as the effect of the process, at most the amount of energy we 
put into the system, the cause of the process. In reality it will be even less because no generator runs 
with complete efficiency. 
 There are cases in which causes merely trigger big effects, like when the trigger of a bomb is 
activated. For these kinds of cases, however, a more fine-grained explanation can be given that re-
establishes the order of causa aequat effectum. In the bomb example, we can expect that, whatever 
the exact mechanism is that sparks off the explosion, there is some threshold that needs to be 
overcome, e.g. depressing a button. The process that enables the spontaneous process, the ‘big 
effect’, the bomb’s explosion, to unfold, is non-spontaneous and requires an explanation, like the 
fact that someone depressed the button by exerting a force on it. The application of the terms of 
proximate and final cause, for the triggering mechanisms itself, and the action that activates the 
triggering mechanism, respectively, suggests itself for these configurations. Previously used 
examples, the removal of a seal from a cask, or pushing a button to turn on a light, have the same 
structure and thus feature non-spontaneous processes as proximal effects.  
 Other examples have a more straightforward structure, from a thermodynamic viewpoint. 
When a cart moves uphill, someone must be pushing it. The roles of cause and effect in ‘A is a 
possible cause of B’ for these kinds of cases can be reformulated as: ‘A is a process that is capable of 
driving a non-spontaneous process B’. This approach takes into account the question of what kind of 
entities the causal relata are: We first identify B as an event that is of such a kind that it requires an 
explanation. B cannot happen without something else happening first. As the explanans we then 
identify an appropriate A. The question of spontaneity of A does not have to be taken into account 
explicitly, due to A’s role of being an explanans, not an explanandum. Therefore, addressing the 
question whether A itself requires an explanation is not required to evaluate the judgment 
concerning the causal connection between A and B. To abstract from the question of spontaneity of 
A reflects a commonsensical judgment concerning the dual role of an event A in a causal judgment 
‘A causes B’ – although at this point we have to be very careful with not conflating the terms of 
spontaneity in the action-theoretic and in thermodynamic sense. The role of A as the cause of B 
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suggests the spontaneity – in the action-theoretic sense of spontaneity – of A occurring to bring 
about B. But there is no contradiction in assuming that A is embedded in a larger nexus of causes 
and effects, and that it happens itself due to another cause A*, preceding A. Spontaneity, in both 
senses, is a relative notion. In the thermodynamic sense it depends on how one divides an 
observation in space-time into system and environment. 
 If B is explicitly understood as a spontaneous process in the thermodynamic sense, then the 
explanatory need connected to its occurrence is due to a necessary triggering factor. This can be the 
activation of a trigger to make a bomb explode, or the supply of activation energy of a spontaneous 
chemical reaction. In these cases, ‘A causes B’ translates into ‘A is a process that triggers the 
spontaneous process B, which would not have happened at that time without the triggering event 
occurring’.  
6.2.3 Thermodynamics and actions 
I have indicated the connection between thermodynamics and causation. What is missing is the 
connection between thermodynamics and agency. This link is established by the thermodynamics of 
steady states (see Bertalanffy (1969)). These are specific kinds of homeostasis that feature a 
constant input of free energy into a system. Steady states are to be contrasted from equilibrium 
states, which can be observed when an isolated system has reached the state of maximum entropy. 
For systems that are connected to their environment by diathermic containment, the equilibrium 
state is reached when the temperature of the system has reached the level of temperature of the 
environment. If the walls of the container are permeable for particles, in addition to the thermal 
gradient the gradient of diffusion has to be zero for all kinds of particles that can pass through the 
walls. By contrast, a steady state is a state that is not characterised by maximum entropy. Organisms 
live in these kinds of states, and therefore have to continually procure free energy to maintain their 
own structure and prevent the macrostate of maximum entropy, which means death. The steady 
state is a rare and anti-entropic state, but it is also a functional state, since only from this state can 
the organism perform its function to sustain itself. These properties of the state, the functionality 
and the improbability, are logically related to each other. In mechanical machines the same relations 
can be observed. One cannot create a watch just by shaking up its parts, because the likely outcome, 
a state of high entropy, is also one of the many dysfunctional states. 
Agency enters the picture with the interest of maintaining the functional state far from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Considering causes in efficient causation, we might speak, at least in 
the English language, of agents in a wider sense, like ‘chemical agents’. But in genuine cases of 
agency there is a relation of identity between the acting agent and the agent that benefits from the 
action, and this identity needs to span the time from the decision to act until the time of 
consumption of the action’s utility, which means, in its basic form, the maintenance of the steady 
state. Achieving this vital goal requires continual interventions. Animals maintain their functional 
state of low entropy by foraging for sources of free energy, or Gibbs energy. It is mostly contained in 
the form of chemical energy in plants or other animals, and ultimately has its sources in the 
electromagnetic energy of the sun (Atkins (2007)). By the process of oxidation ATP is created from 
carbohydrates. ATP can be considered the fuel of the cell, and by this container of Gibbs energy both 
the anti-entropic (and non-spontaneous) process of continuously re-establishing the functional 
state, as well as the externally observable behaviour of the body, is driven (see also Weber (2014)).  
But bringing about non-spontaneous processes by exploiting sources of free energy is not by 
itself a criterion of the kind of agency we need in order to apply the agency-formula. There are other 
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non-spontaneous processes driven by sources of free energy, like certain kinds of physical pattern 
formation, with a dynamical equilibrium that ceases to exist once the input of energy into the 
system ceases. The link to agency is supplied only by considering the flow of information. For sure, it 
makes sense to say ‘Eat this (A), such that your hunger is satisfied (B)’, and to conclude ‘Eating this 
edible object causes the hunger to be satisfied’. But this judgment cannot be easily applied from a 
third-person view. It will not help with the question of the semantic stance, and therefore will not be 
a solution to the problem of causation by information. To solve the problem, I will make an 
assumption whose validity will be demonstrated in the following section about Maxwell’s demon. 
The assumption to be made is that actions are events that are caused by information, and therefore 
require an acting agent that is also an information processor. Since the second assumption, 
expressed earlier in this section, implies that an action’s immediate effect is a non-spontaneous 
process, we need to show that the flow of information is continuous with physics, since non-
spontaneous processes need to be driven by spontaneous physical processes in order to comply with 
the second law of thermodynamics. The result has been anticipated already in the analogy between 
information flow and causation, and will be shown to be a necessary result of the second law of 
thermodynamics in the section covering Maxwell’s demon as a paradigmatic model of acting. 
Information that triggers the ‘right’ action to bring about a non-spontaneous process needs to be 
processed as well (first perceiving, or measuring, its physical signal; then calculating the optimal 
action). That process, as it is shown by the thermodynamics of information processing, is entropic.  
Actions of the kind required by the agency-formula occur spontaneously, but, as causation 
by information shows, there are also caused actions, a seeming contradiction. As the notion of 
efficient cause shows, this seeming contradiction does not have to be a fatal conceptual problem. 
The thermodynamic framework, which promised to provide more information on the constraints on 
causation, might also endow us with a resolution of this conundrum. The commonsensical intuition 
of causation by information implies that information is the cause of action. We can replace, 
according to the argument, the idea of action as realisation of several possibilities by the idea of 
action as the result of both receiving and processing information and the acquisition of a token of 
utility. The optimisation of the choices concerning the possible actions to take in a situation 
constrained by information yields the regularities that a causal judgment requires, while still 
allowing for the intuition of seeing an action. Given a certain contingent situation and the belief-
desire configuration of the agent, there is one optimal way of behaving, i.e. the rational choice. For a 
judgment on type level, the observable reaction of an agent that has processed the contingent 
information about a given situation will be the rational choice according to its internal model. More 
on the internal model will be said in section 6.2.5. The constraint concerning the token of utility is 
necessary to judge whether an action has been taken or not, since the processing of information 
alone, while yielding a set of possible choices to take, does not favour any single one of these 
choices over the others, and therefore would fail to give rise to the regularities that our judgement 
requires. 
Acquisition of a token of utility, on the other hand, introduces further problems, notably to 
judge when observed behaviour of another agent is ‘adequate’ for reaching a goal (Dretske (1981), 
chapter 8; also Dretske (1988), chapter 5). In order to do this (implying the intentional stance), we 
have to have a natural notion of utility. As will be explained in the subsequent section, we will posit 
entropy reduction and acquisition of free energy as the natural utility, with all goals on higher levels 
building on this basic notion of utility.  
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Assuming the notion of utility is correct, and expanding entropy reduction on information as 
well, I propose the following interpretation of agency within the thermodynamic framework: ‘An 
action A brings about B’ means ‘A is a process that is capable of driving a non-spontaneous B’, with 
the following additional constraints: A is an observable event attributable to a structure that benefits 
from the event B. This entity is called agent and it can be assumed that it maintains its identity 
between the time of doing A and benefiting from B. What the benefit consists in has to be explained 
further according to context. Since the physicality of the concepts is at stake in this section, suffice it 
to say here that the utility can consist in consuming a token of free energy, or the reduction of 
entropy of the structure that we identify as the agent.  The utility can also be informational, such as 
increasing the knowledge (or decreasing the uncertainty) about a contingent matter of fact, but 
even in this case the token which represents the flow of feedback back to the agent must have a 
physical basis. The entropy, for the cases where the token of benefit is information, is to be 
interpreted as physically embodied entropy relative to another situation. The reduction of this 
referential entropy can be interpreted as knowledge about a contingent matter of fact that might be 
of vital interest later (for a similar conceptual distinction like that between physical and 
informational entropy reduction, see the distinction of ‘vital’ and ‘active goals’ in Bogdan (1988)). 
6.2.4 Maxwell’s demon as paradigmatic causal agent 
Energy cannot be created from nothing. Correspondingly, a so-called perpetual motion machine of 
the first kind, which claims to do just that, is impossible. The insight that entropy puts a constraint on 
the production of energy, too, came later. The second law of thermodynamics precludes the 
creation of a perpetual motion machine of the second kind. Such a machine could extract energy 
from the environment, e.g. in the form of thermal energy, and transform it into work, which could in 
turn be used for all other kinds of purposes. Energy would not be created from nothing, but – almost 
as good as that – it could be reused indefinitely. However, perpetual motion machines of the second 
kind are nowadays considered as impossible as those of the first kind.  
A process that is thermodynamically equivalent to the extraction of thermal energy from the 
environment and its conversion into work is the creation of a temperature gradient within a system 
that is currently in the state of thermal equilibrium. According to the second law of thermodynamics, 
such a process is non-spontaneous and requires a second, spontaneous process to drive it. To be 
precise, the lack of such a second process driving the first one would contradict Clausius’ formulation 
(see Atkins (2007)) of the second law:  
 Heat does not pass from a body of low temperature to a body of high temperature  
 without an accompanying change elsewhere. 
Yet James Maxwell devised a schematical setup which, although far from being an operable 
perpetual motion machine of the second kind, was meant to show that a temperature gradient 
could be created without expenditure of work that must be put into the system to drive the 
gradient’s build-up. The gradient is achieved by the action of an intelligent being, Maxwell’s demon, 
which performs opening- and closing-operations on a trapdoor through which particles can pass 
from one half of the container to the other. The thought experiment has been developed over 
several stages by other authors, and its gist has turned out to revolve around how to model the 
‘demon’, who is the central actor in the setup. 
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Graphical scheme of Maxwell’s demon 
 
Since the system is said to be in thermal equilibrium at the beginning of the process, the gas 
molecules filling the container will have a Gaussian distribution around a mean value of kinetic 
energy corresponding to the temperature. No energy is to be inserted from outside into the system 
in order to create the temperature gradient, so the only way to proceed is to sort the particles such 
that the particles at a speed lower than the mean end up in one half of the container, the faster 
particles in the other half. The trapdoor indicated in the graphical scheme is meant to achieve this 
sorting, if the demon manages to open it in just the right time to let through the particles of the right 
speed that comply with the intended gradient build-up, and block the particles otherwise. The 
sorting, so the argument of the thought experiment goes, does not involve expenditure of energy, 
since the trapdoor’s operation is frictionless, and the demon’s decisions are mental or intelligent 
operations not contributing to the balance of physical entropy. After the sorting of particles has 
been performed by the demon, the temperature gradient between the two compartments of the 
container can be exploited for extracting work, e.g. by means of a turbine. In terms of 
thermodynamics, the demon’s actions have decreased the entropy of the system while holding its 
internal energy constant, which is tantamount to increasing the system’s free energy. 
However, we have made the assumption that the trapdoor is not a source of friction and 
therefore not a source of increase of entropy. But we need a rise of entropy somewhere within the 
container or in another system that exchanges heat with or performs work on the container, in order 
to explain the apparent decrease of entropy. Prima facie, there does not seem to be such a source 
apart from the trapdoor and the demon. With the trapdoor taken out of the equation, authors 
writing on that subject have concentrated on the demon and its ‘mental’ operations; basically the 
decisions when to make the trapdoor move, as a possible source of entropy in order to reconcile 
what happens with the second law. 
We have to consider the demon’s decisions as systematically correct. It is beyond a lucky 
coincidence if the demon manages to separate a significant portion of molecules of different speed. 
But then the decisions have to be based on contingent information – the whereabouts of the 
particles. Either the state of every particle is measured once and their trajectories are computed, or 
the measurement is done locally, in the proximity of the opening in the separating wall, such that it 
can be decided for a single incoming particle whether the door is opened or not. Historically, it was 
thought that the conundrum of entropy could be resolved by the entropy balance of the 
measurement process. Indeed it seems as if the measurement implies some kind of coupling 
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between two physical systems, but the subsequent mental operation of taking a decision can still be 
seen as an event taking place in a non-physical space, not contributing to the increase of entropy. A 
typical setup for performing a measurement uses directed light which is scattered by interacting 
with a particle (see the discussion in Wiener (1954)). The difference this interaction makes for the 
background radiation is the criterion for measuring the particle, and, according to this account, the 
resulting diffusion of light would have restored the entropy balance. But it was later shown (by 
Bennett (1982)) that there does exist a way of measuring a particle which does not increase any 
entropy in the measurement device whatsoever. This prompted the search for another source of 
increase of entropy, and the answer was found in the resetting of the register that holds the 
measurement results. 
To understand what the result means, it is useful to look at another formulation of the 
second law of thermodynamics, Kelvin’s formulation (Atkins (2007)):  
No cyclic process is possible in which heat is taken from a hot source and converted 
completely into work. 
We can illustrate the idea of the balance of a complete thermodynamic cycle by looking at one of 
the stock examples, the heating of a glass of water in a room at normal room temperature. If the 
heating up passes beyond the room temperature, we know that there is something besides the glass 
of water and the room that needs to be taken into account to explain the phenomenon. It might be 
that an electric heater, driven by a battery, has been at work in the water. To comply with the first 
law of thermodynamics, the conservation of energy, the battery has to ‘pay the energy-bill’. But 
since we are dealing not only with an increase in overall (thermal) energy of the total system 
comprising the glass of water and the rest of the room, but also a temperature gradient between 
glass and environment, which can be exploited for performing work and therefore represents free 
energy, we also have to have the battery ‘pay an entropy-bill’. This it does by running from the initial 
state (fully charged) to the final stage (depleted), the state of chemical equilibrium. The gain of free 
energy in the form of the temperature gradient cannot be higher than its loss by depleting the 
battery. This can be verified by recharging the battery by exploiting the free energy consisting of the 
temperature gradient brought about by the working of the battery. By such a process the battery 
would be set back towards its initial state, the state before it started to heat up the water after the 
heater had been turned on. However, the input of work to recharge the battery would be higher 
than the work performed by the turbine between glass and environment. To put it differently, the 
temperature gradient cannot fully recharge the battery in any real setup of this experiment. 
Turning back to Maxwell’s demon, we are not dealing with an increase of energy of the 
considered total system, but only with an (expected) increase of entropy, since we know that the 
building-up of the temperature gradient is non-spontaneous. There is no energy-bill, but an entropy 
bill to pay. If Bennett’s solution to the problem of Maxwell’s demon is believed to be correct, the 
process does not require input of work up until the creation of some physical representation of the 
measurement result. But if we consider the time when the totality of operations on the trap-door 
has been executed, we have a measurement device with a storage-part that is in another state than 
at the time of the first of all the operations on the trapdoor. Similarly to the battery, which requires 
work to be recharged, we need a reset-operation to put the storage device back to, say, state of all 
registers = zero. However, Landauer’s principle (see Maroney (2009)) predicts a higher input of work 
necessary to do that than extractable by the turbine: 
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There are no possible physical implementations of the resetting operation that can do better 
than to reset a bit to zero converting less than (kT  ln 2) of work into heat 
The resetting of a bit that previously held one of two possible states, and therefore represented 1 bit 
of information, corresponds to a compression of logical space. It was Landauer’s assumption that for 
every compression of logical state there is a corresponding compression of physical space, for which 
standard calculations show that the expenditure of work amounts to (kT ln2). Regarding the entropy 
change of the system (the particles in the canister), the set of possible states for a particle that has 
been sorted already has been exactly reduced by one half, since it can only reside in one half of the 
container instead of possibly occupying all of it. The free energy gained per particle is likewise (kT 
ln2), such that the net gain amounts to zero. 
The resetting of the register, the completion of the thermodynamic cycle for the whole 
system that is causally sufficient for the phenomenon, thus reconciles the thought experiment with 
the second law. It seems that the final solution of the conundrum is closely tied to the tacit and 
unanimous premise of the analyses of Maxwell’s thought experiment: Interventions that bring about 
improbable results (such as the building up of a temperature gradient without expenditure of work) 
need to be informationally constrained. If information refers to contingent matters of fact, then a 
measurement needs to be done that is subject to physical constraints. If this constraint could be 
circumvented, it seems as if agents like Maxwell’s demon would be possible. But due to Landauer’s 
principle, which does not rely on the second law of thermodynamics, whose validity is at stake, 
intelligent actions of a purposive kind are not a viable way to circumvent the second law, but merely 
a particular class of entropic processes able to drive non-spontaneous ones.  
This result explains why nature has not, to our knowledge, come up with an organism that 
can extract ambient thermal energy from its environment in order to drive its metabolism. Such an 
extraction counts as an anti-entropy process, which needs to be driven by an entropic process of 
higher magnitude. But an organism whose body parts comprised agents of the kind of Maxwell’s 
demon could ‘let in’ faster particles in order to build up an internal hot reservoir. In relation to the 
ambient temperature, with which the organism could be thought of as in thermal equilibrium, the 
hot reservoir would count as a system that contains Gibbs energy, and the organism could live off 
this energy and could renew it, apparently ad libitum. The thermodynamic considerations that take 
into account the whole of the causally sufficient system explain why we do not observe such an 
entity anywhere in nature. 
What needs to be taken into account from the analysis is that it puts important constraints 
on both information processing and acting. Maxwell originally wanted to show that the second law 
of thermodynamics has only statistical relevance and is not a law of nature on a par with laws that 
are true by necessity. That seems true even after the analysis by Bennett, Landauer and other 
physicists and philosophers who dealt with the problem. After all, the demon could bring about the 
sorting of the particles by opening and closing the trapdoor at random and happen to be just 
extremely lucky in succeeding with the task. But what has been shown is that one cannot beat the 
second law in a systematic way by intelligent actions, since these depend on external contingencies 
and therefore require measurements, whose result needs to be stored in a register. This register 
needs to be reset in order to complete a thermodynamic cycle, which comes at a cost of entropy 
increase. This has an import for the notion of information in this thesis, i.e. information interpreted 
as a referential structure coupled to an external matter of fact, such that it can later serve as a basis 
for a target-oriented action. Information in this sense needs to be physically represented – 
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otherwise a loophole for a perpetual motion machine of the second kind would be created. For the 
study of causation by information we can note that no discontinuity regarding physical laws is to be 
expected by caused ‘intelligent actions’. The difference between causation by information and 
efficient causation is therefore unlikely to lie in a realm outside of ordinary physics. 
Sorting procedures of the kind considered in Maxwell’s scenario consist of binary decisions 
resulting in physical interventions. Since sorting thus understood is such a basic form of acting, and 
since no assumptions were made concerning further particular characteristics of the demon, or 
specific ways in which the demon was to implement the requirements of his task, it is to be expected 
that the two results – the necessity of measuring contingent information for purposive actions, and 
the necessity of representing that information physically – can be generalised. Under general 
assumptions, information must be gathered in order to act, otherwise actions cannot be expected to 
satisfy the second of our criteria for discerning an action from other kinds of events: it was asserted 
in section 6.2.3 that actions must also be beneficial, and the null-hypothesis is that, in our world of 
competition for limited resources, decisions to act that are not informed, not constrained by 
contingent information, do not regularly result in a beneficial outcome. This refers both to 
competing with an entropic nature and to competing against other agents within an entropic 
environment. (See Wiener (1954) for the description of both kinds of competitive environments, and 
Werner (1991) on the relation between information and game theoretic strategies.) One can 
therefore say that Maxwell’s demon is a paradigmatic toy model of acting, and that informed 
decisions do not come for free. Actions require information, and information about contingent 
matters of fact, like the whereabouts of hot and cool particles in Maxwell’s setup, needs a physical 
underpinning with a cost of entropy. 
From these considerations, the following concatenation of events is to be expected in 
causation by information: 
A) Generation of the matter of fact which is causally relevant 
B) A physical signal, which is coupled to that matter of fact, interacts with the boundary of the 
agent 
C) Physical realisation of a computation whose input is the signal and whose output is the optimal 
action according to the agent’s causal model 
D) Observable action of the agent 
E) Situation which can be valuated in terms of beneficiality for the agent43 
In causal regularities that involve actions, there is always a causally relevant matter of fact realised 
at some point in time. This fact generates causally a signal that carries information about the matter 
of fact. If it interacts with an agent that can extract the information from the signal, and for which 
the matter of fact is in some way relevant, this agent can be expected to react to the signal with an 
observable reaction. By default, a rational, or at least a fit-for-purpose reaction will follow in most 
cases. In other words, the scheme of acting will give rise to a regularity, which can underpin a causal 
                                                          
43 Section 6.2.6 will deal with the criteria for distinguishing a reaction to information from an effect triggered 
by properties of the information-carrying signal. These criteria will turn on the different structural features 
which the relay stations of information-channels on the one hand, and effective causes in a causal chain on the 
other hand, have. This will enable us to recognize causation by information. But, as the previous example of 
the letter informing about a relative’s death shows, not all effects of information are actions. But information 
is a necessary ingredient of an action, as this section has shown. The intentional stance implies the semantic 
stance, but not vice versa. 
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judgment. Hence, caused actions are no contradiction according to this scheme. In its final step, a 
beneficial situation is realised that has some connection to the acting agent. 
 Maxwell’s demon is a paradigmatic agent since it complies with all the steps of the scheme, 
including the final step, if one adds to the standard analysis of Maxwell’s scenario the assumption 
that the demon is the beneficiary of the free energy constituted by the temperature gradient. By this 
extension of the standard setup the demon’s actions become purposive, or teleological. However, 
due to the second law of thermodynamics, in a closed universe, sorting procedures are not sufficient 
to feed functional structures similar to Maxwell’s demon in the long run, in order to reset them to a 
state from which a thermodynamic cycle has started. The thermodynamic cycle considered in the 
thought experiment did not even imply additional expenditure of physical work that might be 
needed to restore parts of the agent that could have become dysfunctional. Therefore we know that 
additional free energy will be needed, and irreversibly wasted, in order to keep a structure like the 
demon functional. In that respect Maxwell’s demon is of course an idealised agent. Natural actions 
that result in accessing free energy often involve getting hold of some other organism, which 
contains free energy in chemical form, or involve exposing oneself to directed sunlight, rather than 
creating the free energy by a sorting procedure. But, as mentioned above, these kinds of actions will 
be likewise informationally constrained.   
Step C of the above scheme involves a computation. This point is quite straightforward. We 
do not want to explain an action as an effect coerced by a preceding cause. On the other hand, 
causation by information needs to accommodate actions that give rise to regularities. Both aspects 
are best squared with each other under the assumption that there is an optimal action for a given 
informational constraint, which will be the action most likely observed in the regularity. I will 
therefore model the relation between a signal that carries the contingent information for the agent 
and the corresponding best action by a function. A function requires a computational model, such 
that the output for the input can be computed. I will outline the computational model in the next 
section. Once the model has been described, I will apply it to Maxwell’s demon during the revisiting 
of causation by information. Then it will be seen that the demon is, very much like the sunflower, an 
example that can be described in two ways: according to a causal reading, and according to an 
informational reading. 
6.2.5 Internal computational model 
In this section, I will not devise a full-fledged account of the reasoning processes that an agent 
undergoes before committing to an action. The rest of the thesis will cover different aspects of what 
underlies the judgment that a certain intervention is considered appropriate by an agent in a 
contingent situation. Here, I will only give the desiderata of a computational model, and the 
constraints that are necessary to distinguish efficient causation from causation by information.  
Starting with the desiderata, the model is supposed to contain criteria that enable an 
observer to classify an action of another agent from the third-person perspective, viz. without 
invoking some notion of similarity on which such a classification would hinge. For example, my 
judgment of having observed an action is not supposed to involve a change of perspective that 
exploits my own experience of having performed a similar action in the past. Secondly, the model is 
supposed to preserve the conceptual frugality of the approach exercised so far. Thirdly, the account 
of action derived from the model should include actions as causal effects and should therefore not 
exclude the possibility that actions give rise to observable regularities, while at the same time 
contrasting actions as effects from those effects which are due to efficient causation. Finally, it 
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should be possible to recognize actions as such, in spite of the previous points made. This last 
desideratum is more than a trivial remark. One could read the account of action that results from 
the setup of Maxwell’s demon, the internal model of computation, and the account of centralisation 
in section 6.2.7, jointly as a technical definition of the term ‘action’ that also works for some 
examples of causation by information. But one could also make a stronger claim: if the criteria 
expounded in the respective sections constitute the concept of action, then the action we 
hypothetically or actually perform when judging causation (the concept of action employed in the 
agency-formula) would fully comply with these criteria – the concepts would be identical. But then 
we would have found a second way of identifying causes and actions. Not only are actions those 
kinds of events we hypothetically bring about by assuming a first-person perspective with direct 
control of some observable event, which needs the (first-person) concepts of direct action and 
spontaneity, and possibly semanticisation, in those cases when the action is triggered by 
information. Alternatively, we could judge action as a result of a computational process, which in 
turn can be read in different ways. A feed-forward interpretation gives a model of efficient 
causation. A feed-backward reading of the same process could explain the referencing back to an 
inert past, and could therefore explain semanticisation. But then actions cease to be a subclass of 
causes, since there would be in principle no way of telling apart causes and actions, and therefore no 
domain of causes that is not also occupied by actions. Then, if further constraints on actions are 
found, these would be informative for the concept of cause as well, since every time we apply the 
scheme of cause to explain an observed situation we actually apply the scheme of action.   
Part of the explanatory story involving caused action is the physically embodied information 
signal, with which the agent has to interact. The signal is a product of a causal process. Via the signal, 
the past matter of fact turns out to be causally efficacious at a later time. But there is no objective, 
local property of the signal that can be just read off it in order to get the past matter of fact, since 
the signal does not ‘contain’ information about the fact in any literal sense. The signal can have a 
very different structure than the matter of fact. Therefore, the agent must be configured such that it 
can extract the matter of fact from the signal. The answer to the question of referentiality therefore 
lies both in the structure of the information channel and in the computational structure of the agent 
that processes the signal, and there can be both a failure of extraction and a channel failure. The 
agent might not be able to interpret the symbol token in cases of semantic information. For 
example, she might not understand a letter written in a foreign language. Or the agent might not 
know a law of nature to decode environmental information, like the correct mapping of the number 
of tree rings to the age when it was cut. Mis- and disinformation are examples of channel failures, as 
are breaches of the non-equivocation condition of the channel. False perception and false 
abductions from effects to causes are cases in which it is difficult to say whom the failure in mapping 
is to be attributed to.44  
If the inference from all signals to their causes is successful, the agent is informed about the 
contingent situation in which it is situated. This is when the second stage of the calculation from the 
signal to the optimal action begins. Although it is conceivable that a non-composite function from 
the signal directly to the optimal action is computed in some situations, this is unlikely to happen in 
the general case, since one causally relevant matter of fact can be informationally conveyed via 
                                                          
44 Of course, if there is no default channel behaviour, or no normative prescription of how a signal is 
to be read, then there is no point in making the distinction between the two kinds of failures. 
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different pathways, e.g. it can be communicated in different languages, or in different styles of 
expression. For combinatorial reasons, it thus makes sense to distinguish an inference from the 
signal to its most probable cause, and a subsequent calculation of the best action given the 
contingently constrained situation.  
We can now contrast a scheme of judging efficient causation with a scheme of judging 
causation by information. We first consider the chain of events from the end of section 6.2.4 again. 
This was a chain of events that we would expect with examples of causation by information, but 
here we interpret the events as connected by efficient causation: 
(A: Generation of the matter of fact which is causally relevant) causes (B: physical signal interacting 
with the boundary of the agent) causes (C: physical realisation of a computation whose input is the 
signal and whose output is the optimal action according to the agent’s causal model) causes (D: 
observable action) causes (E: beneficial situation).  
We can think of this concatenation of observable events as seen through the eyes of an external 
observer. The observer can impose an interpretation that wants to see efficient causation at work. 
This can be verified, among other ways, by applying the agency formula. For example, given the 
agent is configured as an information processor, setting B, i.e. exposing an agent to a signal that is 
similar to a signal which would be brought about by A, we expect that a computational process  is 
triggered in the agent. Similarly, we can perform ‘set-operations’ at other stages of the 
concatenation of events. By this means at every stage the setting of the predecessor yields the 
successive event. There is no referencing ‘back in time’.   
To model causation by information that preserves the judgment that the contingent fact was 
responsible for the observable action, the model of efficient causation needs to be extended by a 
type level consideration. As far as D is concerned, not only C as an individual computational process, 
but also A and E have an influence, but as types, not as tokens. C is the agent’s individual way of 
extracting from the signal B the information that A has happened, and E is the beneficial outcome of 
the best action D in the situation that is characterised by A. The beneficiality of E consists in a 
feedback that flows back to the agent and has an impact on C. However, our previous, feed-forward 
scheme did not allow depicting this feedback. The feedback acts like a force that brings about the 
selection of all those agents in a theoretical population that act such that E is achieved, on the basis 
of interacting with signals, of which B is merely one example.45 Alternatively, one can think of a 
single, adaptive agent that is punished by negative feedback and adapts its computational model on 
the basis of that learning experience. In both cases, we have to consider types of situations, not their 
tokens. This is how and why the intermediate stages, although they are all necessary parts of 
explaining how the agent learned about A and from which point in time the agent could possibly act 
adequately to A, nevertheless drop out as explanatorily irrelevant to account for why the agent has 
done D rather than an alternative D*. 
The following assumptions are made implicitly: the agent has the capacity to infer A from B 
or is structured in such a way that A becomes part of his information base, and it has the causal 
background knowledge to predict the effect of A on E with and without its doing D. That is, the agent 
has at its disposal a model according to which it can determine whether its utility, revolving around 
the final state E, would be increased or decreased by committing to a specific option of acting (of 
which not acting is one), in the context determined by A, or even in collaboration with A. Note that 
                                                          
45 Section 6.2.6 will demonstrate all of this by means of the setup of Maxwell’s demon. 
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evaluating the same concatenation of events according to the first, or the second scheme, do not 
contradict each other, and are therefore alternative ways of evaluation. Picking one scheme in 
favour of the second depends on the kind of explanation one seeks. 
From a third-person perspective, the occurrence of the immediate trigger of the observable 
action explains why the action needs to happen, but it does not explain why the agent is configured 
such that this action rather than another has occurred. The third-person observer, while observing 
the action of the agent, needs to understand that the agent’s calculation, depending on its internal 
configuration, is an idiosyncrasy that would not give rise to a general rule, if the reference classes are 
fixed in an unbiased way. That is, if the agent is connected to an information channel, then the signal 
the agent interacts with is not the event the agent is responsive to, but the event at the source of 
the channel is. This latter event has therefore also been dubbed the ‘causally relevant matter of 
fact’. The agent’s action, if successful, reinforces the correct response to increase the chance of 
future successful interaction in similar situations. The external observer therefore understands the 
transmission medium as accidental; an alternative channel would have brought about the same 
observable behaviour. The fact that the causally relevant fact, instantiated in the source event, was 
mediated by that signal, is as contingent as additional, causally irrelevant properties that the source 
event may have had, say, the exact shape of a lamp that emits light and thereby provides 
information about an emergency situation.  
I assert that the model satisfies the four desiderata above. It satisfies the first and the 
second one, since only correlations between observable relata are involved. There is a relation of 
efficient causation (it can be assumed that the external observer has the concept at its disposal) 
between all the pairs A and B, B and C, A and C, etc., on the token level, viz. for a considered 
individual agent. There is a correlation on type level between A and C. And there is an observable 
feedback from E to C in the context given by A, either by selection, or by adaptation. Given that the 
fourth desideratum is also satisfied, then the third desideratum is satisfied, since an action is the 
result of a computational process that computes a function value, which corresponds to an optimal 
action in the situation. In other words, given that the action is indeed classified as an action, then 
the model assures that a regularity arises in repetitive scenarios. 
6.2.6 Causation by information revisited 
We can now return to the problem of explaining causation by information. The problem consisted in 
elucidating why an action can be caused while still retaining the aspect of spontaneity that is needed 
to classify the observable behaviour as an action. The proposed computational model solves this 
problem by not letting the agent interact directly with the cause that determines its behaviour, but 
instead with its signal. Several different signals, via different channels, can result in the activation of 
the same rule from the causally relevant property of the channel source to the observable 
behaviour, therefore the intermediate steps that concern the channel drop out of the scheme as 
explanatorily irrelevant. In this sense the event at the channel source is highlighted in a unique way 
unlike other distal causes that might be highlighted in some specific contexts. Neither from the 
external perspective of an observer that is not identical with the agent, nor for the agent itself, 
reflecting on its own action, is there a direct contact with the cause. This solution comes at the cost 
of referentiality, which is prima facie difficult to account for in causal contexts. However, the 
reference of the signal to its cause has been taken into account as abduction from effect to its 
efficient cause, and the abduction process has in turn been explained by the feedback stemming 
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from the final, beneficial state, which alters the configuration of the agent in the situation 
constrained by the distal cause.  
The minimal account of an action suffices for distinguishing causation by information from 
efficient causation, by switching to the appropriate scheme of actions guided by internal 
computations, if we have reason to believe that the simple scheme of concatenated, efficient 
causation is explanatorily unsatisfying. The scheme of efficient causation, however, always delivers a 
correct account. This seems to create a paradox, since we use the two schemes to distinguish the 
two types of causation. This paradox will be resolved in section 6.2.9. For now it suffices to assert 
that the computational model delivers an account of action that is sufficient to explain causation by 
information. According to both schemes, a contingent situation comprises some causally relevant 
matter of fact. This fact generates further facts via causal mechanisms, of which some possibly 
interact with the boundary of an agent. For example, an animal that qualifies as possible prey for a 
predator disseminates odorant molecules of which some happen to interact with the olfactory sense 
of the predator. The predator then takes action, which is triggered by the reception of the signal, but 
causally explained by the relevant matter of fact, i.e. the presence of the prey. Finally, the result of 
the immediate action is a further event or state that is of some utility for the agent. The predator 
catches its prey and consumes it.  
The paradigmatic models for actions, the operations of Maxwell’s demon on the trapdoor, 
can now also serve as a test case for causation by information, and likewise as its paradigmatic case. 
All that needs to be done is the conceptual mapping to the aforementioned scheme. In Maxwell’s 
setup, the contingent situation is the initial condition of the canister, which is in thermal equilibrium. 
The demon has a measurement device at its disposal, which serves as the signal correlated with the 
relevant fact, the thermal value and the movement’s direction of a particle approaching the opening 
between the halves of the canister. The demon commits an appropriate immediate action, i.e. 
closing or opening the trapdoor. After a while, consecutively engaging in this activity, the final 
beneficial state is established, if we add to the standard story the assumption that the agent can 
make use of the free energy contained in the temperature difference. 
The part crucial to explaining causation by information is the rule that determines the 
operations on the trapdoor. In order to define the target state, we assume that a turbine, which can 
convert the free energy of the canister into work, is installed in such a way that it is required that the 
fast (hot) particles are in the left side of the canister. The assumption concerning the direction of the 
turbine’s installation is, of course, one that does not entail a loss of generality. Since it is a 
contingent matter of fact whether a cool or hot particle is approaching the trapdoor, an agent (or 
mechanism, for that matter) needs to be informed of this fact via a physical channel. But although 
for any specific implementation of Maxwell’s agent there will be a rule from a channel state to the 
best action, this rule is explanatorily irrelevant. 
For example, the register of the measurement device might show state ‘zero’ for the result 
of the last measurement, which, by virtue of its wiring, might be correlated with ‘fast particle 
approaching from right side / slow particle approaching from left side’. Then the rule the demon 
abides by will be: ‘If register state = zero, then open trapdoor’. But the wiring up could be according 
to exactly the reverse mapping: ‘If register state = one, then open trapdoor’, with a corresponding 
complementary rule. The rule from the measurement result to the action is not explanatorily 
relevant for why the beneficial outcome is successfully brought about, since the best action is 
determined by the relevant matter of fact, not by how it is internally (within the agent boundary) or 
externally (as part of the information channel) represented. In other words the mapping from the 
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signal to the action is irrelevant as long as the rule ‘If fast particle approach from right side / slow 
particle approaching from left side, then open trapdoor’ is implemented.46 
A particular example of the demon will only yield an explanation according to the scheme of 
efficient causation. This can be verified in a simple Markovian model like a Bayesian network with 
conditional probabilities. The demon opens the trapdoor within a significant time interval because 
his register shows state ‘one’. The register shows state ‘one’ because a fast particle is approaching 
from the right side. By transitivity, the demon opens the trapdoor because a fast particle is 
approaching from the right side. The latter is the distal cause of the action, but not in any highlighted 
sense as causation by information requires, i.e. in a sense of back-referencing at the place where the 
decision is taken. To explain the referentiality of causation by information, one has to look beyond a 
particular implementation of a demon and look at how the wiring between system and 
measurement device, and between measurement device and trapdoor, have been fixed. One 
possible way to do this is to think of a model that works by a randomized initial wiring and a 
subsequent process of simulated natural selection in a population of demons. Any demon whose 
wiring does not implement the relevant rule ‘If fast particle approach from right side / slow particle 
approaching from left side, then open trapdoor’, will not benefit from the resulting state of 
disposable free energy and will consequently be purged from the considered population. How the 
internal wiring around the register of the measurement device will be carried out is irrelevant. If we 
now consider a set of Bayesian networks that represent models of a set of demons that took part in 
the outlined game of evolution, the rules revolving around the register will average out, if we add 
the plausible assumption that there are no further symmetry-breakers that favour one variant of 
internal wiring over the other. Then the only significant conditional probability remaining will be the 
rule relevant to the agent’s ‘survival’, or, equivalently, the explanatorily relevant rule, which is the 
rule that relates the particle state to the intervention, by-passing the register state. The 
phenomenon of referencing back in time is explained by changing the perspective from modelling 
the individual to modelling a set of individuals, or from modelling a situation to modelling a type of 
situation. Under this new perspective the register state drops out as causally irrelevant. In contrast 
to the previous perspective, that looked at a single agent, the process will appear informational 
rather than mechanistic: the register-state is merely an indicator for the relevant particle state and 
therefore only an exemplified implementation of a range of possible informational pathways, and 
we know that it could have also been the inverse register state that could carry that information. 
That is how we could best explain the phenomenon of back-referencing from a third-person 
perspective.47  
The account of causation by information is meant to explain the judgment of discerning 
caused actions and coerced effects, even if the actions are brought about regularly. Since the 
concept of efficient causation is used to explain the latter of the two types of causation, we need an 
account of how the two concepts of action are related to each other. One of the two concepts of 
action concerns the notion of ‘bringing about’ in the agency-formula, which connects the ‘free 
agent’ and the immediate object of its action. The second notion of action concerns action seen as 
                                                          
46 Notice that this is the explanatorily relevant rule relative to the way the turbine is installed.  
47 An alternative to averaging over the members of a population of demons, the same consideration 
can be made for a single demon with an adaptive internal wiring, if we give the demon the chance of 
running the experiment several times and then decide on an internal wiring. 
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effect in causation by information. This difference between the two concepts, in terms of the 
primary intension, has been stressed in the example of the contrastive pairs concerning the causal 
chain of cue and two billiard balls on the one side, and the amoebas (see section 6.1) on the other 
side. The next sections try to tackle the obvious question whether the two kinds of actions might be 
extensionally identical while remaining distinct on the grounds of the subjective-objective divide, viz. 
they are two aspects of the same thing in the sense of the double-aspect theory. The operation of 
setting a value of a variable in models of causation based on random variables (e.g. in Objective 
Interventionism) would have found its semantics by the subjective notion of immediate action. 
Whether an observed effect is an action or a coerced effect depends on whether we find a structure 
that has the capacities of information processing, which implies having been selected or designed 
such that on the basis of interacting with a B a rule connecting a prior A (rather than B itself) to an 
immediate action D, such that a final state E follows, is implemented by the structure, potentially in 
a regular fashion. Since the first-person observer is itself such a structure, whose judgemental 
capacities have been pruned by these relations, we would have an argument for the assumption that 
what underlies our judgments concerning causes is indeed a judgment concerning actions.  
I think of that project as another instantiation of an approach which Price calls ‘naturalized 
Kantianism about causation’ (Price (2007), p. 255). 48  Although Price’s account is reductive in that he 
tries to reduce both the temporal asymmetry of causation (causes precede their effects) and the 
means-end-asymmetry (causes are means to their effects, but not vice-versa) to a causal 
perspectivalism, whereas my approach relies on the direction of time as a (non-causally) given, I still 
completely concur with Price’s interpretation of perspectivalism and its relation to science: ‘[T]here 
is a tendency to think that perspectivity is incompatible with good science, in the sense that science 
always aims for the perspective-free standpoint, the view from nowhere. In my view, it is important 
to see that science itself might challenge this philosophical conception of science.’ Price (2007), p 
253)  
My strategy for making the case for an identity of the two actions will be as follows. First I 
look at the constraints on acquiring the concept of agency, subsequently I will address the question 
of how the main obstacle, the aspect of spontaneity of an action, can be couched into a natural 
account of concept acquisition (something that has been done only in a limited sense when judging 
actions from the third-person perspective), and finally, we must show that the account of action 
arising in that context fits the main purpose to which we put it, i.e. making sense of the difference 
between correlation and causation. To anticipate the result, I think that the point that causal 
judgments are necessarily grounded in judgments about action cannot be made decisively, but it can 
be shown that it is a plausible possibility.  
6.2.7 Concept acquisition 
For biological agents, acting is necessary. In order not to deteriorate, the agent needs to get hold of 
tokens of free energy. But in order to do that, it must build a structure that is able to process 
                                                          
48 What comes closest to my understanding of the conceptual problem of causation (the explanation 
of a causal judgment in non-causal terms) in Kant (1787) is his exposition concerning the ‘schemata 
of the pure conceptions of the understanding’, where he writes: ‘The schema of cause and of the 
causality of a thing is the real which, when posited, is always followed by something else. It consists, 
therefore, in the succession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subjected to a rule.’ This 
mirrors Menzies’ and Price’s account, except that they allow for a probabilistic reading of the causal 
rule. 
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information, because unconstrained actions are not adequate for getting hold of a token of free 
energy. But this sub-structure of the agent is again subject to deterioration, so its existence depends 
on this very token of free energy, such that the anti-entropic process of maintaining the unlikely, 
functional structure can be performed. This mutual interdependence clearly defines a structure for 
which a criterion of identity through time can be applied. At the time when the contingency of a 
situation has been fixed, the potential best outcome is fixed for the agent in that situation, and the 
addressee of the eventual flow of feedback is the same agent.49 One can call this phenomenon 
(which efficient causation that does not count as causation by information lacks) ‘centralisation’ 
(echoing Bertalanffy’s notion in chapter 3 of Bertalanffy (1969)), in the sense that the information 
processing structure and the effector, e.g. a limb, serve the purpose of the same entity, which is 
necessary to close the feedback cycle on which the interdependence turns. That is what a 
thermodynamic-cybernetic picture of acting has so far shown us.  
Although this feedback cycle applies to biological organisms, it is plausible that any other 
structure capable of formulating causal judgments that is not constructed and maintained by an 
intelligent designer, and therefore an extrinsic cause, is subject to a similar cycle, since the capacity 
of formulating causal judgments requires a degree of organisation that makes the existence of such 
a structure very unlikely. For structures of such a kind, acting is therefore necessary, and the 
necessity of acting is mirrored by the evolutionary pressure to acquire a concept of acting, in the 
above limited sense of being able to exert direct control on an object. Such a concept is needed to 
model situations asynchronically, when the agent is not actually present in the respective situations. 
Explicit planning as well as communicating the plan to others, also anticipating the course of action 
of rival players from the environment, are all capacities unlocked by an explicit concept of action. 
The paradigmatic model of action, consisting of a measurement by coupling an internal to an 
external structure (the measurement, or perception), and a computation that feeds into committing 
to an action, also affords the explanation of how higher-order goals can arise from the basic 
thermodynamic necessities of harnessing free energy that serves to maintain that very process. In 
the paradigmatic model of Maxwell’s demon, the measurement process is an operation that reduces 
the informational entropy of the agent, which can be defined as the degree of uncertainty of the 
agent relative to the contingent situation outside of its boundaries. This is a necessary prerequisite of 
performing an adequate action, whose final result is – in the paradigmatic case – the reduction of 
physical entropy of the agent by re-establishing its functional state. But in many examples of 
causation, reduction of physical entropy is not palpably an agent’s goal, as the example of the next 
paragraph will show. However, a large class of additional scenarios can be interpreted as higher-
order goals ultimately grounded in that low-level goal, such as when a process of informational 
entropy reduction serves the goals of enabling the agent to perform a more immediately relevant 
informational entropy reduction. To illustrate this case, an agent might want to screen the 
trustworthiness of an informant before deciding to question her about the actual matter of fact at 
stake. Likewise concerning these higher-order problems, we find that in some contexts the question 
                                                          
49 For example, if I sit in my office and someone calls my name from the hallway, I understand that I am the 
addressee of the other person’s calling. I initiate a whole-body reaction of getting up and leaving my room, in 
expectance of another subsequent situation that concerns me as a person. Clearly, a single entity is involved 
across these interactions. Contrast this with a situation where my body is coerced to move, due to an extrinsic 
force. Here, my body is not addressed indirectly, and its reaction is not triggered via some notion of personal 
identity. Instead, it is addressed as a physical object whose identity over time is irrelevant for the causal 
transaction in question. 
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whether an immediate redemption of an informational asset is the most rational option is less 
straightforward to answer.  
For example, a commander of an army might hesitate to issue an attack command and 
instead decide to collect some more pieces of information about the possible weaknesses of the 
enemy’s army. Similarly, an academic might feel he has to read yet another paper on a subject 
before he feels confident enough to elaborate his own ideas. The hesitation can become 
pathological if there is no end to the procrastination. Collecting more and more intelligence about a 
task to be performed can lead to pathological information greed, similar to the greed of acquiring 
more and more money by continually reinvesting one’s returns, in order to be protected from future 
contingencies, rather than committing to its consumption at some time. 
Obviously, describing these constraints and affordances of concept acquisition is far from 
delivering an account of how it actually happens, not to mention a reductive one. A difficulty seems 
to lie in the fact that I need the concepts of (logical) dependence and temporal order, which one 
might take as intimately connected to causation, so that a non-question-begging account cannot just 
presuppose them. Another problem seems to be that the conceptual framework established so far is 
insufficient to make a clear case for the priority of the acquisition of the concept of agency over that 
of efficient causation. The computational model outlined in section 6.2.5 highlights a specific distal 
cause, and the agent acts in the correspondingly constrained situation such that the target state is 
brought about, but it is not easy to identify in this model a criterion that enables the agent to 
distinguish an efficient distal cause from a cause that works via informationally constraining the 
agent. Tantamount to this is the agent’s problem of recognizing its action as an action rather than an 
extrinsically coerced behaviour. One of the possible solutions, the assumption that the agent can 
vary its behaviour in a similarly constrained situation, just passes the problem to the question of how 
to distinguish a degree of freedom in its own action and variation on both the sides of cause and 
effect in probabilistic efficient causation. However, this problem might be due to an overcautious 
and inappropriate alike treatment of actions and events. There is a long tradition of theorising over a 
direct epistemic access of an agent to its own actions (see Bayne (2011) for a discussion), but it is 
difficult to say whether application of this epistemic power requires the prior grasp of the concept of 
action according to such accounts. But in the thermodynamics of actions there is a further source of 
asymmetry between actions and merely observed events, including extrinsically coerced movement 
of one’s own body. It concerns the distinction of spontaneous and non-spontaneous events, which is 
potentially reducible to statistical, rather than causal, notions. If I observe myself moving in accord 
with an external force, my movement will appear as a spontaneous process, while moving against 
the external force must be a non-spontaneous process – interpretable as an action.50 This account, 
however wanting, seems still more adequate than an account of concept acquisition based on 
ostension, as in Menzies and Price (1993). 
                                                          
50 Unfortunately, the spontaneity of actions in the action-theoretic sense and the spontaneity of processes in 
the thermodynamic sense seem to work in diametrically different directions in these cases. Moving uphill, if 
only the body and the environment are observed, is not a spontaneous process in the thermodynamic sense. 
But if the internal processes within the body could be observed, if we expand the perspective, then the 
process of moving uphill evolves spontaneously. The concept acquisition of action depends on the fact that I 
do not observe my own internal processes, therefore I am not able to apply the scheme of efficient causation 
to myself, which would yield thermodynamically spontaneous processes everywhere (which becomes 
interpretable as the nexus of causes and effects, if we draw the boundaries accordingly). The 
thermodynamically non-spontaneous processes thus appear as spontaneous actions. 
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At any rate, I think that a proper account of concept acquisition, of which it would be 
questionable anyway whether it could be plausible in the context of a philosophical story-telling, 
does not have to be delivered to comply with the current task, which is to show that the acquisition 
of the concept of causation – in whichever way it exactly happens – can be expected to arise in the 
thermodynamic scenario outlined in the previous sections. The decisive order of logical dependence 
lies in the concept application in a judgment, and the acquisition of the concept does not necessarily 
have to reflect this order. 
6.2.8 Free action 
The computational aspect of the paradigmatic model of 6.2.4 concerns the implementation of the 
rule mapping the causally relevant fact to the action that brings about the desired target state. Of 
some relevance to the question of concept acquisition is the representation of the result of the 
computation, since this is what determines which of the possible actions will be committed to. In 
this context, it is a reasonable assumption that, given that the outcome of the computation is what 
determines the agent’s decision to act in a certain way, that outcome cannot be again represented 
in an internal model of the agent. If the result of the computation were an internal observable, then 
something would have to be done after the observation, since the observation itself would not be 
the agent’s decision. Rather than that, the agent would need another rule connecting the 
observation with the decision to act, something similar to reasoning: ‘If the result of the 
computation of the best possible way of acting is observed, then obey that result and commit to the 
corresponding action.’ But this rule would be tantamount to another mapping, the mapping from a 
recommendation to the positive or negative decision to abide by the recommendation, and 
therefore another function would have to be calculated, with the iterated question of what happens 
if the result of computing that function is observed. Therefore, the immediate trigger of the decision 
to act cannot be an internal observable of the agent’s model.  
Next to the external, causally relevant factor as such, the computational model also allows 
taking weight factors of decision-relevant criteria, and also motives of higher order, into account. For 
example, if someone in a pub suddenly punches me in the face I might immediately strike back out 
of reflex. Judging with hindsight, this would still leave the possibility open to construe my doings as 
an action based on a triggering factor stemming from my environment. But I might also take some 
time to think through my situation, pondering the pros and cons of what to do, and could then still 
decide to take revenge. Although the cause of my action is still the aggressor’s previous action, 
which has this time gone through a complex intermediate process of computation and whose 
primary cause has thereby been enriched by further motives of second-order, one would also judge 
that my action, in this more complex second scenario, has acquired more of a quality of a ‘free 
action’. 
An extreme case is the situation that prompts the agent to perform causal experiments 
concerning a possible connection between a putative cause and its effect, like a switch and a light 
bulb. In performing an individual action, the agent is not directly constrained, and the immediate 
trigger, which makes the agent ‘arbitrarily’ toggle the switch, does not appear as a causal 
predecessor in the agent’s model, when the agent recollects the episode of having operated the 
switch and formulates a causal story to accommodate that recollection. This account of the opacity 
of immediate triggers in unconstrained situations leaves the thermodynamic model of agency intact, 
and it accommodates the free action as its extreme case. With that, a case has been made 
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concerning the identification of thermodynamic action and the free action of the epistemic agent 
that judges causation according to the agency-formula. 
6.2.9 Concept identification 
At this point it might be worth recapitulating the stage of the argument once more. In examples that 
involve effects triggered by information rather than efficient causes, an external observer classifies 
the effect as something that resembles an action by another agent. At that stage we have assumed 
that the external observer possesses all concepts required to make the conceptual distinction. In 
order to describe causation by information more systematically, Maxwell’s demon has been found 
as a paradigmatic case. But the thermodynamic scenario that embeds the demon is one the external 
observer is also subject to, and it is a scenario that makes it likely for a concept of action to arise 
according to the paradigmatic model derived from the demon’s actions. It is therefore a plausible 
assumption that the first-person concept of action used in the agency-formula uses the same kind of 
model that must be imposed on the agent whose action is judged in cases of causation by 
information. In contrast to the judgment concerning causation by information, when the epistemic 
agent observes another causal agent, the ‘free action’ in the agency-formula is an action 
hypothetically performed by the epistemic agent prompted to utter a causal judgment. The causal 
agent is thus identical with the epistemic agent.   
The main plausibility-problem of that story is the spontaneity of the agency-formula’s ‘free 
action’ that arises from the nexus of causes and effects, but for resolving this puzzle there is now a 
solution given by the account of the observables of the internal computational model (section 6.2.5). 
The phenomena of spontaneity and back-referencing, which are directly given by the first-person 
perspective, can be explained alternatively by a third-person perspective. Still, there is a further 
obstacle to reach the next stage of the argument. Although the concept of action involving a free 
agent can be embedded into a framework in which actions are coerced, the question of logical 
dependence between actions and causes has been left open, viz. we have still the open question 
whether the agency-formula makes the right assertion of explaining all causal judgments as agency-
judgments. But we have not only embedded actions into a framework within which they appear as 
coerced, but we have also allowed for an alternative view within the same framework where 
coerced actions are not different from other kinds of coerced effects.  
The pivotal step in the argument can also be represented as such: 
Agent A (the observer) has been considered at a time when it already has all 
concepts at its disposal, in particular CAUSE and ACTION, leaving open their 
dependence-relationship. Agent A observes Agent B (the acting agent) and judges 
the latter’s behaviour as action. Agent A sets up a model of how, from within a 
closed nexus of causes and effects, a causally relevant fact can become efficacious 
through information processing in Agent B. This model entails the opacity of the 
immediate causal trigger for Agent B’s doings. Therefore, the action taken by Agent 
B appears to be free from B’s perspective. It follows that the agency-formula can be 
employed by B, so that B now has a means of deriving efficient causation from 
action. But Agent A’s concept application, on which the explanatory model for B’s 
behaviour depends, is constrained in the same way as B’s concept application. So B 
could apply the same reasoning judging A’s behaviour, so that in A’s conceptual 
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scheme, efficient causation is derived from action, independently from what 
ontologically underlies efficient causation. 
Thus the efficient causation that might be a necessary ingredient to conceptualise non-spontaneous 
processes depends on the agent’s concept of agency. But what the application of the concept in the 
end effects is an account of the origin of its concept. It can be debated what follows from this 
conceptual loop (rather than from a flat circle) – whether the concept refers to an illusion or is 
something rather substantial, but at least it follows that it is not inconsistent. 
In the model of Maxwell’s demon there is a difference between considering populations of 
demons, which yield the explanation of back-referencing of causation by information, and 
considering an individual demon, for which the aspect of being an action is explained away since its 
doing equates the workings of a mechanism in which every part of the chain of causes and effects is 
determined by its immediate predecessor. Applying the agency-formula from the subjective, first-
person perspective consecutively to a chain of events a -> b -> c -> … etc., yields that the same kinds 
of events can be causes and effects, by virtue of extensional identity. That much had been clear 
before, but now that the concept of action has been supplemented by its natural constraints, we 
have finally identified a further source of information of how to characterize an action, such that the 
agency-formula might serve further purposes besides evaluating binary causal claims. These further 
characteristics are the thermodynamic properties of events that are embedded in relations of 
entropic order, such that an event of higher entropic order causes an event of lower order. Actions 
inherit these properties from thermodynamic events, and in turn causes inherit these properties 
from actions. The most conspicuous of these properties are locality, asymmetry, and regularity (see 
next section). 
The work done by the preceding sections is almost sufficient to answer the objection of 
anthropomorphism raised against agency-theories. First, my suggestion of a limited interpretation of 
the agency-approach as a theory that addresses only the conceptual, not the ontological aspect of 
causation, makes the difficulties of this task easier, since I thus do not have to find an ontologically 
committed account of agency, which then allows a kind of extension to cases that do not seem to 
involve genuine agency. In addition to that, the thermodynamic scheme, which explains where the 
immediacy and spontaneity of actions come from, seems to deliver a sensible semantics of the 
setting of the value of a variable – a concept the Objective Interventionists require – while the 
connection between the observables A and B can be explained as a probabilistic dependence. 
This philosophical position embraces the duality of perspectives and does not see any 
further use in analysing the experience of agency as far as the first-person perspective is concerned. 
The case is similar to what Chalmers (1996) says with respect to conscious experience in general: 
‘Indeed, as far as central processing is concerned, it simply finds itself in a location in this 
space. The system is able to make distinctions, and it knows it is able to make distinctions, but it has 
no idea how it does it. We would expect after a while that it could come to label the various 
locations it is thrown into—“red,” “green,” and the like—and that it would be able to know just 
which state it is in at a given time. But when asked just how it knows, there is nothing it can say, over 
and above “I just know, directly.” If one asks it, “What is the difference between these states?” it has 
no answer to give beyond “They’re just different,” or “This is one of those,” or “This one is red, and 
that one is green.” When pressed as to what that means, the system has nothing left to say but 
“They’re just different, qualitatively.” What else could it say?’ 
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In that regard the analogy between experience of agency and experience of colour seems 
correct, although, as I have made clear in section 6.2.7, I am sceptical whether this analogy covers 
the acquisition of the concept as well, unless it is underpinned by a distinction between spontaneous 
and non-spontaneous processes.  
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6.3 The properties of causation: asymmetry, locality, regularity 
In the preceding section a case was made for the claim that an agent can reasonably explain a causal 
judgment on the basis of the concept of action. An effect B can be seen as correlated with A, and an 
observed correlation between A and B continues to hold when A has been brought about by means 
of a direct action, which would render two merely spuriously correlated events A and B 
independent. A problem of the approach of grounding the concept of cause on manipulation is the 
question of how to proceed from there to make more informative statements about causation. 
Mellor clearly states the problem thus: 
Causation's means-end connotation is even more basic than its evidential and explanatory 
connotations, being to my mind the very core of the concept: causation is essentially the 
feature of the world that gives ends means. […] This may not however tell us much about 
causation. For to bring about a means in order to bring about an end is just to cause the 
means in order to cause the end. This makes it look as if we need to invoke causation to say 
what it is to be a means to an end. If we did, the means-end connotation would be as 
useless as the connotations […] that effects are 'produced by' or 'derived from' their causes, 
expressions whose meaning here obviously derives from that of 'caused by'. (Mellor (1995), 
p. 80) 
Spohn (2001), on p. 8, makes a very similar remark. What I find particularly problematic in this 
context is that we learn little more about the nature of the relata by merely acknowledging that they 
stand in a means-end-relationship. A second problem is that it seems difficult to say more about 
specific causal structures involving more than the action and its effect, so that from a set of binary 
relations a more complex model, e.g. a causal network with multiple nodes, could be constructed.  
Theories that start from or at least acknowledge a relation of manipulability, wherever we 
see a causal relation, incorporate the insight that there is importance of that notion to causation in a 
different way. Not many philosophers develop a theory of causation completely from agency and its 
perspectivism (Huw Price is one of the few), but some at least make some effort of integrating the 
phenomenon of agency into a wider, coherent theory. In order to present my own approach to the 
question of how to progress from here in contrast to how other authors proceed regarding the 
question, I will present a little survey of treating this question.  
Of course, for some philosophers, like Wolfgang Spohn, there is no deeper issue to the 
question. While acknowledging that agency is a particular instance of causation, many writers seem 
to content themselves with believing that agency uses causation, but that this is all there needs to 
be said about it. I think this cursory way of dealing with that question is a mistake; not only because 
by looking at agency we can learn more about causation, but also because we can learn more about 
the relation between the first- and third-person perspective in general.  
Mellor seems to be taking agency seriously. His quote from Mellor (1995) suggests that his 
analysis of causation in terms of a means-end-relationship is a reductive one, similar to Price’s, given 
the fact that he sees this relation at the ‘very core of the concept’ and its ‘essential feature’. In 
contrast to ‘production’ and ‘derivation’, causes seen as means to ends do not depend on causation 
in a derived way. Rather than that, causes and means to an end are in some sense notions on a par 
with each other. But it seems that the agency inherent in the means-end-relation has no logical 
precedence over causation in his account, which is already indicated by his treating agency as one of 
the ‘connotations’ of causation. In his discussion of the means-end-relation, he outlines his version 
of expected utility maximisation, but in doing that is careful to distinguish expected valuation, with 
subjective credence and subjective utility, on the one hand, and mean utility, with objective chance 
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and objective utility, on the other hand. Mellor’s concern is a possible outranking of expected utility 
by the dominance principle, which would give the wrong result in standard (Non-Newcombian) 
problems of decision theory. Mellor’s example is a patient facing the question whether to take 
medicine or not. The dominance principle prescribes not taking it, since no matter whether recovery 
takes place or not, the patient would be worse off conjoining this event with the intake of medicine, 
which would be unpleasant and incur a further cost. The application of the dominance principle is 
easily rejected in these kinds of problems, since both the evaluation of the expected utility according 
to evidential probabilities (i.e. looking at all the possible combinations of the probabilities and 
utilities) and the evaluation according common-sense causation (the intake of the medicine 
influences the likelihood of the recovery) accord in favour of taking the medicine. Mellor does not 
discuss Newcomb’s problem directly in this context, but his idea of distinguishing expected valuation 
from mean utility clearly serves the purpose of providing a criterion for being able to tell when 
evidential probabilities should not determine an agent’s decision when the dominance principle 
recommends the opposite. In Newcomb’s problem, two-boxing is the rational choice, in accordance 
with dominance, if an independent account of the causal connections tells the agent that his 
decision will not influence the past, even if the rules of the game contradict this causal fact.  But if 
the cause’s role as a chance-raiser is all an agent has to go by in order to judge a causal connection, 
her choice in Newcomb’s problem, since it makes a difference to the expected utility, will classify the 
chance-raising action as cause. Since Mellor has, by virtue of his philosophy of time, an independent 
account of when an event objectively raises the chance of another event, he can discharge this 
conceptual confusion by attributing the error to the agent’s failure to adopt the ‘real chance’ as his 
most rational choice of credence, rather than the evidential probability. An evaluation of Newcomb’s 
problem according to the real chances, unlike the evidential probabilities, is in accordance with the 
dominance principle, since causes must precede their effects, according to Mellor. It follows that 
Mellor’s account is not a reductive analysis, and accordingly, his theory of causation is not 
synthetically built up from the notion of the means-end-relationship.  
Price’s philosophy of causation (Price (1992), Price and Menzies (1993), Price (2007), Price 
and Weslake (2009)) is a consequential attempt to explain causation from agency, and is meant to 
be a reductive analysis of causation. As a consequence, Price abides by the recommendations of 
evidential rather than causal decision theory, even in Newcomb’s-problem-like scenarios, i.e. 
scenarios where the two variants of decision theory drift apart. In a plausible interpretation of 
evidential decision theory in this context, the logic of this choice leads to backwards causation, and 
that in turn opens an interesting but hard to oversee conglomerate of questions concerning the 
direction of time, of causation, and of thermodynamic state transitions. Price embraces the 
possibility that causation allows for an atemporal interpretation, with ‘effects of its interventions 
showing up in various directions, throughout the manifold’ (Price (2007), p. 282), given that there 
might be creatures with a sufficiently all-encompassing perspective on space-time. The conceptual 
distinction between ‘options’, ‘knowables’ and ‘fixtures’ (in ibid.) in an agent’s deliberation allows to 
represent structure beyond the binary case of the cause-effect-relation. Price also seems to endorse 
the formalism of the objectivist branch of interventionism, which offers a calculus for these multi-
variable structures. However, he disagrees with their notion of intervention, which he calls a ‘Trojan 
Horse against objectivist approaches’ (ibid.). Unlike my interpretation of agency, Price is interested 
primarily in the metaphysical consequences of a perspectivalist interpretation of manipulations. One 
of the aforementioned, hard to oversee consequences of negating a reality of directed time 
independent of causation is the correct interpretation of Price’s distinction between ‘options’ and 
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‘knowables’. If something is an option, then the agent can either realise the option or refrain from 
realising it. Unlike a ‘knowable’, the agent cannot tell whether the option will get realised or not 
before it will actually have been realised. Since causation hinges on deliberation, and deliberation 
hinges on the distinction between option and knowable, even for a godlike agent it is required to 
introduce an additional personal, asymmetric time. The consequential next step indicated by Price is 
the denial of causation in an objective sense, if this minimal constraint on a perspective in any sense 
is lifted. 
Judea Pearl is an ardent critic of evidential decision theory (see Pearl (2000), chapter 6). His 
theory of causation, belonging to the interventionist branch, is not a reductive theory. In particular, 
he does not reduce causal knowledge to evidential probabilities (next to Pearl (2000), see also Pearl 
(2001) on this point). Although his view is that causation can be defined by means of the ‘set-
operation’ (see section 4.2.5.1), which is a formalisation of his notion of intervention, this 
mathematical operation has to be seen in context with evidential probabilities underpinned by a 
causal graph. In this graph, all arrows converging into a single note are always interpreted as 
mechanisms. It is unclear in his exposition in (Pearl (2000)) where causal background knowledge, 
which seems to provide the basic causal structure in a lot of considered cases, originally comes from, 
and what might bootstrap the applicability of his method.  
The question whether evidential probabilities and the notion of manipulation is sufficient for 
delivering an account of causation, which would qualify as a reductive account, arises for all other 
theorists concerned with probabilistic theories of causation, too, given that the importance of the 
notion of manipulation to underpin the probabilistic approach is acknowledged. This is usually the 
case, since no contemporary theory claims that causation can be derived from probabilities alone. 
The question of reduction is therefore focused on the relation between manipulation and causation. 
Cartwright (2007) holds that the methods of causal inference and the devising of effective causal 
strategies have to be seen in conjunction with the right causal metaphysics, so her theory is not 
reductive in that respect, either. Among the other theorists, besides Judea Pearl, working with 
Bayesian networks, Spirtes et al. are agnostic about the metaphysics of causation. They are also not 
interested in providing a definition of causation, or conceptualising it in a sense that goes beyond 
the constraints needed for causal inference. So for them the question is left open. Wolfgang Spohn’s 
theory might be considered reductive. He thinks Bayesian networks exhaust the idea of causal 
dependence, but his theory of causation has to be considered in conjunction with his theory of 
ranking functions, which formalise our notion of belief. If his theory can be considered reductive, it 
will be reductive with respect to ranking functions. In any case, there is, explicitly, no reduction to or 
development from the notion of action or intervention, although, interestingly, he treats action 
variables as conceptually distinct from observational variables (Spohn (2012)), similar to Price’s 
distinction between ‘knowables’ and ‘options’. Williamson’s theory in (Williamson (2005)) interprets 
causal Bayesian networks as a product of observation and prior causal beliefs of an agent. The 
question of reduction in this theory appears to be tied to the quest into where the prior beliefs of an 
agent stem from. However, since Williamson has also focused on investigations into causal 
mechanisms, it is unlikely that his theory is reductive; at least it will not be considered a reduction to 
probabilities and interventions. 
With respect to reduction of causation to intervention, Woodward’s theory is an interesting 
case. He explicitly states that his theory is not ‘reductive’ as he understands the words, since the 
notion of an intervention is itself a causal notion rather than an independent primitive notion 
(Woodward (2003b), p. 27). He goes on saying that seeking a reductive account leads one into a 
109 
 
subjectivistic or anthropomorphic conceptualisation of manipulation. In contrast to such projects, 
exemplified by Price’s theory of causation, his project attempts to ‘elucidate the concept of 
causation by tracing its interconnections with or locating it in a “circle” of interrelated concepts’ 
(ibid.). Accordingly, Woodward defines interventions in terms of causation (see again section 
4.2.5.1), while causation is defined in terms of manipulability (Woodward (2003b), p. 45). Like 
Spirtes et al. and like Pearl, Woodward espouses the causal Markov condition, but unlike them 
regards this condition as derived from manipulability. Thus he doesn’t presuppose this condition as 
the former authors do, but sees it as a corollary of his notion of manipulability. 
In the remainder of this section I will outline my own answer to the question of how to get a 
more informative account of causation based on the concept of agency. The result of the preceding 
section has yielded the extensional, ternary identity of subjectively free actions, triggered actions 
and coerced events, which can be effects or causes, depending on the context. Since the case for the 
priority of actions in an agent’s judgment over causes has been made, I can now say that causes 
inherit the properties of the natural actions. After the properties will have been assessed in this 
section, it will be the subject of much of the remaining thesis to draw conclusions from them to the 
way we form causal judgments and to the standards of validity we assign to causal models. The 
properties in question correspond to what is often referred to as ‘connotations’ (Mellor (1995), or 
‘platitudes’ (Menzies (1996)) about causation. 
6.3.1 Asymmetry 
To start with the most obvious connotation, the causal relation is most often considered 
asymmetrical. Intuitively, a series of interventions renders two observables not related as cause and 
effect statistically independent, even if a correlation has been observed before. This seems to hold 
true without additional assumptions, which has already been stated as the virtue of the 
manipulationist approach. An approach that explicitly addresses the conceptual level of the problem 
can content itself with accepting the asymmetry as a given fact of the agent’s first-person judgment. 
The usual approach of conceptual analysis (Margolis (2014)) matches cases intuitively judged against 
the result of applying the theory to be tested.51 My approach analyses causal intuition merely up to a 
certain point, from which agency-intuition takes over. I have subsequently analysed the origin of the 
agency-intuition, where the thermodynamics of spontaneous processes plays a role. It seems that 
the problem of asymmetry of time, thermodynamics and causation arises after all, but only via the 
problem of grounding thermodynamics, which this theory brackets. For the agent that sees the 
necessity to intervene because some process would not happen without its doing, the question 
where that intuition comes from must be left open given the limited means of the analysis used in 
the section covering the thermodynamics of causation.  
It is therefore quite clear that my approach is guilty of what Price (1992) calls ‘conceptual 
buck-passing’. It explains the asymmetry of causation by appealing to the asymmetry of agency 
whose orientation is as problematic as that of causation itself. But it is of a benign kind and thus one 
of those instances of conceptual buck-passing which, according to Price, can allow rendering 
problems more tractable than before. This is in fact how I think about causation itself: if it can be 
cashed out in terms of agency, as the objectified version of the latter concept, then causation might 
                                                          
51 Obviously, the literature on causality and causation makes extensive use of that approach, no matter 
whether the theory is explicitly categorised as a piece of conceptual analysis or just proceeds in such  a fashion 
that in the end it looks like conceptual analysis. 
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allow us to address the heavier metaphysical questions of time, rise of entropy, and regular patterns 
within the rise of entropy, in a more tractable way. 
Asymmetry is a property of causation that presupposes that the agent can tell whether two 
events A and B are distinct. Otherwise there is no sense in speaking of bringing about A such that B 
follows, in contrast to doing B such that A follows. But this is a prerequisite of applying the agency-
formula in the first place. There are certain setups that defy the idea of asymmetry. For example, 
one can think of a pair of buckets and a hose that connects the two buckets through a hole in their 
respective bottom section, such that if one fills one bucket, one also fills the other. An agent can 
target each of them as the immediate object of the action irrespective of the same result. But a 
symmetry-breaker would still be given by the fact that there is a dependence of the indirect event 
on the direct action, in the sense that, in the eye of the judging agent, the indirect event would not 
happen without the action. In practical contexts, the reason for believing in the dependence will 
often be a mechanism, but can also consist in a blunt belief of dependence no matter what the 
further circumstances are. However, the belief should imply at least a notion of dependence that 
stands in contrast to mere logical dependence. Pearl’s often used example of ‘making the grass wet 
causes the grass to be slippery’ (in Pearl (2000) and elsewhere) is a very questionable example to 
make his readers acquainted with his invention of causal Bayesian networks, since the application of 
water brings about both changes in the properties of the grass with the same action, and the 
asymmetry is merely a logical one. Supposedly, applications of all kinds of liquids, including water, 
make the grass not only wet but also slippery, whereas slipperiness can also be brought about by 
other means. Therefore, there is an asymmetry in reasoning from one proposition to the other; but 
one can have doubts about whether this involves a genuine causal asymmetry. In the same 
questionable sense, one might want say that drawing a red ball from a ballot box ‘causes’ the 
drawing of a coloured ball, whereas the converse does not hold true. Notice that the difference 
between causal and explanatory reasoning might not be possible if one does not have a theory of 
the relata of causation as physical processes, according to a view similar to the one I have developed 
in this chapter. 
6.3.2 Locality 
Another point often observed but differently formulated is what I want to call ‘locality of causation’. 
It is contrasted with Laplacean universal determinism, according to which a state of the universe 
determines the state of the universe that ensues temporally, rather than entailing that a local cause 
influences events in its surroundings. Law-based approaches to causation (e.g. David Armstrong) on 
the one hand, and approaches that treat objects as bearers of local capacities or dispositions (e.g. 
Steven Mumford, Nancy Cartwright) on the other hand, also reflect this dichotomy. 
In the conceptual context, again in decisive contrast to the ontological context, the locality 
is, like asymmetry, a relatively uncontroversial property of causation, and this holds true for agency-
approaches in particular.52 Locality captures the idea that the agent has a limited range of influence, 
and that the effect’s occurrence is due to what has happened in that limited range. Whereas an 
explanation from a cosmic perspective of how things in the world unfold in time might favour a law-
based account that does not attribute causal power to individual things, the agency-stance prohibits 
                                                          
52 This cannot be said of a more metaphysically committed reading of the agency-approach. For example, 
Hausman (1997), in his critique of Menzies and Price’s agency-theory, represents this theory as maintaining 
that causation is a relation extrinsic to the primary aspects of the involved events, in virtue of having a 
‘secondary quality’. This reading conflicts with locality seen as an intrinsic quality of causes. 
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the assumption that actions are instantiations of a law, since it requires them to follow from a free 
decision to act, even if this view eventually turned out to be an illusion. Leibnizian pre-established 
harmony is a metaphysical theory of causation that takes into account the manifest but false 
judgment of an agent that its action can bring about a physical effect. Another instance of falsely 
attributed locality of causation is when we see a film or a computer simulation, where there are no 
objects that make a local difference to what we see in the ensuing frame. But when I act in reality, 
my decision to intervene results from my belief that my intervention is called for, since if I refrain 
from doing what is in my local sphere of influence, the intended event would not occur. 
Locality is a crucial feature of causation according to the way I have construed the concept, 
which is why I juxtapose it next to asymmetry and regularity and assign it equal importance. Going 
back to the spontaneous, non-spontaneous distinction, there was a worry of an underlying, hidden 
circularity, if we ground the concept of agency on that dichotomy and then derive causation from 
agency. But there are clearly processes that do not require a causal explanation. For example, if 
water evaporates from a glass into its surroundings, or when a temperature gradient of gas in a 
container gradually levels out. The reverse of this process is non-spontaneous, but as the second law 
of thermodynamics shows, if such processes are observed there are other processes elsewhere that 
restore the balance of entropy. So, looking for causation requires the partitioning of space, and 
therefore causes are necessarily local. Importantly, if this outlook is sound, there is a prospect of 
reducing causation to non-causal concepts, viz. to statistics, with no hidden, underlying circularity 
involved. Of course, this would only be true if the direction of time can be grounded non-causally. 
We have relied on the direction of time by implicitly taking for granted that the next most likely state 
to be assumed by a system at a given time, according to its statistics, is the state that lies in its 
future, not its past.  
6.3.3 Regularity 
In the conceptual context, the property of regularity can be defined as follows: whenever we judge 
that ‘a causes b’, there is a corresponding ‘A causes B’-judgment. The first proposition involves a and 
b as event tokens, while the second involves the corresponding types A and B. A situation involving a 
and b might seem non-repeatable, but from the fact that we made a judgment about the causal 
connection between the two relata it follows that this situation would give rise to a regularity, if 
instantiated repeatedly. Thus, a judgment of the form ‘a causes b’ depends on ‘A causes B’, but not 
vice versa. Since my approach abstracts from the epistemic question of how the agent learns about a 
type level causal claim, this is not supposed to preclude a reversed dependence as far as the causal 
epistemology is concerned.   
The argument for this claim goes as follows: The causal claim ‘A causes B’ hinges on the 
concept of action. But the application of the concept of action hinges on an event that takes place in 
the thermodynamic context as outlined in sections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5. An action is always constrained 
by information about the situation that embeds the agent. According to information and its use in 
the agent’s model, different hypothetical situations are contrasted, which include acting in different 
ways. Whether the agent commits to an action depends on the result of such a computation. 
Evaluating the result of its own action, the agent is again dependent on its internal model. It follows 
that the agent is never in direct contact with the event (the causally relevant fact) that triggers the 
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action causally. It is rather configured to react to a causal type.53 This scheme applies to causal 
judgments concerning an observed past, but also concerning the planning of a future situation.   
The second argument for a causal judgment mediated by types, rather than pertaining 
directly to observed tokens, takes into account that the agent is limited in its computational 
resources to represent the rule from the causally relevant fact, in conjunction with the range of 
possible direct actions, to the targeted situation. The agent is limited computationally because it is 
limited physically, and information, according to section 6.2.4, needs to be represented physically. 
So the causal model, the basis of the computation of the best action, must involve causal types.  
The first argument is further corroborated by the fact that the inference from the signal to 
the matter of fact is itself a rule, and therefore concerns types. Every signal depends on the 
bandwidth of the information channel via which it is produced, and the event at the sending end of 
the channel will therefore always appear as an abstract representation of a possibly more concrete 
specification, in other words it will be given to the agent on type level. The second argument can 
also be made further plausible by reminding oneself that actions are always informed actions. So far, 
the necessity to measure contingent information has been highlighted, but evidently this 
information needs to feed into the model that makes sense of the measured data. But, as the 
thought experiment of Maxwell’s demon shows, information needs to be physically represented 
throughout a process between an input (the measurement) and an output (an observable action). 
This puts a limiting constraint on how an agent can produce a causal judgment. Relying on types 
given by causally relevant properties, which individual events merely instantiate, is the most obvious 
solution to the problem of how to make maximum use of an agent’s computational resources. 
The causal types are best interpreted as causally relevant properties, and individual causally 
relevant causes are seen as instantiations of classes that bear those properties. No assumption 
concerning the reality of these properties is made (as opposed to a metaphysical reading of these 
properties, as in Ehring (2009)), since they are just instrumental concepts that inform the agent’s 
internal model. An account based on causally relevant properties can make sense of what the task of 
causal prediction (of which planning an adequate intervention is a subclass) consists in, and how the 
agent is enabled to cope with this task. For example, a prediction to be made might concern the 
most likely ramifications of what will happen if a certain observed object is thrown into a window. 
Let us assume the possible final states are coarse-grained in such a way that a bivalent result: 
‘window breaks’ / ‘does not break’, is expected, following a vigorous throw of the object, targeted 
right at the centre of the window. Then a successful prediction will depend on the right classification 
of the object in question, and this classification depends on the causal relations the object engages 
in with the observer, prior to the causal interaction in question. E.g., a gold bar, a marble plate, a 
stone, a billiard ball, etc. are all possible objects that qualify for breaking the glass of the window, 
whereas a sponge, a paper dart, a snowball, etc. do not qualify for that outcome. The combination of 
causally relevant properties, in this case the fragility of the glass plate, and the solidity of the stone 
thrown into it, determines the outcome of the causal interaction, and the class of similar causal 
interactions determines the causally relevant property of which the individual stone observed in a 
specific situation is an instance. But if a prediction is to be made, this property has not been 
observed via the causal effect in question. So the correct classification prior to the causal interaction 
                                                          
53 This is true in particular, but not only, when the agent’s decision is based on an inference from an observed 
signal. For example, if a flashing light tells me to engage in security procedures, since this signal indicates 
super-critical pressure in a vessel, then it is clear that the type of super-critical pressure causes my action, 
because presence of the type is all the information the flashing light can deliver. 
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must depend on other causal interactions. Given the object is indeed a stone, the agent needs to be 
informed via channels that attribute colour, shape, size, the circumstance of where the object was 
found, possibly weight, etc., to the object. Once the classification has been performed, access is 
granted to information concerning further properties of the ‘stone-hood’. Among others, this set 
includes properties that are causally relevant to the current situation, which is in the considered case 
its density and solidity.  
This scheme suggests a distinct temporal order for this kind of causal inference: being 
exposed to indicator variables – classification – prediction. The first two steps of this sequence 
enable an agent to classify an observed object, which unlocks access to further properties of this 
object-class, of which some are potentially causally relevant in the situation. It is interesting that the 
agent is thus exposed to some information about the object via an information channel that is 
distinct from the causal channel that concerns the content of the causal prediction. For example, 
perceiving the stone via its visible features is a causal process distinct from the possible future causal 
interaction when the stone is thrown. Catching up on an earlier example, becoming informed of 
toxic gas spreading in a building is realised via a channel different from the causal channel to which 
one would become exposed if no action, like leaving the building quickly, is taken. 
If the interpretation of types as causally relevant properties, which are grounded in an 
agent’s model, is correct, then we would also have an agent-dependent account of reference 
classes. The similarity of causal situations within one reference class turns on the fact that the same 
causally relevant properties are instantiated in the situation. Moreover, the relata of a causal 
relation are now further specified. Next to knowing that the relevant distinctions of causal ‘variables’ 
are indeed connected to localisable events (from locality), we now know the relata are instantiated 
properties. On the other hand, the downside of the approach is that we need an account for how 
token level causal claims are to be evaluated. This will be done in section 7.1.1. 
The three properties, asymmetry, locality, and regularity, describe the relation of causation. 
These properties were inherited from the concept of naturalised action, with which causes were 
subsequently identified. They describe how agency looks like from the third-person perspective, but 
from that perspective there is no difference between actions and causes. The concept of causation is 
therefore analysed a second time. The causal relation is a local, asymmetric, relation of two 
correlated observables. It is the ‘X’ in the term ‘correlation plus X’, if we exclude notions like  ‘direct 
action’, ‘free action’, ‘semantic information’, etc., which all belong to the subjective category, in 
order to describe what causation is.  
The grounds of the asymmetry are still the agent-manipulations understood as in section 
5.1, a concept whose natural origins are explained in chapter 6. The concept thus allows for an 
agent-centred and an objective reading, in the sense of a dual-aspect theory. The approach so far 
consisted in selecting agency as a promising account for analysing causation, and the subsequent 
naturalisation of the concept of agency, such that its thermodynamic properties can be revealed. 
Now these results have been used to constrain the causal relations and its relata, so that more can 
be said about valid causal models that consist of more complex structures than merely assertions 
involving two variables. In the following sections, I will make use of that information to underpin 
some causal judgments. The properties that constrain the causal relation and its relata are those 
that are, in other accounts of causation, often directly inferred from typical causal examples. 
Therefore, the relations that the analysis in this section has come up with do not come as a surprise. 
However, the virtue of the analysis consists in the fact that now the origins of these properties can 
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be explained further, since without such an analysis the expectation that enlisting properties can 
inform our quest for a better understanding of causation begs the question. 
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7 Causal judgments in LoA1, LoA2, and LoA3 
Associated with the different stages of the analysis of agency and causation across the sections of 
chapters 5 and 6 were the different perspectives on agency. These can now be translated into the 
concepts that the philosophy of information recommends. Thus each perspective can be mapped to 
a corresponding level of abstraction (as introduced in 3.1). There is a conceptual distinction between 
intuiting causation on the basis of an agency-experience and explaining that causal judgment 
linguistically on the basis of the concept of agency. But I will assume that the contents of the two will 
not be divergent. Both forming the judgment and explaining the judgment are considered as 
occurrences that are detached from the actual course of events. The judgment is either prospective, 
or retrospective. With this precaution, we clearly stay at the conceptual level of causal analysis. Also, 
it is thus ensured that the informational account of causal judgments, which the method of 
abstraction (henceforth: ‘MoA’) promises, will not try to achieve more than it can deliver. In 
particular, this means that if a concept of free action is applied prospectively or retrospectively, the 
action does not really have to be free to underpin the causal judgment to which the concept of free 
action is applied. 
Causes are evaluated as hypothetically performed actions, but actions have been explained 
as events that have a natural origin in the physics of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, which I have 
not analysed further and whose theory might require causal notions after all. My method does not 
ultimately decide on which of the two, cause or action, has the ontological prevalence.54 But in order 
to underpin judgments, actions have the advantage of exploiting the first-person perspective, which 
yields a non-circular account, whereas analysis based on objective causes, like James Woodward’s 
theory, seem to run into difficulties at some point. The order of the three levels of abstraction, 
which reflects the course of the argument of my thesis, depends critically on the first-person 
perspective. This dovetails with the fact that the identity of acting and judging agent posited by LoA1 
is not explained further, whereas LoA2 merely approximates diachronic identity of the (observed) 
agent by the idea of centralisation. Markovian models like Bayesian networks, which belong to LoA3, 
cannot make sense of identity, except via the (extra-logical) interpretation of their variables.   
From the point of view of my argument, the problem with those variants of materialism that 
do not posit subjects as distinctive kinds of entities is the assumption that a subject can ‘model itself’ 
like it can model all the other objects it observes (and which are observable by other subjects, too). 
This leads to some problematic results like the account by Dennett (1991) of how Mary, the colour-
blind scientist, can anticipate her first experience of colours because she has knowledge about it by 
reading books about the neurophysiology of colour experiences. According to Dennett, that would 
enable her to judge whether certain prepared objects are truthfully coloured, because she would be 
able to watch her own reaction to the exposition and compare that to the expected reaction 
according to her disposition. Although it is conceivable that some bodily reaction of one’s own body 
can be observed, it is by no means guaranteed that it is possible to the degree required by Dennett’s 
argument against the reality of qualia, since two faculties of the subject – the reaction and its 
observation – would operate at the same time. On the side of actions, this corresponds to 
completely objectifying one’s acting body, as if one is one’s own puppeteer. But our body is steered 
                                                          
54 Since a thermodynamic picture like the one outlined in chapter 6 has both actions and causes depend on 
drawing boundaries, it is plausible that there is no ontological order of causal concepts to begin with; at least if 
we read causation as a binary relation, which is a conceptual choice. In that case, such ontological questions 
arise at the level of regularities, not at the level of causation. 
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differently from how we steer an external puppet, or a virtual avatar. These are controlled causally, 
our body is controlled directly. LoA1 reflects this crucial difference.  
LoA1, in its simple form, consists of just two variables, which become observables (in the 
MoA-sense) by interpreting them as an action-event and effect-event respectively. The degree to 
which the variables can be strictly typed depends on the context. For example, strict types can be 
assigned for events in a strict thermodynamic context, which is the paradigmatic context on which 
the whole theory of agency-causation ultimately rests. The behaviour of the direct-action-variable is 
governed by the assumption of any value from the range of possible values (determined by 
feasibility), following a free decision of the agent. The corresponding predicate is true simply when 
the event that putatively happened according to the judgment of the agent in fact happened as 
represented in the judgment. The behaviour of the effect is governed by a relation of dependence 
on the action, in the sense of chance-raising. The values the effect-variable can assume again 
depend on the specific context and the variable can be typed to varying degrees. On the conceptual 
level, there is no actual causal connection in an individual situation (as section 7.1.1 will show), 
therefore the truth of the causal relation between the two variables can only be established on type 
level by the agent. However, the agent can simply assign truth to a token level causal claim bona 
fide. In this case confidence is expressed that the action was a real difference-maker, and that the 
corresponding counterfactual ‘had the action not been committed, the effect would not have 
happened’ (for qualifications see 7.1.2 and 7.1.3). 
If the agent judges its own action as caused by information rather than free, there are two 
ways to modify the simple variant of LoA1, i.e. the LoA for modelling a free action. Either a further 
event will be taken into account, and represented by its variable. This variable will stand for the fact 
that triggered the action.  In addition to that variable, an explicit signal that carried the information 
about the past matter of fact for the agent can be represented. Corresponding behaviours of 
dependence can be defined between the causally relevant event, the signal, and the action. A 
judgment that explicitly represents these new variables could be formulated such as: ‘I did C because 
I learned that A on the basis of observing B, in order to bring about D.’ If one wants to avoid the 
teleological aspect of C’s dependence on D (which my proposed account only requires in order to 
explain the conceptual scheme of the agent), one could also formulate it as follows: ‘I did C because I 
learned that A on the basis of observing B, such that D followed from C.’ The judgment preserves the 
aspect of freedom from coercion stemming from the simple, two-variable case, in so far as the agent 
reconstructs the experienced event such that its action is suggested by considerations of optimising 
behaviour, while allowing that the time, at which the action is committed to, could have been 
chosen otherwise. The same holds true for the choice of the context from which utilities are chosen 
(for example, one could choose to commit to an action that makes use of a piece of information 
needed for that action, or one could choose to commit to an action that serves the improvement of 
the causal model in order to increase the chance of successful action at a later time; see also the 
remarks made in section 6.2.3 concerning vital and active goals, and 6.2.7). 
LoA2 does not allow judging actions in a theory-free fashion as LoA1 does. The judging agent 
needs evidence that underpins the judgment that the agent judged upon does in fact commit to an 
action. Often, the observable action is part of a regular sequence of events. The quasi-spontaneity of 
the action has to be squared with the property of being dependent on other regular events. LoA1 
faces a similar problem in the case of informationally triggered actions, where the seeming 
contradiction can be cashed out by resorting to a counterfactual evaluation that entails that every 
actual action could also have happened at other times, or could have been eschewed if the agent 
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had wanted that. In LoA2, the same purpose is served by identifying the variables belonging to 
information channels on the one hand, and the ones belonging to causal mechanisms on the other 
hand. This informs a behaviour (in the MoA-sense) between the causally relevant event that 
precipitates all signals that serve as information carriers. This flow of information is a causal process. 
But a variable’s role as a signal requires the causal structure to be devoid of equivocation; otherwise 
no inference from the signal back to its cause would be possible. The channel structure, in 
conjunction with the computational capacity of performing the inference from the signal to the 
cause, enables the judged upon agent to react appropriately. Unlike the judgment at LoA1, judging 
the appropriateness of the action is more significantly tied to the flow of feedback (physical or 
informational) to the judged upon agent, otherwise it will be hard to see in most contexts how 
another agent’s action can be discerned from an event that is not an action, unless the kind of 
behaviour is already well-known to be an action by the judging agent. In particular, this requires the 
judged upon agent to be semantically enabled. For example, one could think about a situation where 
certain test subjects are told to press a button when they see a flashing light, without giving them an 
idea which further events are set off by pressing the button. They might abide by the announced 
rule anyway and we would then interpret their doings as actions, even in case we are not able to 
identify any sort of beneficial feedback. To suppose that the test subjects have understood the rule 
and that they might have some motivation to abide by the rule would in such a case be sufficient for 
telling apart an action and a coerced bodily movement.   
LoA3 enables the representation of causal structures, as long as one does not ask what a 
causal connection between two elements of such a structure means (an answer of which is given by 
switching to LoA1). The variables can again be typed to varying degrees of strictness, depending on 
context, and they stand for observable (in the default meaning of the word) events, which is the 
interpretation that turns them into observables (in the MoA-sense). At this level of abstraction, 
unlike LoA1, none of the events has a highlighted role to play. The number of variables is 
unbounded. A default assumption that governs all variables concerns their dependence on their 
respective predecessors according to an order. Variables can reside at a position parallel to each 
other in that hierarchy, and can have independent influence on their successors. This interpretation 
corresponds to the connotation of locality, whereas the ordering corresponds to asymmetry. All 
variables are interpreted as instantiations of causally relevant properties, which corresponds to the 
connotation of regularity. The aforementioned dependence on their ancestors determines the 
behaviours of the observables of this LoA. The structure of these causal networks depends on the 
assumed constraint-level (see section 4.2) of the causal system.  
The next step which the method of abstraction recommends is the specification of the 
relations between the levels of abstraction. LoA3 can be supplanted by LoA2, if there is reason to 
impute the capacity of information processing and of being able to implement the result of the 
computation. Since this also implies the attribution of causal knowledge, or at least some causal 
model, replacing LoA3 by LoA2 results in a higher-order problem of causation. The causal agent 
judged upon might even react in a pre-emptive move since its causal model involves representing 
yet another agent that might interfere with its purposes, in which case the judging agent needs to 
model a causal problem of third order. The opposite procedure, replacing a LoA2-based causal 
explanation by a LoA3-based explanation, increases the number of variables. It loses the causally 
relevant matter of fact as the actually ‘interesting’ causal explanation, but allows asking for a 
detailed mechanistic story of what enables the adequate reaction. Alternatively, one might ask for 
further details of how an agent is informed of the causally relevant matter of fact, in which case one 
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can further fine-grain the model of the information channel, but still reside in LoA2, since the relay 
stations of the information channel are, in accord with this level of abstraction, not interpreted as 
efficient causes. 
A plausible way of mapping the ideas incorporated by the above definitions of LoAs to the 
ideas underlying usual modelling strategies like causal Bayesian networks can be outlined as follows. 
LoA3 provides an interpretation of vertices (also called ‘nodes’) of a network as instantiated causally 
relevant properties, which entails that they will give rise to regularities. The ordering that results 
from the direction of the arrows corresponds to the connotation of asymmetry, whereas the fact 
that vertices of the same level of the ordering can be instantiated parallelly corresponds to locality. 
If the semantics of a node imply more than being an instance of a property that is causally relevant 
to an effect explicitly modelled in the graph, then these properties of the cause-object can be 
considered as accidental. If a cause-object has several effects, different causally relevant properties 
can play a role in bringing about this effect. That would be a configuration where we would expect 
modularity to govern the associated probabilities, since, if independent mechanisms entail 
modularity, it is a fortiori true that different types of mechanisms entail this constraint. Performing a 
manipulation of a variable from a network amounts, according to Pearl (2000), to lifting it from its 
old influences and putting it under the influence of a manipulation variable. The corresponding to 
switching from LoA3 to LoA1, where the target of the intervention is considered as a direct action 
that is not subject to a probabilistic measure, whereas anything that follows from the direct action, 
qua being indirect, is subject to such a measure. Spohn (2001) and Price (2007) make similar 
recommendations concerning evidence and action variables. 
What has been explained narratively in section 5.2 can now be formalised more precisely. A 
direct action does not have to be an infallible measure of successfully bringing about an effect. It is 
not necessarily identical to bodily movement, either. But it is not assigned a rate of failure via a 
probability measure, as it is the case for indirectly brought about effects. If a failure occurs, this 
might prompt a change of level of abstraction. If an event, previously classified as a direct action, is 
now thought of as an indirectly brought about event, then this is a qualitative change in the status of 
this variable in the model. This is not quite the case in Objective Interventionism. A default 
assumption of Objective Interventionism is that what appears to be a direct cause according to one 
model can be an indirect cause according to a more detailed model. Therefore, drilling down into a 
more fine-grained causal model from a more coarse-grained model does not feature this qualitative 
change, since the presence of additional and previously unrepresented intermediate causes is the 
null-hypothesis of the models of Objective Interventionism. Similarly, in LoA1 any indirect effect 
following a direct action allows for insertion of additional variables that screen off the indirect effect 
from the direct action, while such an insertion is explicitly forbidden for the connection between the 
agent’s decision and the direct action. If my account is correct in this regard, then there is no such 
thing as the ‘intervention variable’ from Objective Interventionism. An arrow in a causal model 
always allows for further fine-graining of the model, and therefore allows for a causal influence that 
fails to bring about the effect, including even the intervention variable, which is something LoA1 
absolutely forbids. 
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7.1 Objectification  - Switching from LoA1 to LoA3 
The agent-perspective requires that the relation of ‘direct action’ is unanalysable (action as an 
unconstrained realisation of several possibilities), whereas the correlation (which is made 
asymmetric by A’s being the target of direct action) can be explained further on the basis of 
mathematical, therefore non-causal, terms. Since direct action is not analysable further, the 
semantics of the causal relation (understood as a binary relation) can be said to be grounded in 
direct appeal to everybody’s experience as an agent. If I commit an action by bringing about A, such 
that B follows, then another agent, who watches me perform this action, should come to the same 
conclusion (using LoA2) as I do. As far the causal connection between  A and  B is concerned, this 
connection should persist even if we switch to a perspective that does not feature a free and direct 
action, and it should even persist if we perform a further step away from LoA2 and stop construing 
the observed behaviour as an action altogether (moving to LoA3). The causal judgment should 
survive these changes of perspective. Similar reasoning concerns the question of what it is that 
makes me think that my intervention would be adequate in the first place, before I start testing 
causal connections by intervening on a suspected cause in the system. The role of this truth-maker is 
played by the causally relevant properties, and the way they return a verdict depends on the 
structure of the internal model.  
Since causal judgments of the form ‘A causes B’ are, on the basis of this account, to be 
understood on type level and in a probabilistic sense, an agent can make the judgment ‘A causes C’, 
on the basis of his judgments ‘A causes B’ and ‘B causes C’, if the Bs are successfully identified, viz. 
the B which is dependent on A is the same causally relevant property as the B directly brought about 
in order to bring about C). But this means that, for C, it is irrelevant how B has occurred, since it is 
only relevant that the B does occur. In A -> B -> C, the B has a dual role: it is on the one hand 
dependent on A if we evaluate the A -> B part, and on the other hand it occurs spontaneously if we 
evaluate the B -> C part. But the agent’s contradictory way of evaluating B does not instil a 
contradiction into the real events. It is rather the case that the seeming contradiction stems from a 
priori constraints from the level of abstraction used. Similarly, no contradiction arises if we allow for 
a revision of judgment concerning an event B that can either be considered as another agent’s free 
action or follow (according to a causal rule) depending on a prior, yet to be observed, event A. This 
can apply even to judgments concerning our own actions, previously considered free and now 
considered determined in the light of new evidence. 
The procedure shows that longer causal chains of causation can be synthesized by 
consecutively applying LoA1. If my action brings about B via bringing about A, and if I subsequently 
bring about B by means of a direct action, such that C follows from B, then I can infer that C follows 
causally from A via B. Agency is literally ‘taken out of the equation’ by extensional identity of the 
event of direct action and an event that is dependent on an action. But this procedure seems to 
require causal transitivity, which some authors, e.g. Christopher Hitchcock and James Woodward, 
argue against. 
As an example, if we have three or more billiard balls and a sequence of one ball impacting 
on the next one in the sequence, then it is unproblematic to expect causal transitivity to hold in the 
example as far as our intuition is concerned. An example where such a conclusion is problematic is 
reported in Cartwright (2007): A dog bites the right thumb of a terrorist who was about to make a 
bomb explode by activating a trigger. Now that the right thumb is incapacitated, the terrorist uses 
the left thumb instead, and the bomb goes off. The transitive reading of the example has it that the 
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dog’s bite causes the terrorist to use his left thumb to activate the bomb’s trigger, and using the left 
thumb to activate the trigger would be the cause of the bomb’s explosion.  
Of course, causal transitivity fails in this example, and this is prima facie all the more the 
problem of an account that explicitly posits causal relata to be observables. The intermediate event 
(depressing the button with the second-choice thumb) is clearly only one physical observable, such 
that the causal chain should line up exactly as needed for causal transitivity. Therefore, transitivity 
should apply to the bomb-example no less than to the billiard ball example.  
However, for each element in the causal chain we have to evaluate both relata of the 
relation individually, and this individual evaluation is done on the basis of the agency-formula. If one 
event is in fact the effect of the preceding relation, and would also be, brought about by any means, 
a proper intervention for bringing about the subsequent one, then we have the causal alignment 
needed for transitivity. This underscores that, although observable phenomena always play a role in 
causation, in the sense of a necessary criterion, they are not identical with causal relata, because, for 
the agency-account, types, or more precisely causally relevant properties, are relevant. There are 
empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that this is how our judgments actually proceeds 
(see ‘inference over perception’ in Sloman (2005)).  
In the dog-bite example, one and the same observable represents two events in the agent’s 
model: changing fingers in order to do whatever one has intended to do, and pressing the button no 
matter what finger is used, which are two events that don’t line up for transitivity. The 
corresponding agency-consideration is: is making the dog bite any one of the fingers an appropriate 
measure to prevent the terrorist from pressing the button? No. Is making the dog bite the right 
finger a measure to make the terrorist switch the fingers? Yes. (This means the dog’s bite causes 
merely a finger-switch. And the subsequent question is: Is switching fingers, given I intend to press 
the button anyway by any means, a measure to prevent the bomb from exploding? No (Result: B in 
its role as effect and B* seen as cause don’t align). By contrast, the billiard ball example passes the 
corresponding test. 
Non-alignment of types of events is sufficient to negate causal transitivity in examples of 
token level causation such as the dog-bite example, and it shows that we reason correctly via models 
at type level. But this is a negative finding only. To establish token level transitivity requires the 
demonstration that the particular intermediate event brought about by the original cause was a 
genuine difference-maker with respect to the final effect in the transitive causal chain (see next 
section). Moreover, as the golf-example from the next section shows, the reasoning from types to 
tokens in the case of genuine token level causation that features unlikely chains of events is not a 
straightforward process of judgment. Positively, one can say that transitivity on type level is true. If A 
is a chance-raiser of B, and B is a chance-raiser of C, then A is a chance-raiser of C – unless there are 
further causal pathways via which A lowers C’s chance, in which case only the partial effect of A on C 
is positive (Woodward’s definition of a ‘partial cause’ in Woodward (2003b) can be applied here). 
The origins of the causal models lie in thermodynamics mediated by a thermodynamically 
formed concept of agency. As the name suggests, thermodynamically informed causal models are 
dynamical models. They have to work in conjunction with other internal models, like those that 
model logical relationships. There are several examples for the fact that such cooperation is 
necessary. Reasoning from the perceived properties of an object to the causal properties of the class 
to which this object belongs (see section 6.3.3) is one case. Another example is alignment in causal 
transitivity. If an event A causes an intermediate event B, then B will rarely be mentioned as an 
instantiated property causally relevant to C. For example, I enter my child’s cluttered room and 
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stumble across a toy, which causes my falling to the floor. My falling to the floor causes the child to 
wake up. In this case, it is a specific property of my fall that does the causal work – its loudness. 
Probably any other loud noise would have had the same effect. Seeing my fall as an instance of that 
causal property is a non-causal inference. 
The problem of token level transitivity shows that extensional identity of events alone leaves 
a chance of conflating the properties of being an effect and being the realisation of a causally 
relevant property into a single, but compound causally relevant event. There is a similar problem 
that arises when one intervention entails one observable effect, which is the realisation of different 
causally relevant properties. Pearl’s example of a causal Bayesian network with rain and sprinkler as 
two causes of wet grass, an example I have already criticised in section 6.3.1, has this structure. The 
wet grass allegedly causes the grass to be slippery as well. Pearl’s interpretation, besides confusing 
causal and explanatory reasoning, seems to stem from imposing the causal Markov condition as a 
necessary criterion for a correct causal model. The alternative model, the one the agency-approach 
in my interpretation would suggest55, creates a v-Structure, where Pearl’s model features a causal 
chain (given one models the rain-variable and the sprinkler-variable as a compound variable for the 
sake of simplifying the case): 
 
 
On the left Pearl’s version, on the right my version of the correct depiction of the causal relations of this three-variable 
case 
 
The v-structure is due to the agent’s action of turning the sprinkler on or seeing that it rains over the 
patch of grass. This has the two effects of wet and slippery grass, which are not independent of each 
other, such that observing the wetness of the grass would be an indicator of the slipperiness, over 
and above what the presence of the cause indicates about the occurrence of the effects (the causes 
might fail to bring about the effect). As far as the concept of agency is concerned, there is nothing to 
be said against constructing the causal model of that situation in the above fashion.56 
Summing up these ideas, the account of objectification of agency (i.e. the account of how 
causation becomes an objective relation while being derived from the concept of agency) can be 
expounded as follows: In a typical causal model (causal graphs, Bayesian networks, structural 
                                                          
55 Other interpretations might reiterate the fallacy of confusing causal with explanatory reasoning by judging 
that making the grass wet is an appropriate means of making the grass slippery as well. The fallacy consists in 
the fact that the measure taken by an agent is more adequately represented by saying that applying a layer of 
water on the grass makes it slippery (and it also makes it wet). 
56 Notice that Cartwright’s factory example (see section 4.2.4) also features a v-Structure forbidden by the 
causal Markov condition. But the structure is a different one, since product and by-product are extensionally 
distinct observables, while in the rain-sprinkler-grass example one and the same observable is an instantiation 
of different properties. 
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equations), every node has a causal predecessor, root nodes are subject to determination by error 
variables. The assumption of a value of a variable in such a model (Pearl’s ‘set-operation’) is a 
mathematical notion. But if we apply this idea to a real world scenario and perform a causal 
judgment, then the agency-intuition needs to be applied as well. We cannot help resorting to the 
idea of agency and its uncaused events to attribute the role of cause to an event, even if the event is 
not connected to real agency in any way. I see this solution as a compromise between the objective 
and subjective aspects of causation. As far as anthropomorphism is concerned, it partly accepts the 
reproach of yielding an anthropomorphic concept of causation, while rebutting the simplistic 
conclusion of the objection, which denies that agency-causation cannot make sense of causation 
that does not evidently involve actual agents. I see the burden of proof lying with the objectivist 
camp, which has to show that causation does not impose our conceptual scheme as agents, 
especially in the light of the criticism of Russell (1913), Norton (2003), and others. 
In the preceding section it was announced that the next due deliverable would be an 
account of token level causation. Such an account is required since token level judgments are 
probably equally relevant as type level judgements, so any conceptual account of causation cannot 
just ignore this class of judgments. Some more examples of applying the scheme provided by the 
three levels of abstraction follow in the subsequent sections, before discussing the causal Markov 
condition, which constrains an important class of causal systems and which is a further source of 
structural information about causal models. 
7.1.1 Causal judgements concerning particular past events 
The concept of causation that is given by the agency-formula affords causal judgements on type 
level. A causes B implies that A is a generic strategic means to bring about B. This can only be true if 
the connection between A and B is non-spurious and works at least in the sense of raising B’s chance 
compared to a default scenario. This kind of causal connection underpins propositions concerning 
probabilistic causation. So what if a particular event token, or, as a manner of speaking, a particular 
object, is assigned the status of a cause, like ‘the cat’s crossing the street caused the accident’, which 
can be abbreviated to ‘the cat caused the accident’? These statements have a certain implication, 
namely that  
I1 both events (the cat's crossing the street, and the accident occurring) did in fact happen, 
I2 and that the cat made a critical difference to the effect, such that had the cat-event not 
occurred, the accident would not have happened, at least not in the way it did happen. 
The question is whether these implications survive scrutiny, and whether they do so across different 
concepts of causation, holding true in the agency-account in particular. 1. is quite uncontroversial; 
for a discussion supporting 1., see for example Mellor (1995), also Hitchcock (2002), who discusses 
‘cause’ as a ‘success verb’, if used on token level. 2. Is supported by many counterfactual approaches 
to causation (Lewis (1973), Woodward (2003b)). To see that 2. also holds true, one must show that it 
would be meaningless to assign the cat the role of the cause in case the accident would have 
happened exactly as it did, even if we subtracted the cat from the event-description. Granted that 
both implications are true, however, they do not seem to follow easily from the agency-formula. 
First, it is difficult to think of any past token cause as being the result of an intervention. Is it 
plausible to think of the cat’s crossing the street as the cat’s own intervention on itself, or an 
intervention hypothetically added to the actual event specification? Even more difficult is the 
interpretation of the consequences of this supposedly direct action for the effect in question, since 
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the agency-formula only speaks of cause as an ‘effective means’, and the conservative reading of 
this term, which is also recommended by Price, implies that a cause merely raises the chance of its 
effect happening. Not considering here the question of the measure of probability at stake, and 
assuming that a measure for such a single token case can be found, the question would remain to 
which supposedly critical value the chance was raised by the cat’s actions, in order to justify the 
causal blame. 
These considerations show that the questions revolving around an appropriate 
interpretation and measure of probability, in order to address token level causation, are crucial. This 
section lays the foundation of an account of the meaning of chance-raising in the contexts 
concerning actual causation, and the account will be applied in the following section that deals with 
some well-known counter-examples against probabilistic theories. Another problem is the 
interpretation of causes as difference-makers in the context of agency, particularly worrying in cases 
of causal over-determination. That subject will likewise be treated in its own section. Both those 
kinds of problematic cases concern token level causation more than type level causation, which is 
why a successful defence of the agency-account depends on the model to be developed in this 
section. Another section of this chapter will shed some light on further problematic cases of token 
level causation, in the context of neural diagrams used to depict causal situations. 
The problem of token causation is substantial for all probabilistic and all difference-making 
theories of causation. I will first expound the problem in its aspects specific to the agency-account, 
and in this context I will further specify, as usual, the challenges for the conceptual level of the 
problem.  
We can approach the problem by thinking of an agent that intervenes on the state of 
illumination of a light bulb, via operating a button. The agent has observed a set of sequences of 
states with respect to these two observables. One pair of observations from this set consists of an 
interval where nothing happens (button remains in its default state of being undepressed, and the 
light is off), and a second interval during which the bulb either gets illuminated, or not. This specifies 
the agent’s database of observations. In some cases, the agent has observed that the light turns on, 
although no change in the button’s state has happened. In a second run, the agent can intervene on 
the button in the first of the two intervals of a sequence. The agent notices that after having 
performed the intervention of depressing the button in the course of the second run, the chance of 
the light bulb getting illuminated has increased compared to the first run, when it had been unable 
to intervene. If the chance of the light turning on is below 1 in the second run of the trial, there will 
have been cases for which the agent’s intervention on the button was futile. Now imagine that the 
agent is asked, after the two trials, which of its individual interventions was successful, if we show 
the agent only the list of states of button and bulb for each individual sequence of the two runs, 
without further data. Since the agent knows that interventions can sometimes fail to bring about the 
effect, and on the other hand, the effect can happen irrespective of the button’s state, such a 
question cannot be answered reasonably. Assigning truth values to individual events in that context 
would be tantamount to pretending to be able to predict an individual sequence of drawings of, say, 
red and blue balls from a ballot box full of equally distributed balls, rather than admitting that it is 
only the ratio of colours than can be predicted with some precision. Notice that in the considered 
scenario the agent would still be justified in asserting a type level causal connection between button 
and light bulb, and this would be true even if the agent is convinced that the type level causal 
connection depends on individual token level instances of a causal connection – it just happens to be 
impossible to tell the true cases apart from the false ones.  
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I neither want to delve further into a discussion of ontological priority of type over token 
level or vice versa, nor into an examination of how the information underlying the agent’s judgments 
would have to be supplemented by further data, such that the above epistemic question could be 
settled. Instead, I want to focus on the conceptual question of what the agent’s judgment could 
mean, given he does try to guess which ones of its interventions were successful, when a depression 
did in fact bring about an illumination, and frame this content in terms of agency. 
The case of the depressed button that nevertheless might not be the responsible cause of 
the bulb’s getting illuminated is analogous to how Woodward (2003b), on page 75, moots the 
problem of token level causation: ‘It can be true that smoking causes lung cancer, that Jones 
smokes, and that Jones develops lung cancer, and yet false that Jones’ smoking caused his lung 
cancer. (It was instead caused by his exposure to asbestos.)’ The example chosen by Woodward 
clearly shows that, apart from special cases like causal over-determination, probabilistic accounts 
face a general challenge at this point. As do many other theories of causation, the agency-account 
relies on the concept of probability. The problem is that, as the example of button and light bulb 
shows, the concept of probability is adequate to help in forming type level judgments (via the 
frequency-interpretation of probability), and in situations where a prediction needs to be made (as 
in deciding whether the chance of the effect will increase if one intervenes). With respect to the 
computational model, which followed from the thermodynamic account of concept acquisition of 
action, both applications of the concept are necessary for a natural agent. The type level judgment is 
necessary to create and adapt an internal model based on experience (i.e. for inductive reasoning), 
and the prospective sense of probability comes into play in the application of the model, when in a 
concrete situation the agent needs to decide whether intervention is called for, or not. But the 
concept of probability is difficult to apply in retrospect, and that is a predicament for probabilistic 
accounts of causation as well. That is why some accounts suggest that the two claims ‘A causes B’ 
and ‘a caused b’ (see Woodward (2003b)) revolve around two different concepts of causation. It 
seems, however, the intuition of different concepts turns on an epistemological issue, rather than 
ontological constraint. 
My suggestion of a solution to the problem is similar to Lewis’ solution in asserting that it is 
primarily a counterfactual question. Also Pearl’s solution takes that direction, which is even closer to 
mine since it also asserts that counterfactual questions involve a wider information base than 
prospective ones like predicting the effect of interventions or predicting a situation merely as an 
observer. Before formulating a generic proposition concerning a token level causal assessment by an 
agent, I will apply the ideas first to the aforementioned example involving the cat having caused an 
accident. The example is of an intermediate level of difficulty. It involves a type level probabilistic 
difference-maker (a cat crossing a street) of an accident. That makes the example more difficult than 
the deterministic examples which are considered in Woodward (2003b) in the section on token level 
causation. But it does not explicitly contain over-determining additional causes of an accident, and 
does not involve a difference-maker that, in default scenarios, lowers the chance of the effect, while 
still counting as the actual cause (as considered in the next section). 
One thing to notice is that the only non-arbitrary values of probability for the accident 
happening after the subtraction of the cat from the scenario, given we do not opt for intervals of 
values, would be 0 or 1, unless we add some further background theory. As a first attempt to make 
sense of the token level claim, I will stick with the value of 0. This value-fixing, however, is justifiable 
only if we ask the question concerning the causal connection at the conceptual level, the question of 
what the basis of our judgment of the case is. Neither do we address the question in its 
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epistemological sense (‘how could we verify the truth of the counterfactual conditional in the 
concrete case?’), nor do we address it in its metaphysical sense (‘at the moment when the cat took 
action, was the complementary scenario fixed, such that the cat’s action was a genuine deterministic 
cause of the accident? Or did an indeterministic factor remain after the cat contributed to the 
scenario specification, such that it remained merely a contributing (chance-raising) factor for the 
accident occurring?’). When we judge that the cat was the cause of the accident, we are assuming a 
chance-raising from 0 to 1, which is not necessarily a correct one.  
It is worth discussing the case distinction that is indicated above in parentheses, concerning 
the metaphysical question of indeterminacy, and its possible bearing on the conceptual question. 
First, we exclude deterministic causation from our considerations on type level, for the ease of the 
discussion. Viz., we assume that, in general, cats crossing a street do not necessarily produce 
accidents. Rather than that, there is merely a certain chance that they do. Then there are two 
further cases to consider. 
A) (epistemic indeterminacy) Either the cat’s crossing the street is merely one of several factors 
determining how a situation unfolds, and the seeming indeterminacy even if we know about the 
cat’s exact actions stems from our not knowing about all these other factors. These factors, 
however, will typically vary across different example situations of the type ‘accident involving 
cats’, and from this variance follows the epistemic indeterminacy, while the unfolding of events 
is actually completely determined. 
B) (metaphysical indeterminacy) It could also be the case that the cat is merely what Mellor (1995) 
calls an ‘indeterministic cause’. Given a complete specification of the situation, and adding the 
cat to this specification, still a degree of indeterminacy remains. The cat has merely raised the 
chance of the accident happening. 
These two variants can be modelled by encapsulating the ‘other factors’ in a single factor (which can 
be dubbed the ‘second’ factor) that works towards the outcome in conjunction with the cat. A), 
epistemic indeterminacy, can then be modelled by a randomization of the second factor before the 
cat takes action, such that the cat either makes a critical difference (chance is raised from 0 to 1), or 
it doesn’t (chance remains at 0). Although it seems that the indeterminacy given by the fixing of the 
second factor (=conjunction of all other factors) contradicts the metaphysically deterministic 
scenario, this is not the case, since the randomization merely models the way we arbitrarily select an 
example situation from within a deterministic world, such that on type level a probabilistic scenario 
arises. On token level, however, the case becomes a deterministic difference-maker once the other 
factors of the scenario are fixed. B), on the other hand, is modelled by adding a genuinely 
indeterministic element by randomization after fixing the cat-event and all the other factors at their 
respective values. Now the cat is an indeterministic cause. This is how David Lewis and Humphreys 
(1989) model indeterministic causation. 
Given I1. and I2., with I2. excluding the problem of over-determination for now, we see that 
the counterfactual is evaluated such that the cat did in fact make a critical difference to the accident 
which then did in fact take place. Evaluated according to A), the cat is judged to be an INUS-
condition in a Mackiean sense, which necessarily had to bring about the accident given the other 
factors are in place. Evaluated according to B), the cat’s action changed the chance of the accident 
happening, alongside the other causal factors, and then the remaining indeterminacy was fixed. 
Supposedly, without the cat’s interference, nothing would have happened, since the chance in that 
scenario, after the fixation of its corresponding degree of indeterminacy, would have resulted in no 
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accident happening – at least this is what is that the judgment claims, otherwise the cat would not 
have been judged ‘the cause’ of the accident. But then it seems it is – assuming the stance of the 
judging agent – merely a matter of when to roll the die of the remaining indeterminacy, either 
before, or after fixation of all other relevant causal factors, including the cat. Whereas the question 
of metaphysical vs. epistemic indeterminacy is meaningful in general, it is meaningless in the context 
of judging a particular past event.57 The question is whether there is a way the agent operates with 
its internal model and its levels of abstraction such that such a retrospective evaluation of events 
can be made plausible. 
We do not have to stick with the considered example to notice the general issue at stake: 
‘a:A caused b:B’ (with ‘a:A’ meaning ‘a as an instance of type A’) connects particulars, and it does 
not allow for the kind of probabilistic qualification as ‘A causes B’. ‘a:A caused b:B’ is an absolute 
judgment. It asserts a’s success in bringing about b, but not merely in terms of b’s occurrence, since 
a’s and b’s joint occurrence could be spurious. For now, I assert that the relation implies the 
assumption that, without a, b would not have happened. At the core of the account must therefore 
lie the idea of a a:A as a critical difference-maker, which places this account of token level causation 
in the conceptual range of the agency-account. But in the following it will be needed to spell out 
further qualifications of that idea. The qualification will revolve around how an agent makes use of 
its computational model to evaluate causal judgments. 
First, the internal model, on whose calculations every decision to intervene depends, is for 
many pragmatic cases a probabilistic model. But the application of agent-probabilities (cf. Price 
(2007), regarding the discussion of stances of deliberation) and probabilities in general (Gibbs’ 
comment reported in von Weizsäcker (2006)) to past occurrences is conceptually problematic. 
Accordingly, the question of abduction (‘What was the cause of b?’) is not a simple reversal in time 
of the prospective question of what will happen to b when we set a. Taking the question in the 
prospective sense, we are interested in the probability of b occurring, whereas the retrospective 
question takes, at some stage, the occurrence of a possible cause as granted, and instead asked for 
whether this cause was critical for the effect, rather than co-occurring with the effect in a spurious 
way. This grounds a difference in rationality constraints concerning token level causation. Under 
general assumptions (see von Weizsäcker (2006), Williamson (2009)), the subjective probability 
distribution should equal the objective probabilities. That is a constraint that enables the agent to 
assess type level causal connections, or predict token level instances of causation of future cases. 
This rationality constraint derives from survival pressure, since if the subjective probabilities deviate 
from the objective ones, then the agent will not be able to deploy effective strategies to reach its 
goals. But no survival pressure of that sort seems to apply to judging correctly what the cause of a 
specific observation was. In terms of the utility of solving such a question, two possibilities come to 
mind: assigning blame, and learning about a causal connection from a single instance. In assigning 
blame, we are not asking whether a putative cause event occurred, but whether it was the critical 
factor in bringing about the cause. Probabilities can corroborate one’s case, but they are insufficient 
                                                          
57 Lewis would have rejected this interpretation, saying: ‘[T]he objection presupposes that the case must be of 
one kind or the other: either e definitely would have occurred without c, or it definitely would not have 
occurred without c. […] But I reject the presupposition that there are two different ways the world could be, 
giving us one definite counterfactual or the other . . .’ (Lewis 1986, p. 180). I think that the difference between 
Lewis’ and my interpretation could be understood as trading on the conceptual-ontological distinction that I 
usually make in this dissertation. 
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to settle the matter (see section 7.1.2, 7.1.4). Similarly an agent cannot use single observations to 
increase one’s causal knowledge in the form of incorporating a new causally relevant property into 
the causal model. That could not be grounded on a single instance, since any observed co-
occurrence could be spurious. It is evident that the rationality constraints in judging past tokens of 
causal connections are therefore less well defined compared to type level judgments. 
  The softened rationality constraints in hindsight assessments correspond to a more flexible 
use of the level of abstraction of the internal model, which is why the corresponding scheme should 
be more sensitive to an agent’s purpose and context of forming a token level causal judgment. 
Obviously, one has to be careful not to succumb to overly ad hoc adjustments. On the other hand, a 
certain flexibility in describing what an agent is actually doing during the formation of the judgment 
has to be granted as well. That said, in retrospective evaluations, the agent does not only often know 
about the occurrence of the effect and the cause, but can also supplement these observations by 
further assumptions of how other variables would have to be fixed. The agent can also twist the 
probability measure, by highlighting certain outcomes that are, in the type level context, considered 
unlikely. The subsequent sections will clarify these points further.  
 
A possible formulation of a token level cause from an agency-stance is:  
TLC: a:A caused b:B means that a particular a (of class A) was a difference-maker either for 
the fact that b (of class B) occurred, or for the specific way b occurred, or when b occurred, 
contrasting the real occurrence of b with a potential failure of b occurring without a, 
according to the internal model of the agent.  
For a judgment, the effect’s chance without a could have been high as well, but since there is a 
chance that the effect would not have happened, the potential outcome of the effect not happening 
in that counterfactual scenario is sufficient to ground the above judgment. If the causal structure, 
according to the internal model of the agent, is such that other causes would have necessitated the 
effect, and a had no influence on the specific way (including the exact time) b would have occurred, 
then a is not a token level cause of b. On the other hand, if we individuate the effect-event b, and 
the subtraction of a from the bundle of causes would result in a different individuation of an effect-
event b*, then a is deemed b’s cause, even if other causes from the considered bundle of causes 
would have necessitated the same type of effect. The point in time when the event starts is often 
particularly relevant for its individuation, as section 7.1.3 will show. 
If, due to the presence of other sufficient causes, a scenario of the necessary occurrence of 
the effect is approximated, then a causal judgment that singles out one event as ‘the cause’ will 
appear more and more distorted and fail to capture the truth of the matter. But this is in accord with 
how token level judgments are sometimes made, e.g. in the context of blaming a, possibly 
preselected, cause. A token level judgment – ‘a did in fact cause b’ – is a crisp concept, but causation 
might not work in this crisp way. Type level judgments allow for formulation of a varying degree of 
influence of a cause on an effect by the notion of probability, a notion that is problematic in 
retrospective scenarios. That is why token level judgments sometimes seem irrational and over-
stated.  
‘A causes B’ allows for qualifications, like A’s having a strong or not so strong influence on B, 
but ‘a caused b’ only allows for the use of the term ‘caused’ in an absolute sense. That does not 
entail that we have two different concepts, but that we use the concepts in two very different ways. 
Attributing the status of ‘the cause’ in the face of the possibility of genuine indeterminism forces the 
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agent to commit to an assessment that seems more and more irrational, the more the effect’s 
chance after setting the cause diverges from 1. The absolute sense seems to imply unwarranted 
determinism in a world that might be genuinely indeterministic (Hitchcock (2004) discusses this 
inconsistency and mentions its possible consequences for jurisdiction).58 
In sum, it seems that in token level contexts an agent does not operate in a betting scenario 
similar to when situations have to be assessed prospectively. The agent is also free to make 
additional assumptions that would not be made prospectively.59 Taking all these preliminary 
considerations together, it is clear that a good account of token level causation must accommodate 
two conflicting intuitions – a certain flexibility on what counts as a token level cause, which is often 
unavoidably subject to interest, but which also takes into account the simple fact that intuitions are 
divided in some borderline cases. But on the other hand, an account cannot simply deny the 
intuition that whether something was a cause of an effect is also an objective issue, and not up to a 
completely arbitrary assignment of an agent. So any plausible account will have to strike a balance 
between both aspects successfully.  
 
 
  
                                                          
58 This absolute sense ’forced upon‘ an epistemic agent prompted to make a judgment can be compared to 
trying to make sense of the statement ’the rose is red‘ in a black-and-white only world. Although sense can be 
made of that utterance, the corresponding proposition would be necessarily wrong. 
59 Notice a peculiarity of the question of token level causation. Although often addressing a problem 
conceptually abstracts from technical difficulties, it is in some contexts easier to solve the epistemic problem 
of elucidating via which means an agent came to a causal judgment than spelling out what the agent really 
means by the judgment. For example, see Woodward’s example, cited above, of lung cancer, which has 
developed, not from smoking, but due to exposure to asbestos. One could adapt the example by imagining 
that asbestos, in all known populations, reduces the risk of developing lung cancer significantly, and by 
assuming that we do not know which sub-population Jones belongs to. Then, epistemically, the case allows for 
a pragmatic approach to the question: the smoking was the cause of its death, since the only known additional 
factor was a preventative of lung cancer. Still, one could assert that the latter was the cause of the disease. But 
it is hard to say – in probabilistic terms at least – what this judgment’s content actually is. 
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7.1.2 Counterexamples against chance-raising 
After expounding the general problem of how to make sense of a token level judgement grounded in 
an agency-oriented, type level account, more specific concerns can be addressed. These are 
illustrated by examples meant to be counter-examples against the idea of causes raising the 
probability of the effect. Although the concern is more specific for my theory, it must be clarified 
that all probabilistic theories, not just the type level theories, are affected by this concern. The issue 
consists in the problematic interpretation of ‘raising the chance’ of a singular event. Although the 
concept of ‘chance’, which typically (Williamson (2005)) implies the singularity of the case, is not 
inconsistent, the assessment of what the value of the chance is, poses severe problems, as will be 
seen in this section. Since the concept applies to singular events, a type level theory will have to 
make sense of this in a derived way. In my short overview of how to deal with the problem, I will first 
consider the singular probabilistic theories, then the type level theories. 
There are several theories of singular causation that are also probabilistic. Hitchcock (2002) 
names: David Lewis, Patrick Suppes, Hugh Mellor as proponents of singular probabilistic causation, 
and he himself would have to be included in this list. Hitchcock (2004) states that there are two 
types of counterexamples against the theories of these authors: 
(1) causes that appear not to raise the probabilities of their effects;  
(2) and events that appear to raise the probabilities of other events, without causing those 
events 
 
Since (2) concerns a phenomenon that corresponds to spurious correlations, I will not consider (2) at 
this point in much detail. (1) has attracted attention by some philosophers via an example that is 
originally due to Deborah Rosen. Hitchcock (ibid.) reports it thus: ‘A golfer lines up to drive her ball, 
but her swing is off and she badly slices the ball, sending it on a trajectory well to the right of the 
hole. Her slice decreases the probability that it will land in the cup for a hole-in-one. By chance, 
however, the ball bounces off a tree trunk at just the right angle to send it on a trajectory back 
toward the cup. As it happened, her slice did cause the ball to go into the cup, even though the slice 
lowered the probability of this outcome.’ 
This is how Hitchcock treats the case: ‘perhaps the relevant alternative is the one in which 
the golfer refrains from swinging altogether; relative to such an alternative, the slice actually 
increases the probability of a hole-in-one. My view […] is that there is no objectively correct 
alternative for purposes of probability comparison. Rather, causal claims are contrastive in nature; 
they are true or false relative to a specific alternative. Thus, the golfer’s slice caused the hole-in-one, 
relative to the alternative in which she abstains from swinging, but not relative to the alternative in 
which she hits it squarely. In the latter case, we say that the ball landed in the cup despite the badly 
sliced shot.’  
Hitchcock’s treatment of this case makes use of the idea of contrastive causation, which is, 
in this respect similar to my interpretation of the agency-theory, which contrasts different 
alternatives of action. However, his solution is wanting in that the contrastive cases which Hitchcock 
chooses are clearly not the ones suggested by Rosen, even if it is not spelled out explicitly. If we 
replace the action of refraining from swinging by the intended alternative, swinging in a straight way 
rather than slicing, then the problematic assessment of the example is restored. 
Mellor (1995) treats the example in a slightly different way. According to his theory of 
causation, the causal relation between individual events, like the golf player’s slicing the ball and the 
holing derives from facts about these events, namely the fact that he sliced the ball, and that the 
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ball was holed. The contrast of the former of these two facts would be the fact that the gold player 
did not slice the ball at all, reducing chances of holing in to zero, according to Mellor. So far this 
treatment resembles Hitchcock’s. Mellor then turns to the question whether it is true in the first 
place to claim that the golf player holes out because he pulls his drive, rather than saying despite 
that fact, or saying because he pulls the drive so that a tree is hit first. Denying the implications of 
the counterexamples at the level of causation as it is intuited enables Mellor to bypass the question 
of chance-raising. According to Mellor, conflicting intuitions reach a stand-off as far as the causal 
intuition is concerned, and that theory should command denying a causal connection between the 
aspect of slicing the ball and the holing. 
Although my own theory does not operate with objective chances, I would still want to 
suggest a possible solution that does not imply a denial of the causal impact of slicing the ball. Might 
it not simply be incorrect, or at least ill-defined, to say that the slicing lowered the probability of the 
outcome? Why should the probability have been lowered in the first place? The slicing achieved an 
absolute success in holing the ball. It would not do so in general circumstances, and therefore will 
entail a smaller chance compared to cases of some reference class of broadly similar situations, but 
this is not the point at stake, since the example addresses a particular situation. I hold, similar to the 
case of the cat causing the accident in section 7.1.1, that the slicing increased the chance of the ball 
being holed to 1 (or close to 1 under genuine indeterminism), since any other value begs the 
question when and how such a value is determined.  
Generally, slicing golf balls rather than hitting them properly does not increase their chances 
of being holed, and so indeed they aren’t in any situation distinct from the episode that the example 
recounts. Similar considerations hold true for many other examples that introduce spurious, 
haphazard causal connections. If an agency-theory contents itself with governing only type level 
judgments, the theory would be vindicated thus.  
Still, the token level problem needs to be addressed, since the easy solution of being content 
with a type level theory has been ruled out in the previous section. Then questions similar to the 
ones of the preceding section arise. How does the agency-theory deal with the problem? Would it be 
an adequate way to proceed for an agent to slice the gold ball in order to hole it? Obviously not, but 
in the particular case this is what caused the success. So we need to ask what the basis is concerning 
the judgment that the chance decreases by driving the ball in the specific situation. I would claim 
that there is none, because the reference-class for determining the probability consists solely of the 
specific situation, whose final result is a success. Notice that this objection against the common 
intuition does not deny that chances are real, but it denies that the agent is in any position to judge 
the value (even in a mere comparative sense) of that chance.  
In order to judge the chance of a specific situation objectively, an agent probably needs a 
huge amount of information. For example, judging what the objective chances of the outcome of 
throwing a die amount to, an agent needs to assess in detail the geometrical and physical properties 
of the die, e.g. ascertain equal size of all the die’s faces, symmetry, a central balance point (equal 
density), it needs to be ensured that the die will be rolled properly, probably also that a proper toss 
result is the authoritative one that stands, etc. There is not much doubt that the information 
delivered by the example is very underspecified to comply with these requirements. On the other 
hand, there is additional information available to the agent after having made the swing, and this 
additional information changes the evaluation drastically. Before the swing, the agent will assess the 
situation in accordance with a ceteris paribus law. Generally, slicing the golf ball will lower the 
probability of holing the ball, on the basis of similar experience. The underlying model features two 
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variables, connected causally according to a probabilistic model, with past frequencies in similar 
cases delivering the value of the probability. However, in that particular case, as we can see with 
hindsight, slicing the ball exactly in that way such that it bounces off the tree in that angle, it must 
have been the case that the chance of the ball’s holing was significantly increased from a low default 
value, so that any other kind of slicing would have failed to bring about the effect. This way of 
evaluating the situation confirms that the slicing was a cause (contrary to Mellor), it confirms that 
the contrast consists in swinging in a straight direction (as the counterexample’s intention is, and 
contrary to Mellor and Hitchcock), and it confirms that the chance of the singular event of holing 
was increased (contrary to Rosen, Hitchcock, and Mellor, but not contrary to intuition). 
Woodward (1990) considers an example with the following structure: C1 and C2 are both 
causes and probability raisers of E, and work independently of each other. On a particular occasion, 
all three occur, but it was only C2 that brought about E, since C1’s operation has been a failure at that 
time. So C1 raises the probability of E (and probably also its chance on this occasion) without causing 
E. Now that is an example of (2), the case when events which appear to raise the probabilities of 
other events do not cause those events. For the agency-theory, the structure of the example does 
not pose a challenge. Although the agency-formula (see chapter 5, first paragraph) asserts an 
equivalence of causation and agency properly understood, and agency relies on the notion of raising 
a probability, it does so only on type level, where C1 is clearly judged correctly a cause of E. As 
explained in the preceding section, the derived account for token level causation does not allow for 
this kind of reasoning (see the example concerning button and bulb of the preceding section, where I 
explain that an agent has to engage in more complicated counterfactual reasoning specific to the 
situation in question, which sometimes requires additional information about how the events are 
specified; see also 7.1.4). 
7.1.3 Over-determination 
Evaluating cases of over-determination requires the distinction between token and type level 
theories, too. Again, token level theories tend to be more affected by them than type level theories. 
In line with what has been stated in section 7.1.1, I want to address both levels, while keeping in 
mind that the token level is derivative and depends on what the primary account, the type level 
account, allows. 
Obviously, causal over-determination is prima facie a challenge to difference-making 
theories. My interpretation of the agency-account falls into the class of difference-making theories. 
The agent’s action makes a difference to the intended effect. Therefore, the agency-account needs 
to be defended against objections stemming from that phenomenon. The objection says that if an 
effect is over-determined by two or more causes, none of them, taken separately, makes a 
difference to the effect, since each of the other causes already brings about the effect. One of the 
classical examples is Hall (2004): ‘Two children, Billy and Suzy, are throwing rocks at a bottle. Suzy’s 
rock hits the bottle first, just before Billy’s. Suzy’s rock causes the bottle to break, even though Billy’s 
would have done so if she had missed.’ This example clearly affects the token level only. On type 
level, throwing stones at bottles clearly is a difference-maker (and an effective means) to breaking 
bottles, since the situations with someone else throwing and hitting simultaneously a targeted 
bottle are rare and average out when regularities are considered. Examples of coincidental over-
determination are easily dealt with on type level. But this does not hold true for the token level; 
also, there are more elaborate examples where problems do not go away that easily. 
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The type level equivalent of coincidental, token level over-determination is systematic over-
determination. An example of it can be constructed from Mumford (2009), originally due to Hugh 
Mellor: ‘A nuclear reactor […] has the capacities to explode. When it is about to do so, a safety 
mechanism cuts in and shuts the reactor down.’ The original point is that sometimes causal 
capacities have no chance of manifesting themselves, and an analogous relation exists between type 
level difference-makers and their chance of making a difference. The example has the right 
structure, if we count the normal operation of the reactor as a cause of its not exploding, which is 
over-determined by the safety mechanism. Otherwise one can adapt the scenario slightly. For 
example, one can easily think of several layers of security mechanisms in the nuclear reactors, where 
one mechanism takes over if the mechanism of the previous level fails. Systematic over-
determination is an ill-conceived concept in an absolute sense, though, and therefore fails to be a 
counter-example against probability-raising on type level. First, the design of such a structure 
already takes into account that some primary factor is a cause, and therefore a difference-maker 
prior to the implementation of the over-determining super-structure, which, in the considered 
example, is implemented by the additional safety levels of a reactor. Secondly, there is always a 
hypothetical scenario, and therefore a reference class, where the additional causes are absent or fail 
to activate. Therefore, over-determining structures never touch the correct assessment that takes 
causes to be difference-makers on type level. Notice that, for the scenario of the failing additional 
causes, James Woodward’s minimal definition of causes as difference-makers in some, rather than 
all, background conditions applies (see Woodward (2003b), page 40).  
Turning to token level over-determination, things become more complicated. I will in the 
remainder of this section defend TLC of section 7.1.1, my formulation of a necessary and sufficient 
criterion for the token level judgment, and discuss examples unrestricted by domain considerations, 
except for causal models that follow the paradigm of neural diagrams, which will be discussed in the 
following section. 
Christopher Hitchcock is one of the authors most involved with these issues, so I am going to 
discuss his treatment of the problem and compare it to my solution. The general approach he 
recommends is his principle PSE, the principle of precise specification of events, while I do not need 
a special purpose model and will stick with the general formula instead.  
PSE: ‘Suppose that on a particular occasion, events occur that instantiate types C and E. Even 
if, relative to the relevant background conditions, C raises the probability of E, if there are more 
precise specifications of the events in question, C’ and E’, such that C’ does not raise the probability 
of E’, then we should not say that C causes E.’ (Hitchcock (2004)) 
There is a type-token slip in this formula, concerning the final line, which conflicts with the 
assertion that we are considering a particular occasion. It should be ‘… then we should not say that c 
causes e [where c is the particular event instantiating the type (!) C, and e the particular event 
instantiating the type E]’. Apart from this error, the formula is applicable to the following case: 
Barney smokes (c), and Barney likes sunbathing (not assigned a variable). Barney contracts cancer 
(e), and more specifically, he contracts skin cancer (E’). Although smoking (C) generally causes cancer 
(E), it is not true to say that Barney’s smoking (c) causes his contracting cancer (e), so ’we should not 
say that c causes e‘. That is because the more precise specification of what happened is Barney’s 
contracting skin cancer (E’), and any more precise specifications of his smoking cigarettes (C’) has 
not raised the probability of E’. (Notice that, for consistency, we could have replaced C’ and E’ by the 
small letters equivalent to refer to corresponding particular events corresponding to more specific 
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specifications of the respective types C’ and E’. I refrained from that, since I wanted to keep the 
alteration of the original formula minimal.) 
The formula can be applied to classical examples of over-determination. Suppose there are 
two firings at a vase, each of them having an a priori chance of 0.5 of hitting the vase. Next, we are 
assured that one shot hits the vase, while the second would have missed it. The first shot is deemed 
the cause. The solution by applying PSE tells us that there is a more specific way of describing the 
shattering of the vase as it actually happens due to the first bullet, such that we have to retract from 
the a priori assessment of 0.5 assigned to the second shot’s contribution to the effect’s chance. The 
adapted value will be zero given a sufficiently precise description of the shattering.  
There is another solution, which Hitchcock also discusses in Hitchcock (2004), where he says: 
’Another possibility emerges if instead we focus on the trajectory of the first bullet. Suppose now 
that there is some time t at which the bullet fired from the first gun is determined to hit the vase. If 
we hold fixed the trajectory of this bullet at time t, then the firing of the second gun no longer makes 
a difference to the probability of shattering: The probability is 1 either way.’  
I concur with both solutions, and TLC incorporates both. It ensures that the cause has to be a 
real difference-maker, which the second shot would not be given the first shot at some point 
completely determines the outcome in all possible scenarios. And it asserts that a cause must be a 
difference-maker for the effect as it happens. The constraint ’as it happens‘ must be read carefully, 
though. It is not sufficient merely to affect the outcome in its accidental features. For example, the 
second bullet might interfere with the trajectory of some of the vase’s flying fragments, and by that 
have an influence on how the effect unfolds. The difference between causing and affecting applies 
here. It is therefore relevant that the way in which the cause affects the effect makes a critical 
difference to its individuation, which, in the considered case, is given intuitively by the time the vase 
started to shatter. This ensures that the first shot is indeed the cause of the shattering. 
But Hitchcock is worried about additional empirical assumptions, such as taking for granted 
that in cases of over-determination more specific information can be given about how an effect-
event unfolds, such that the cause can be determined. The second, and most substantial concern 
expressed (ibid.) is genuine indeterminism, which undermines the second of his two treatments of 
cases of over-determination. Thirdly and finally, there is a worry that the probabilistic approach to 
causation has to seek help from process theories, which consider causation as involving continuous 
processes. Only by means of such an assumption can we assume that there is a point in time when 
the cause completely determines the event. But I think that all three worries do not carry over to 
account for how an agent would ground its judgment of highlighting one of several causes in a 
structure of over-determination as the responsible cause of the effect. As far as the first and the 
third worry are concerned, my interpretation of the agency-account has no problems in making 
those assumptions. First, the event has already happened, so if one wants to supplement one’s 
assessment concerning a particular past event by further assumptions of what would have been 
measurable, there is a priori nothing wrong with doing that. Secondly, nothing in my account of 
action, and therefore cause, speaks against the assumptions that events are measurable in ever 
more detailed a way. This would even be a very conservative, default assumption, just like the more 
conservative assumption that causes merely tend to bring about their effects rather than 
necessitating them. So it seems that it is the opposite of that assumption, i.e. expecting a discrete 
specification with limited available information, which is in need of further evidence. The next 
section on neural diagrams will show that the assumption is even likely to explain some unexpected 
intuitions in neural diagram structures. As far as the genuine determinism is concerned, I can refer to 
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section 7.1.2 again. If an agent is forced to make an assertion concerning alternative outcomes of an 
actual event in the absolute sense that ‘caused’ requires, where such a sense is precluded by an 
indeterministic context, then the judgment can only be irrational. This is a paradigmatic example of 
using a LoA beyond its specification. 
Over-determination is also discussed in another context. It concerns the possible 
epiphenomenalism of a mental decision that leads to an observable bodily movement. The effect of 
the bodily movement would be over-determined by a preceding physical cause if we assume the 
causal closure of the physical world. It seems that every agency-account of causation should say 
something concerning this issue.  In chapter 6 I developed a scenario which allows the concept of 
action to emerge while asserting the causal closure of the physical world. This seems to favour an 
account that equates mental phenomena, including decisions, as an epiphenomenon. An alternative 
account, which asserts that free decisions are not only construed as such with hindsight (or 
projected as such for the purpose of planning), but real in situ, would indeed undermine the whole 
argument of identifying causes with actions. That being said, the category of the subjective world, in 
the sense of a dual-aspect theory, is in harmony with my account, since physicalistic models like 
Markovian causal networks lack the resources to express crucial ideas such as the identity of actor, 
information processor, and beneficiary of an action. Also, although it is consistent with my account 
to assume that the subject is determined in its decision by the way it is configured to react to 
information, believing in the modifiability of one’s own structure does make a difference to one’s 
behaviour. Thus, reflecting on and then regretting past decisions can change the future response to 
the same stimulus. Therefore, in a certain sense there is a causal impact of the mental; however, not 
in situ, but in the long run. A concern of possible over-determination in that sense can be 
circumvented by an appropriate design of the level of abstraction of the question. Thus, the 
question asking what determines the agent at the time when the stimulus arrives at the agent must 
be answered by referring to the physical structure as the responsible cause. This is basically the 
same solution as the one that dissolved the ‘contradiction’ of seeing information as a cause of 
observable behaviour rather than the event that precipitated the flow of information about it. 
7.1.4 Counterexamples from causal diagrams 
Hitchcock (2004) admonishes that in some cases of causal over-determination, we are disposed to 
ask further questions about the case, in deciding which of two possible causes the actual cause of an 
effect was. I agreed with that assessment in section 7.1.3., and added that, if there is no prospect of 
getting further information, a model for causal evaluation might just be supplemented by 
hypothetical data if that helps to underpin a judgment. Examples of causation are normally drawn 
from realistic, real world scenarios, and must then be mapped to a model. Intuition supposedly has 
some way of modelling the conceived situation in a wider sense, and a theory of causation tries to 
capture the right intuition, at least for those cases when intuition yields a univocal result.  Ned Hall 
has developed a model for representing causal structures in the form of graphical diagrams. 
Interestingly, it is not examples drawn from a real-world situation, but from the diagram itself that 
he wants us to judge according to intuition. This intuition is then compared to what theory would 
say about the case. But the diagrams are already the model. That means that both intuition and a 
theory-driven model are applied to what has been processed – and possibly distorted – by a specific 
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modelling technique. In that regard, the approach is interesting, but also very problematic.60 In this 
section I will discuss some examples from Hall (2007). Since graph-based representations do seem to 
play a role as an important modelling paradigm (e.g. for visualizing causal Bayesian networks), and 
are therefore possibly relevant to the internal representation that human agents’ intuition uses (cf. 
Sloman (2005)), I will use this space to show  how the levels of abstraction appropriate to my theory 
deal with these cases. 
For his analyses of causal structures, Hall uses a specific graph-based model he calls ‘neuron 
diagrams’. The nodes of such a diagram are called ‘neurons’, the event of their firing or not firing is 
modelled by assigning the arbitrarily chosen values of 1 and 0 respectively. If the tail of an edge 
connecting two neurons has a blob, like the edge connecting C and B in the diagram given below, 
then the connection is inhibitory, otherwise it is excitatory. The model is deterministic, and the 
relations can also be modelled by an analogous system of structural equations.  
By means of neural diagrams, Hall considers several cases of token level causation, for 
example the following structure:  
 
Diagram 7.1: Hall’s example of causal pre-emption 
 
A is firing, but C is likewise firing and, by virtue of being a preventative of B, it blocks A’s influence 
along the A – B – E path. C is also a cause of D, which is a cause of E. According to Hall, and I would 
agree with this assessment, C is the actual cause in this instance of neuron-firings. Hence, we seek an 
account that identifies C as the actual cause of E, while A is causally irrelevant to E in this situation. 
Hall deploys his ‘H-account’ (which resembles Woodward's concept of ‘actual cause’ in 
Woodward (2003b)) to predicate A negatively and C positively as cause of E. Next to A and C firing 
for being considered as candidate causes, and the effect E firing, we require that ‘C is a cause of E 
just in case there is a path from C to E, such that for zero or more off-path variables X1; . . . ;Xn with 
actual values v1; . . . ; vn, the conditional 
if (C = 0 & X1= v1 &. . . & Xn = vn ), then E = 0 
In the considered case, application of the rule to the path A – B – E requires the conditional: if (A = 0 
& C = 1), then E = 0. But that is false, so A is not the actual cause. Applied to C – D – E, the 
conditional: if (C = 0 & B = 0), then K = 0 needs to be true, which it is. Thus C is the actual cause of E. 
                                                          
60 The problematic aspect is encapsulated by Hall’s saying ‘[T]his is one of the advantages of working 
with such diagrams: they provide clear tests for any analysis of causation.’ (Italics added), without 
saying in which way we have to qualify the result of such a test.   
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The H-account has in this case managed to capture intuition. But it is questionable whether 
intuition tells us anything substantial if applied, not to a real-world example, but to a diagram, and 
therefore it is likewise questionable whether any account that tries to track intuition as much as 
possible in that context tells us something interesting about causation. The problem, I think, consists 
in how intuition deals with the neural diagram scenario and its constraints. These consist in a 
completely discretised picture of the events – there are only on- and off-neurons, time does not 
seem to play a role, nor do properties of the connection between two nodes (their length is 
irrelevant, etc). Also, a neuron’s firing necessitates the firing of its descendant. Apart from that, the 
model is causally sufficient, such that a neuron’s only causal antecedents are those in the model, and 
it is complete, such that when a neuron has some descendant nodes, these comprise all the effects 
the firing of this neuron has. All of these constraints would fail to hold true in an absolute sense in 
any real implementation of the diagram, and even more in the real-world case from which the 
scheme is, according to Hall (p. 111, ibid.), derived. So the question is whether we can expect 
intuition to tell us something authoritative about such cases. I assume that intuition does not judge 
the neural diagram case, but a potential physical implementation of such a diagram, where the 
above constraints cannot be expected to hold true. 
The formula TLC tracks this intuition by trying to take into account as best as it can the 
agent-perspective in its variant of hindsight-judgment. Assuming that perspective, A is not a real 
difference-maker, since it is in fact blocked by B. C is a real difference-maker for how E happened 
compared to some potential outcome in the counterfactual scenario of not having acted on C (=C 
switched off). First, a reasonable default assumption about a physical realisation of the causal 
structure of diagram 7.1 is that the time of E’ (in case it would have been brought about via A – B – 
E) would be different from that of E. And secondly, because it is possible that the mechanisms 
connecting A and B, or B and E, might have failed. If, however, the internal model of evaluation 
abides strictly by the rules of the neural diagram, C would fail to qualify as a cause, because it would 
fail to meet the criterion of being a difference-maker to E in any significant sense. But the cause of 
this failure to track intuition might be that intuition does not abide by these – unnatural – rules of 
neural diagrams. This is why I have doubts that Hall’s diagrams will ever bring about a clear-cut 
account of what it means to be a token level cause. 
Interestingly, in the second half of the paper, Hall acknowledges a distinction that closely 
resembles the distinction between spontaneous and non-spontaneous processes, which is 
absolutely central to my account of where the concept of agency comes from, since the agent is 
itself subject to that distinction; that is, not only as observer of an external system. In his terms, the 
corresponding primordial dichotomy is between default and deviant states, which are the states of 
an object when nothing acts upon it and when something in some way acts upon it respectively. Hall 
admits that, by virtue of the concept of ‘acting upon an object’, only a causal criterion can be given 
for that distinction. But the distinction is crucial to the evaluation of the counterfactual that we need 
for an account of a token level cause, and again I agree with that assessment. I also refer to sections 
6.2.7 and 6.3.1 on the question of conceptual circularity. Hall observes that the evaluation of the 
counterfactual ‘Had C, the putative cause, not happened, what would the rest of the objects of the 
system, and the effect in particular, have done?’ The removal of the cause-event requires us to set 
the cause-object to a default state, which is distinguished from all others in that we would assume 
this state to be occupied by the object if we did not know anything else about the causal history of 
the object. 
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Allegedly, the notions of default and deviant behaviour help to shed some more light on 
further considered examples. But the question remains whether some sort of final account can be 
achieved if one continually tries to track the results of a possibly misguided intuition (see Hitchcock 
(2009) for further problems of the neural diagram approach). As a final comment on the approach, 
consider what the motivation of these retrospective causal evaluations could consist in, seen from 
an agency-stance: either an agent wants to learn about a possible causally relevant property new to 
its internal model, or it seeks to update the empirical data concerning the strength of the influence 
of a probabilistic cause to a more objective value. In the first of these cases, something about causal 
structure can be learned; in the second case, the probability measure that governs the internal 
model can be updated. Both cases are ruled out in the neural diagram considerations, since we know 
both the causal structure and the (degenerated) probabilities. The second motivation is assigning 
responsibility to a single neuron. As the cases of early pre-emption above, but also examples of over-
determination show, this can be done, but it is often arbitrary to some degree, and it seems more 
informative to show in all openness the known causal structure. Then responsibility can be shared in 
a fair way. But this is obviously not what the account seeks to achieve; instead the goal is a perfect 
projection of a causal structure to a single object that carries the causal responsibility in an absolute 
sense. 
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7.2 Different constraint-levels inform different causal concepts 
Based on the findings of the previous chapters, one can now analyse the import the concept of 
causation given by objectified agency has for standards of model validity. First, the hierarchy of 
causal concepts established by different constraint levels will be outlined, and proofs of their 
hierarchical relation will be delivered. Subsequently, the concept of causation derived from agency 
will be situated within that hierarchy. The result of 4.2 has been the negative finding that we should 
not expect the causal Markov condition to follow immediately from the notion of an intervention, 
while in this section the constraint level of causal models that does comply with causation as derived 
from agency will be situated on the hierarchical map of causal concepts. 
A model that is not level invariant (and therefore neither modular, nor coefficient 
independent), but rather orders correlations according to customary causal inference, is useful for 
causal predictions by conditioning on evidence variables. Gillies (2002) has called such a network a 
‘propensity network’. A concept of causality from the classical literature that corresponds to such a 
moderately constrained graph is advocated in Schlick (1932). A further constraint of causal models is 
given by level invariance (LI). LI critically hinges on interventions, and therefore marks the transition 
from interpreting the antecedents of inferences as propensity-raisers (or, if other accounts of 
probability are used, from frequency-, chance-, or degree-of-belief-raisers) to genuine causes. If a 
system is modular according to the MD condition, CMC is satisfied under both interpretations of 
probability described in 7.1.1, and the correct skeleton and the v-structures can often61 be 
determined on the basis of observational data. Modularity implies level invariance, but not vice 
versa 
Proof:  
Modularity -> level invariance: Let S be a system of equations, and Vi one of the endogenous 
variables. Due to modularity, the equation determining Vi can be replaced by an operation 
that sets Vi’s value directly, and this operation has no repercussions on any of the remaining 
equations of the system. Accordingly, it is either the case that some considered equation 
from the set of remaining equations of the system contains occurrences of Vi as independent 
variables. Then none of the parameters of these equations have been changed by the 
intervention, so the equation is level invariant (since invariant simpliciter) with respect to Vi. 
Or it is the case that such equation does not contain Vi as independent variable, in which 
case it is vacuously true that the equation is level invariant with respect to Vi.  
Level invariance (not ->) modularity: Cartwright’s factory example serves as a 
counterexample. The structure does not comply with the causal Markov condition, so a 
fortiori the system is not modular, but its equations are level invariant: it is possible to 
manipulate both E1 and E2 by manipulating C without invalidating the equations for E1 and 
E2. One can also manipulate any of them, e.g. E1, by manipulating the parameter aE1 
connecting C and E1, or by manipulating the error variable uE1, without invalidating the 
equation that determines E1. But because of the correlation between the parameters (or the 
error terms, depending on the mathematical modelling), the intervention would have 
repercussions on E2, therefore modularity is not satisfied.  
The strongest causal model in terms of the probabilistic constraints is the one that features 
coefficient independence (CI). In such a case, not only are the effects of a common cause 
independent of each other, but also all causes of a given effect and their corresponding mechanisms 
                                                          
61 See the constraints described section 4.2.3. 
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are independent of each other. For a deterministic SEM, this relates to independence of all 
coefficients, including those of a single equation. In a corresponding probability specification, CI 
relates to manipulability of an effect via a single cause while holding the values of its other causes 
fixed at any chosen level. In common causal terms, this corresponds to the exclusive presence of 
disjunctive causes, rather than cooperative causes.62 
Proof: 
Coefficient independence -> Modularity: If coefficients of all equations from a system of 
equations are independent, then there is a modular intervention for any given variable Vi 
from the system, by appropriately setting the coefficients in the equations for that variable. 
These settings have no repercussions on other equations of the system.  
Modularity (not ->) coefficient independence: Examples of cooperative causes, e.g. oxygen 
level, combustibles and spark plugs cooperatively causing fire. The relation of extensity of 
fire and oxygen level is proportional, but the parameter that quantifies the proportionality 
depends on the parameters that regulate the influences of the spark plugs and the 
combustibles. Such a system can be modular, but there is evidently no coefficient 
independence. 
  
Those theories that have an underlying mechanistic ontology, and also assume that causal relations 
are ultimately deterministic (e.g. Judea Pearl’s theory), equate causal with modular systems, which 
comply with CMC under the assumption of acyclicity and independent error variables (causal 
sufficiency). Woodward, Hausman, and Steel consider genuine indeterministic causation, but they 
also rely on a mechanistic ontology. Since each arrow in a causal graph, or, alternatively, each factor 
in a SEM, is taken to represent a distinct mechanism, the systems they consider as causal are 
likewise modular systems. Cartwright’s six assumptions about causal systems, given in Cartwright 
(2007), are consistent with LI. Accordingly, she explicitly endorses this constraint level in Cartwright 
(2002). Modular systems, in her framework, are particular causal systems that are more strongly 
constrained than causal systems in general. Jon Williamson’s epistemic theory does not endorse 
CMC generally, since its endorsement is dependent on prior causal beliefs that allow for both 
modular and non-modular systems. 
The concept of causation derived from my interpretation of the agency-account is situated 
at the constraint-level of LI, as far as LoA3 is concerned. This can be illustrated with the simple 
example of a level invariant system given in Hausman and Woodward (1999), who consider the 
regression equation:  
Y = aX + U 
Level invariance states that this equation represents truly the relation between X and Y, no matter 
whether we read this equation in an observational or in an interventional context. LoA3 interprets 
the equation thus:  
y:Y <= a x:X + u:U,  
                                                          
62 An example of such a structure is a charged particle whose trajectory can be manipulated by a gravitational 
and an electric field. Manipulating any of the two fields contributes to the overall acceleration of the particle, 
and the contribution of one field is independent of the value of the other field, so the causes are disjunctive. 
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where ‘<=’ is to be interpreted as ‘causes’. The equation’s variables are thus interpreted as tokens 
that instantiate corresponding types. If repetitively instantiated, the equation gives rise to an 
observable regularity. The equation is not symmetrical and therefore does not allow for isolating x, 
or allowing any prediction of x when y is intervened on. The locality of the concept is reflected by the 
presence of additional factors (U), which render the relation between x and y a ceteris paribus rule. 
By contrast, the constraint of modularity of a system of equations is not a necessary condition. Since 
the model of Cartwright’s factory is level invariant, it is a causal model according to the concept of 
causation derived from objectifying agency. Therefore, it is a counterexample against the claim that 
causal systems are situated at the level of modularity in our considered constraint-hierarchy. 
Modular systems are therefore specific causal systems. 
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8 Summary, final conclusion, and outlook 
8.1 Summary 
In the quest for the right approach to explain the meaning of a causal proposition I was guided by 
two convictions. First, there must be some significance to the fact that an agent feels that a causal 
connection obtains between two observables if she has herself performed the intervention on the 
observable representing the cause, and, secondly, that there is significance to our concept of 
causation stemming from the fact that living organisms have to be agents in order to maintain their 
structure, by exploiting the asymmetry between spontaneous and non-spontaneous processes. This 
asymmetry depends on drawing boundaries and is otherwise a statistical phenomenon. The agency-
account of causation by Huw Price and Peter Menzies immediately expresses the first conviction. I 
have attempted to defend the account against some frequently articulated objections. This, 
however, is just a necessary step to vindicate the approach. To further corroborate it, I have looked 
for a connection between the first and the second conviction. The bridge between the two turned 
out to be information theory and a phenomenon which I have called ‘causation by information’. 
Information is conveyed via physical signals, but if the event this signal stands for causes some 
behaviour, rather than any physical property of the signal being responsible for that, then the 
observed behaviour is an action. To explain this phenomenon further, the thermodynamics of non-
spontaneous processes were examined. Although I have left open the possibility that the arrow of 
time might be a construction of the agents’ perspective as deliberators, I took the asymmetry of 
time as a premise of my argument, and also assumed that entropy rises within time. I treated both 
these assumptions as (non-causal) facts. Causation arises from this metaphysical backdrop as a 
phenomenon that allows localised, improbable structures to exist by consuming free energy. The 
causal arrow does not follow the thermodynamic arrow in the sense that A is the cause of B because 
A is the state of lower and B the state of higher entropy, but instead in the sense that A drives the 
local process B by virtue of its higher entropic magnitude. Following this lead, I found the scenario of 
Maxwell’s demon as a significant object of the combined study of thermodynamics, information 
theory, causation, and action. It allowed the derivation of not only the finding that contingent 
information, the resource needed to guide purposeful action, needs to be physically represented, in 
order to prevent breaches of the second law of thermodynamics. But it also enabled an account of 
how efficient causation and causation by information are connected, since there are two different 
ways to describe the chain of events during the demon’s sorting of particles. The demon obeys a 
rule, such that causation by information gives rise to an observable regularity, although actions are 
involved. The rule was interpreted as a function, a mapping from the signals containing contingent 
information to the optimal reaction. But if there is a function, then there is a computational model 
that computes this function. My interpretation of this computational model, which belongs to the 
agent and constitutes its identity as information addressee, acting agent, and beneficiary of the 
action, also delivered an account of free action. With that, I found an interpretation of the required 
spontaneity of the A in the judgment of ‘A causes B’. The thermodynamic model grounded the 
asymmetry, locality, and regularity of agency. An identification of the concepts of agency and 
causation let causation inherit these three properties that inform actions. I subsequently devised 
three levels of abstraction that are respectively applicable to the different perspectives previously 
assumed. The concept of levels of abstraction was shown to be sufficiently flexible to allow 
specifications of causal concepts as parts of a wider family of concepts. I have concentrated in this 
dissertation on providing my own positive account of how causal judgments can be analysed, yet I 
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hope it is not impossible to see how other approaches could be integrated into the account if the 
focus of causal analysis is a more specific one than mine. For example, it was shown that further 
constraints can be added to the generic three properties, like modularity or different variants of 
indeterminism. In Chapter 7 it was expounded that some problems concerning the judgments we 
make about causal scenarios can be addressed without explicit commitments to further 
metaphysical constraints. What defines the aforementioned family of concepts is the compliance 
with the above ‘agency-formula’, which occupies the root of a conceptual hierarchy that determines 
causal concepts. The levels of abstraction I have used throughout the thesis depend on the pre-set 
purpose of justifying generic causal judgments of the form ‘A causes B’. Less conceptually orientated 
approaches, focusing more on epistemological or ontological issues, might construe the object of 
studies of causation very differently, e.g. the study of causation according to a causal process theory, 
or a mechanistic approach. In these cases, integrating a corresponding interpretation of causation 
into the conceptual family might be more difficult or not feasible at all, but that assessment requires 
another kind of analysis. 
8.2 Final Conclusion and outlook 
The proposition ‘A causes B’ means ‘the occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a 
free agent could bring about the occurrence of B’.  This dissertation is an attempt to defend this 
fundamental claim, and I am convinced that a conceptual reading of the equation is indeed 
plausible. The decisive argument that prioritises agency over causation is the non-circularity of this 
conceptual explanation, and the fact that agency makes sense at least from the first-person 
perspective. 
My argument has conceded some points made by critics against the agency-approach. 
Indeed, the concept of causation given by the agency-approach is to some extent anthropomorphic, 
but not to a degree that would invalidate causal claims not actually involving human agents. It has 
been granted, too, that the above equation yields little information about causation, if the 
manipulability of effects via their causes is the only constraint that can be imposed on causation. 
Seen as a project of pure conceptual analysis, it is hard to make a case for the identity of actions and 
causes. Also, it is difficult to see how we can make sense of more complex causal structures, or of 
causation at token level. 
My project has not been a reductive analysis of causation in terms of agency. However, 
agency inevitably belongs to causation. Agency, seen as a phenomenon, served as the starting point 
of the conceptual reconstruction – but it stayed with the concept of causation throughout. I contend 
that any causal judgment ‘a causes b’, if we press for an explanation of the meaning of that 
judgment, will have to resort to the first-person notion of agency. Interventions require an 
interpretation as action – when we decide to push a button, we do not ‘wipe out equations’, ‘break 
arrows’, or do anything alike. Instead we directly act, exploiting thermodynamic asymmetry. The 
sense of the detour via thermodynamics of action was given by the fact that, without it, the agency-
account would have stayed potentially true, but uninformative, as Hugh Mellor, Wolfgang Spohn, 
and others had noticed. The detour delivered further information about agency, and therefore on 
causation. But the analysis was not meant to fix the secondary intension of our object of 
investigation, vaguely identified via the notion of manipulability. Instead, the thermodynamics of 
actions deliver further information about how we have to evaluate causal structure in our world; it 
therefore delivers information that has to be considered as contingent. One can think of agency that 
is not thermodynamically constrained, and whose concept does not have thermodynamic origins. 
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Arguably, all causal judgments can be thought of as derived from causation in those alternative 
worlds as well. In that sense, the thermodynamic analysis I have given after defending the agency-
approach against the objection of circularity is not different from analyses of causation in terms of 
mechanisms, of modular systems, etc. But the approach that I have taken allows a much more 
logical, step-by-step synthesis of concepts of causation. Since the further constraints on causation 
are contingent, the primary intension of causation as a relation of manipulability seems to remain 
the semantic hard core of causation – it is not a mere symptom of causation. 
The causal concept is therefore based on agency and subjectivity, even if an analysis of its 
grounding seems to show that it is itself embedded in a thermodynamic metaphysical backdrop. To 
ask the binary question of what it means when we say a causes b, if a and b are taken from the 
context of a wider and more encompassing causal model, is a crass turning towards a subjective 
level of abstraction – otherwise one can well work with causal models while avoiding the question of 
spontaneity.  
The specific arguments I have devised in order to vindicate of the ‘agency-formula’, by which 
term I have dubbed Menzies and Price’s identification of causation and agency, constitute the main 
points of this thesis. I could only indicate how different concepts of causation could be 
accommodated into a family of concepts, and where the connection between a concept of causation 
and a level of abstraction as a prior constraint of that concept lies. These questions concern the 
relation between different levels of abstraction for the evaluation of token level cases. Since 
difference-making on type level is the primary constraint that informs our concept of causation, 
which is tied to the strategy the agent needs to act prospectively, there seems to be a conflict 
between type and token level claims that I could not completely solve. It seems to me that more 
empirically informed levels of abstractions are called for, which should take over from more generic 
levels of abstraction.  
I have outlined some parts of what I think of as the web of causal concepts, which is in parts 
a hierarchy, as the last section of this thesis has shown. The position of a causal concept within this 
hierarchy is determined by the number of constraints that the concept satisfies. Some approaches to 
causation start with fundamentally different categories (e.g. mechanisms, counterfactuals, causal 
processes). It might be part of future research projects to work out how the causal concepts these 
different approaches give rise to can be integrated into a more complete conceptual map of 
causation. 
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